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
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Franz Joseph

FRANCIS JOSEPH I.

"History does not teach principles, but prudence."—BURKE.

FRANCIS JOSEPH I.

HIS LIFE AND TIMES

AN ESSAY IN POLITICS

BY

R. P. MAHAFFY

(WITH AN APPENDIX ON RECENT EVENTS)



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PREFACE

THE following pages contain an attempt to summarise the events of the life of the oldest, and in one sense, the most important of European sovereigns, and to pronounce a fair judgment as to the part which he has played in the history of his country. The brevity of this book shows at once that a great deal has been left out; and it contains little that is not familiar to those who have followed the story of Austria-Hungary in the last fifty years. I intended to publish it on or about December 2, 1908, when the Emperor-King should have been sixty years on the throne; and I hoped that the occurrence of that anniversary would have given it a chance of being read. Since the book was written, events have occurred in Europe which have directed English attention in an unusual degree to Austria-Hungary. These events have not made it

necessary to alter or omit anything ; indeed they are to a great extent explained by the facts in this book and by the view which is presented of the life and work of the Emperor-King. In order to bring it up to date, an appendix on recent events has been written. This addition was, however, not composed in the leisure of the Long Vacation as was the case with the others, and may show signs of hasty preparation. Yet I hope it will serve to correct the false impressions which are abroad in this country as to the Emperor-King's recent action.

My first acquaintance with Austria-Hungary was made in 1889, when I had just left school ; but in 1894 I went to Hungary on a commission for a friend, the late Mr. J. G. V. Porter of Belleisle, in the County Fermanagh, who desired to have a report on the Hungarian Constitution. I was at Budapest in the summer of 1894, when the Civil Marriage crisis was at its height, and met there many of the leading men in Hungary, from whom I learnt what it would be hard to learn from books. In 1896 I again visited Austria-Hungary as the correspondent of a London

newspaper. In both years I had occasion to travel about the country, and saw a good deal of it. The friendships then made have been interrupted in some cases by death. Those which have been preserved have enabled me to hear frequently from a country which, for politicians, is the most interesting in Europe.

It is difficult to write a book which necessarily deals with many matters of controversy without taking a side. The view presented in the following pages is on the whole favourable to the Magyars and their claims, in the past, if not in the present. I have no doubt that the view held by the Hungarians, for which they fought nobly in 1849, and which received a striking vindication in 1867, was the right one; but I am aware that some people think otherwise, and regret that the Compromise of 1867 was ever concluded. In modern times the Hungarians have advanced claims which cannot be fully satisfied without grave danger to the military strength of the monarchy. Moreover, they are constantly charged with needless persistence in the use of their language in Hungary. Critics ask why they could not have been content to keep the German

language which they had in 1867, and which is one of the great languages of the world. I do not think that it was possible for the Hungarian leaders of 1867 to say, "Now that the oppression for which German stood is gone, we will keep German and not revive Magyar." Such a course would in theory have been the best ; but in such matters the best course is often impracticable. On the other hand, I think that the Hungarian leaders of to-day ought not to persist in a policy which must lead to the division and weakness in the army of the monarchy ; and I do not believe that, in the future, their fellow-countrymen would think worse of them if they abstained from the full prosecution of their claims. I do not give this opinion without some diffidence, for I know it is contrary to the view held by many prominent men in Hungary. But they must remember that compromise has been of good service to them in the past. If their predecessors had held out for the maximum of concession, Hungary would not now be what she is.

I owe much more than formal thanks to Dr. Friedjung's admirable, if somewhat elaborate,

books on Austria, which are referred to in the notes; to M. Eisenmann's *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois*, and to the same author's excellent chapters in Lavissee and Rambaud's *Histoire Générale*. Miss Arnold Forster's *Life of Francis Deák*, M. Chéradame's *L'Autriche*, etc., and Mr. Stillman's *Union of Italy* have also been freely used. For the Hungarian side of the question I have relied more on my own intimacy with Hungarians and their views, and on long friendship with Hungarian politicians, than on any other source. The best books on this side are in Magyar, of which I know very little. It is fortunate that the Hungarians are such good linguists that anybody who knows French and German can talk freely with them.

I have not, in the following pages, said anything about the Emperor-King's private life; and I have purposely avoided reference to family events and to the domestic misfortunes with which he has been afflicted. Such information as I have on these matters is, I need hardly say, not at first hand, and I think it undesirable that, in topics of the kind, authors should pretend to a knowledge

which they do not possess. I am sorry to feel that the deliberate omission of the personal element will lose this book some friends amongst readers who desire chiefly to know which is the favourite soup of this or that sovereign, and whether he prefers brown eyes or blue. At all events no one will read it under any misunderstanding on this point.

I have abstained from pedantic adherence to the terms "Emperor-King" and "Austria-Hungary." The position of affairs is now such that readers no longer need to be constantly reminded of the absolute legal equality between the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg and the Kingdom of St. Stephen.

INNER TEMPLE,
November 4, 1908.

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CHAPTER I

1848-1851

Austria in 1848—Failure of the Vienna Revolution—Parentage and Education of Francis Joseph—The Constitution of 1849—Revolt in Hungary—Világos—Novara—Olmütz.

It is not easy for us, with the Austria of to-day before us, to realise what manner of state, or system of states, was the Austria of December 1848. The political condition of the people has undergone vast changes, greater, in some ways, than any which have come to pass elsewhere in Europe. A new people, the Austro-Hungarian people, is being formed. The map of the country is wholly altered. New races, scarcely heard of in 1848, rise into prominence. New territories have been opened to progress. New cities have sprung up; and old cities have put on the vesture of youth. A new religious liberty, unknown in 1848, is abroad in the land. These changes make it hard for us to place ourselves, in imagination, in the Vienna of 1848—the old Vienna, still

contained within that circular rampart which is now beneath the foundations of the most stately street in Europe. Yet one person in Vienna is the same as in 1848. It was in December of that eventful year that at Olmütz, the old northern capital of Moravia, Francis Joseph, the present Emperor, and King of Hungary, ascended the tottering throne which had been left vacant by the abdication of his uncle. His personality connects the modern Austria with that of the old *régime*. He was brought up in the school of Metternich, and has lived to see the most modern type of democracy on foot in his dominions. He has conquered or outlived revolution, survived defeat, learnt by mistakes, surmounted difficulties, and profited by adversity. He has borne family sorrows with admirable courage, and sustained without failure a public part such as few men have taken in the history of their country. The present essay is an attempt to describe some of the most interesting events of his reign; and to show how the difficulties which beset him have been met.

In December 1848 the revolution which broke out in Vienna during the spring of that year had been crushed; and in Italy the attempt of the Italian nation to shake off Austrian

patronage had for the moment failed. Italy and Austria had taken fire in the spring of the year after the outbreak of the February revolution in Paris. Indeed, Italy had taken the lead in revolution ; for it was in the first days of 1848 that the Austrian officers who were smoking in the streets of Milan were attacked by the mob because the consumption of tobacco fed the exchequer of the Hapsburg. In Italy, and also in Hungary, the revolutionary movement was founded on two distinct ideas, democracy and nationality. In England and France political revolutions have not usually been complicated by the rivalry between dominant and obedient races. In the Austria of 1848 they were so ; and it is possible that they may be so also in the future. Since 1815 the Hapsburgs had been practically in undisturbed possession of the miscellaneous collection of kingdoms, principalities, and powers which had from time to time been brought into their possession by conquest, diplomacy, or marriage. Known since the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 as "Emperor of Austria," the chief of the Hapsburgs was Archduke, King, or Count of Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Carniola and Carinthia, the Tyrol, Trieste, Dalmatia, and the other territories comprised in the modern omnibus name

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“Austria.” He was King of Hungary by virtue of the acceptance (in 1723) by the Hungarian Parliament of the Pragmatic Sanction—the edict by which the last of the old male line of the Hapsburgs declared that he should be succeeded by his daughter Maria Theresa. He was President of the German Confederation, a loosely-built structure of thirty-nine German states which were pledged not to pursue divergent foreign policies and to send delegates to a Congress at Frankfurt. He was King of Lombardy and Venetia, and his soldiers garrisoned the two noblest cities of northern Italy. In Parma, Naples and Sicily, petty sovereigns reigned who, whilst they would tolerate no liberty in others, were themselves docile subjects of the Imperial Court of Vienna. In two other Italian states (Tuscany and Modena) ruled grand dukes who were Hapsburg princes and who relied on Austria for support against their Italian subjects. Such a position could only last on sufferance. The Tory advisers of Francis Joseph’s two predecessors, Francis and Ferdinand, knew well that concessions either to nationalism or to democracy could not be made without destroying the whole fabric of the empire. It is a mistake to suppose that Metternich, the chief of these advisers, was by nature or

preference a champion of absolutism. He was merely a cautious Conservative, who saw that the movements which culminated in 1848 spelt destruction for the Austria of his time.

It was with these views that he committed the education of the young Archduke Francis Joseph to the Marquis de Bombelles, the son of a French refugee, and a strong Conservative, and to the Abbé Rauscher, a Tory cleric of the old school. The Archduke's father, Francis Charles, was a person of no great significance. On the other hand, his mother, the Archduchess Sophie, daughter of King Max of Bavaria, was a keen politician, and entertained views much in advance of the orthodox Hapsburg creed. She had considerable differences with her friend, Prince Metternich, as to the education of the young Prince. Frightened by the excesses of 1848 she became in that year a Tory of the Tories, but during the period before the revolution, when Francis Joseph was growing up, she inclined towards Liberalism. Some of his subordinate tutors, too, were of moderate views; so that when, in December 1848, the new Emperor acceded, he came to the throne with the natural indecision of a boy of eighteen uncorrected by any really consistent education. He was well trained as a soldier,

and had served in the earlier part of the war of '48 in Italy with Radetzky's army, coming under the fire of the Piedmontese in the summer campaign. He was now suddenly called upon to take command in an Empire which had never been united in anything but name and sovereignty. In the year of his accession, it was shaken by no less than three revolutions.

In Vienna the insurrection of March led to the dismissal of Metternich, and late in the spring the Emperor Ferdinand had promised a parliamentary constitution. One concession after another was given through the following months until, on the eve of the assembly of Austria's first Parliament, the Emperor and his family deserted the capital and retired to safer quarters at Innsbrück. In his absence his ministers agreed to most of the demands of the insurgent populace, and on July 22 the Parliament in Vienna was convened. A few of the principal grievances of the people were swept away by rapid legislation, but differences of opinion soon appeared in the assembly, which was composed partly of representatives of the German *bourgeoisie* and partly of those of the peasantry, the majority of whom were of Slavonic race. It soon became clear that, if the majority were to have their way, the German supremacy in Austria would cease;

but, in fact, the peasant deputies were little disposed for a stand-up fight with the Crown. They voted for the equality of all citizens before the law, and for the abolition of feudal dues and jurisdictions; but, these points gained, they were not the least interested in theoretical discussions on constitutional law or in the resistance to which such discussions might lead. Meantime the Crown had commenced that remarkable series of successes by which it regained all it had lost in the early part of the year, and which ended in the temporary triumph of Francis Joseph over the democrats of '48. On July 25th, Marshal Radetzky defeated Charles Albert of Sardinia at Custoza, whilst in June Prince Windischgrätz, the military governor of Prag, had stamped out the Liberal and Czech movement in the capital of Bohemia. On October 7th, the Emperor Ferdinand, who had returned from Innsbrück to Schönbrunn, near Vienna, late in the summer, left the capital again and withdrew to Olmütz. Windischgrätz and his army were at once let loose upon Vienna. As there was no organisation in the insurgent force, the Imperial general had no difficulty in occupying it (October 31).

The fall of Vienna was a notable victory for reaction, and left the Hapsburgs—so far as Austria proper was concerned—free to deal

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as they thought best with the demand for a constitution. The Imperial ministers, headed by Prince Felix Schwartzberg, were in no mood to make large concessions to democracy, but they felt that it was impossible to preserve the old absolutist *régime*. Accordingly, at the end of September, the Austrian Prime Minister issued a manifesto in which he promised that a constitution should be granted within the Emperor's hereditary estates. Whilst its terms were being discussed the Austrian Parliament was removed by Imperial decree from Vienna, and ordered to assemble at Kremsier, a small town in Moravia, where, it was thought, the deputies would not be amenable to the democratic influences which were at work in the capital. Whilst the members of the rusticated Reichsrath were awaiting the decision of the cabinet, astounding news was brought to them. The Emperor Ferdinand had abdicated, his brother the Archduke Francis Charles had waived his right to succeed, and the Crown had devolved upon the youthful Archduke Francis Joseph, who had been crowned at Olmütz on December 2nd.

The accession of the young Archduke was quite legal in Austria, where the Imperial dynasty were under no obligations of law and could make their own arrangements. But in

Hungary the the royal family were bound by certain statutes passed in 1723, and the Hungarians asserted that the spirit of these laws had not been respected when the Archduke Francis Joseph was called to the throne. Although the Acts of 1723 contain no provision as to abdication, the Magyars held that the Emperor Ferdinand could not abdicate in Hungary, and that his brother could not waive his rights, without the assent of the Hungarian Parliament; and that no Emperor of Austria could be King of Hungary till he had been crowned at Pesth, and signed the declaration which pledged him to observe the laws of the kingdom of St. Stephen. They therefore refused to recognise Francis Joseph as King of Hungary.

It is difficult to agree with the Hungarian contention that the Emperor had no right to abdicate, or the Archduke Francis Charles to waive his rights. But the Magyars were on firmer ground when they said that Francis Joseph was not King till he had been crowned with the Crown of St. Stephen. His claim to the throne of Hungary was a good one, but it was subject to his doing certain things; and the first act of his reign showed that he did not intend to do them. This act was the issue of a liberal proclamation in which he promised

to take his subjects into partnership in the government of his country; but the proclamation made no mention of the independent rights of Hungary, and contained an implied repudiation of them. "We are convinced," it said, "of the necessity and value of free institutions, and enter with confidence on the path of a prosperous reformation of the monarchy. On the basis of true liberty, on the basis of the equality of rights of all our people, and the equality of all citizens before the law, and on the basis of their equally partaking in legislation and representation, the country will rise to its ancient grandeur. . . . Jealous of the glory of the Crown, and resolved to maintain its privileges uncurtailed, but ready to share our privileges with the representatives of our people, we hope, by the assistance of God and the co-operation of our people, to succeed in uniting all the countries and tribes of the Monarchy into *one integral state*." It was to the words "one integral state" that the Hungarians objected.

In pursuance of these promises the Emperor and his advisers set to work to prepare a constitution for Austria and Hungary. This constitution was promulgated on March 4, 1849. It was of a moderate type, and would

have set up for Austria and Hungary a Parliament about as democratic as the English Parliament of the day. The constitution for Austria was followed shortly afterwards by separate constitutions for each of the provinces, which were to possess diets endowed with the right of sending members to the central Parliament. As, however, the nomination of the first diets rested with the Emperor, it was clear that the so-called constitution gave no guarantee whatever of popular control. Two things also may be said about it: first, that it was designed to include Hungary, and to supersede the Hungarian constitution; secondly, that the Emperor did not intend to allow the other states of Germany to come into the new and Parliamentary Austria. The inclusion of Hungary in a unitary Austrian state was a thing to which the Magyars would never submit. The exclusion of the South German states was a great disappointment to those German Liberals who had hoped to arrange for a democratic Parliament for the whole of Germany.

The constitution of March 1849 was never taken seriously by its authors, but it served the young Emperor and his advisers to keep things quiet at home until they had vanquished

their enemies in Hungary, Italy, and Germany. Hungary was subjugated before the end of 1849, and in Italy Marshal Radetzky practically put an end to all popular movements by his victory over Charles Albert and his Sardinian troops at Novara (March 23, 1849). It was not till the end of 1850 that Austria succeeded in securing her place in Germany, and re-establishing the old constitution of the German Federation as it had existed since 1815. So soon as this was done, there was no further reason for keeping up the semblance of a constitution in Austria. On the last day of 1851, a few weeks after Napoleon III.'s successful *coup d'état* in Paris, the Emperor, by simple edict, abrogated the constitution of March. Thus Parliamentary institutions in his Austrian dominions came to an abrupt and humiliating end.

In abrogating the constitution of 1849 the Emperor made a mistake. He was influenced in doing so by his nearest advisers, but chiefly by Prince Felix Schwartzenberg, his reactionary Prime Minister, and by Alexander Bach, Minister of the Interior, who in the next ten years was to become his constant guide in the management of domestic affairs. Had the Parliament of 1849 survived, it would have fallen into the hands of a middle-class majority,

and would probably have made for unity in Austria. It is not likely that Hungary would ever have sent members to the Austrian Parliament, but Liberal feelings would have been conciliated by its existence, and the difficulties which Austria could not for ever stave off would have been fairly faced. In Italy and Prussia Parliamentary institutions made for unity, and this might also have been so fifty years ago in Austria. But the Emperor was in the hands either of aristocratic advisers, who hated the idea of parting with any of their privileges to a middle-class legislature, or of upstarts like Bach—useful tools, whose consciences, as well as their industry, could be purchased. And so in 1851 we find the Emperor, advised by Schwartzenberg and Bach, settling down to a careful and consistent attempt to govern the country from their offices at Vienna, with no other ultimate support than the loyal army.

In Hungary the Emperor's accession or usurpation—for it was legally no better than that—led to a crisis which made civil war inevitable. The House of Hapsburg-Lorraine only reigned, and to this day only reigns, in the kingdom of St. Stephen by virtue of the three first statutes of the year 1723.

These Acts¹ provided that the Hungarian Crown should, on the failure of male heirs to the Emperor Charles VI., pass to his daughter and her heirs male, if Roman Catholics, or, failing them, to the male and Catholic heirs of his predecessors, the Emperors Leopold I. and Joseph. But they confirmed also all the laws and approved customs of Hungary, the most important of which was the right to elect and crown their own kings, and to compel the new king to swear to respect the liberties of the kingdom. The right to crown was first conceded to Stephen, King of Hungary, by Pope Sylvester II. in the year 1000, as a reward for his having converted great numbers of his subjects to Christianity; and the famous Crown of St. Stephen, which is still preserved in the Castle at Buda, is, in part at least, the actual Crown then sent by Sylvester II. to the Hungarian prince.² This Crown was always treasured as an emblem of Magyar liberty and of the

¹ They will be found in Dumont's *Corps Diplomatique*, vol. viii. Part II. at p. 52.

² Thus Dr. Vámbéry in his *Hungary* ("Story of the Nations," 1887); but there is now, I believe, some doubt as to whether any part of the Crown is as old as 1000 A.D. This wonderful relic is preserved in a case in the Castle of Buda, and guarded by two hereditary guardians, who are of the noblest Hungarian families. The Crown may not be taken out of its case without an Act of Parliament; but such an Act was passed at the time of the Hungarian millennial celebrations. I was at Budapest in April and May 1896, and had an opportunity of examining the Crown with care. See Appendix B.

right to have kings who were independent of the Holy Roman Emperor. It may be urged that the Hungarian rights were swept away and destroyed by the Turkish occupation (1526-1683) of Hungary, that when the Hapsburgs recovered the country they were freed from all obligations, and that the right of the Hapsburgs to hereditary succession in Hungary was admitted by the Hungarian Diet in 1687. Yet, even if this be so, it must be remembered that the Diet of 1687 only accepted the male line of the Hapsburgs; and that their right to make terms on accepting the female line was fully admitted by Charles VI. in 1723. During the reign of Maria Theresa there was no reason for the Hungarians to reassert their right, but the centralising tendencies of her son, Joseph II. (1765-1790), aroused their suspicions. He was never crowned in Hungary, and never recognised as king by the Magyars. When in 1790 Leopold II. came to the throne, they obtained a full recognition of their complete independence of Austria and their right to their constitution. This being so, it is difficult to agree with disputants who urge that the decree of 1687 had abolished the right of the Hungarians to have their kings crowned at Budapest before they assumed the royal

prerogative. And even if it be admitted that the reigning Hapsburg prince, whoever he may be, is *ipso facto* King of Hungary, he is clearly bound by the Acts of 1723 and 1790 to respect the country's institutions, the most important of which was the Diet at Budapest. It is not too much to say that the attempt of the Emperor Francis Joseph to exercise royal rights in Hungary without having been crowned was unlawful; and that the issue of the constitution of March 1849, which simply ignored the rights of Hungary, was a violent attempt to destroy rights which had been long in existence, and which his ancestors had freely admitted. If in such a case insurrection was not justified, it can never be so.

During the early part of the nineteenth century the Hungarian Diet had rarely been convened, but a spirit of independence which has distinguished the country for many centuries was alive. It had been fostered by a number of aristocratic leaders, and also by men of the people who were possessed of more or less Radical views. In 1847 the Diet met at Pressburg, on the frontier between Austria and Hungary, and the national demands were stated in a programme drawn up by Francis Deák, the moderate Liberal

leader, and a lawyer of the first ability. He asked for a guarantee that Parliament should meet annually, and should be elected not by the old county assemblies but on a £30 franchise, that the nobles should no longer be free from taxation, that feudal dues should be abolished, that judges be appointed for life, and that the King of Hungary (who was also Emperor of Austria) should nominate a ministry for Hungary which should be responsible to the Hungarian Parliament. Early in April 1848 the Emperor Ferdinand appeared in state at Pressburg and granted all these demands. He also agreed to the complete union of Hungary with Transylvania, a south-eastern province of the kingdom of St. Stephen, which had long claimed local independence. These admissions were a great triumph for the Magyar race. They gave to Hungary the position which she holds to-day, and made her a state of equal rights with Austria. Consequently they aroused the jealousy of the Slavonic populations throughout the whole Hapsburg territory. There, every concession made to the Magyars was used as a precedent by weaker nationalities.

Ferdinand began to intrigue with these malcontents, especially with the Croats, whose invasion of Hungary he secretly favoured.

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So soon as he heard of the success of his arms in Italy he refused to assent to certain laws passed by the Hungarian Parliament in 1848 with regard to the organisation of the Hungarian army. This refusal was followed by evasive answers to the Hungarian demands as to the relations of the Emperor with the Croat leaders. In the meantime Jellachich, the Ban of Croatia, who had raised a considerable Croat army, had invaded Hungary at the end of July. Shortly before his abdication Ferdinand declared the Hungarian Parliament closed (September 9), and named the Croat invader as commander-in-chief of the troops in Hungary, and Viceroy of the kingdom. Outvoted by his own loyal subjects, and unable to reduce them to obedience, he sought to conquer them by calling in the Slavs to his help. His action may justly be compared to the action of Charles I. of England, who, unable to defeat the English Republicans of 1642, endeavoured to overpower them by the help of Irish and Scottish soldiers, offering their nationalities a high reward if they would assist him in his English warfare. The policy of Ferdinand was, indeed, the very policy which, just two centuries before, had brought a king of England to the scaffold at Whitehall.

Thus, when Francis Joseph came to the

throne in Austria he found in Hungary a heritage of tyranny and civil war. The new Emperor's accession as King of Hungary was contrary to law, and the Magyars were justified in refusing to recognise it. The Austrians had an army of some 150,000 men, including the Croats and other Slavonic insurgents who had risen in southern Hungary against Magyar rule. The Magyars could not put more than 100,000 men into the field, and at first their forces were unable to make headway against the motley army of the Hapsburg usurper. The tide of Austrian success flowed until February 1849, when Dembinski, a Polish general who had been given command by Kossuth, was defeated at Kapolna (February 26th). This defeat led to the appointment of Colonel Görgei, a young Hungarian officer who had served in the Austrian army, to command the Magyar forces. Görgei turned out to be a strategist of the highest merit, and he was in addition a man for whom his soldiers fought with a bravery that deeply stirred the heart of Western Europe. The Hungarians gained a series of successes which, in a short time, brought the Hapsburg monarch to his knees. Late in April 1849, though he could now command the regiments whom his victories in Italy

had set free, he was compelled to beg Russia to intervene in Hungary. The Hungarian Government had in the meantime (April 14) declared the Hapsburgs banished from Hungary for ever as traitors to her liberty and constitution. // This was a very strong step, taken at Kossuth's instigation. The Hungarian nobility and many of the generals, including Görgei, objected to it. One should remember that it was not taken until after the Emperor Francis Joseph had promulgated the Austrian constitution of March 1849. This constitution aimed at enveloping Hungary in a "great Austria," and involved an abrogation of her constitution. As Francis Joseph had assumed the regal authority without having been crowned, and as one of his first acts was to abrogate liberties which his predecessors had sworn to respect, it cannot be said that the decree of banishment was without justification. //

It is not my object to follow at length the details of the war *à outrance* which followed (April—September 1849). The intervention of Russia was resented abroad. In England and Turkey, where love of liberty or affinity of race had made many friends for Hungary, feeling ran high against the Austrians. "I believe," said Lord Palmerston on a

famous occasion, "I believe that in this war between Austria and Hungary there are enlisted on the side of Hungary the hearts and souls of the whole people of that country. . . . Such a contest is most painful to behold, as, whatever may be the result, Austria cannot but be weakened. If the Hungarians should be successful, and their success should end in the entire separation of Hungary from Austria, it is impossible not to see that this will be such a dismemberment of the Austrian Empire as will prevent Austria from continuing to occupy the great position she has hitherto held among European powers. If, on the other hand, the war being fought out to the uttermost, Hungary should, by superior forces, be utterly crushed, Austria in that battle will have crushed her own right arm! Every field that is laid waste is an Austrian resource destroyed. Every man who perishes upon the field among the Hungarian ranks is an Austrian soldier deducted from the defensive forces of the Empire."¹

But though Lord Palmerston echoed the opinion of the majority of Englishmen, Kossuth never succeeded in bringing about a counter-intervention, and with Russia and the Hapsburgs against them, the Magyars were at

¹ House of Commons, July 21, 1849.

length outnumbered and crushed. Kossuth went into exile, and afterwards, in England and America, excited foreign audiences to enthusiasm by his eloquent vindication of Hungarian rights. Görgei, invested with supreme powers, surrendered at Világos (August 13) with 23,000 men; yet it was not to the Austrian Haynau, but to the Russian general Paskievitch, that he handed his sword. At the end of September the last of the Hungarian strongholds, Komorn, surrendered with the honours of war. The laws of 1848 and the fundamental charters of Hungarian liberty were swept away, and, in October 1849, the Emperor Francis Joseph declared the ancient constitution of Hungary abolished. For seventeen years the ancient kingdom of St. Stephen became a subjugated province of Austria.

Victory over Hungary had thus been obtained, but only by the help of Russian troops and of the Croat levies, who were of Slavonic race. We shall see hereafter how great a price Francis Joseph had to pay for Russian help. The surrender at Világos occurred only a few days before the surrender of Venice to Radetzky, and as that event brings the revolutionary period in Italy to a close, we turn for a moment to Italian affairs. There

we find a story less discreditable to Austria than that which is on record in Hungary, but terminating, like the Hungarian story, in the triumph of absolutism and reaction over nationality and progress. At the commencement of 1848 the Hapsburgs were kings of Lombardy and Venetia, and owned Northern Italy from the Adriatic and the northern frontier to the Ticino and the Po. Their governors and garrisons were in Venice, in Milan, and their magistrates and tax-gatherers dispensed justice and collected revenue. In Parma and Modena Hapsburg or Bourbon princes ruled absolutely, and in Tuscany the Grand Duke Leopold, a direct descendant of Maria Theresa, was a respectful client of the Austrian Court. In Rome, Pope Pius IX., elected in 1846 by French influence, had already granted limited liberties to the populace. In Tuscany, where the Duke held mildly Liberal views, some concessions had been made, and the same thing had occurred in Piedmont, where the House of Savoy, the only national dynasty in Italy, ruled in the person of Charles Albert. In Naples and Sicily, on the other hand, Ferdinand II., of the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons, had refused all concessions.

At the commencement of 1848 the infection

of democracy spread from Paris and Vienna to Italy, and violence took the place of orderly reform. The revolution broke out first at the extremes of Italy, Palermo and Milan, and in Palermo it was successful. King Ferdinand was compelled to promise a constitution in February, and during the spring the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King of Piedmont, and the Pope followed suit. In March the Austrian governors were driven from Venice and Milan, and Marshal Radetzky, who commanded the Austrian army, was compelled to retire within the sheltering fortresses of the Quadrilateral. When on March 23 the Venetian Republic was established it might almost be said that Austria had nothing left in Italy but the ground on which her soldiers stood.

But the Italian insurrections of 1848 were isolated events, caused by local circumstances in each of the little states. The Unionist idea had gained scarcely any ground. But we see a first indication of such an idea in the invitation extended by the Milanese to the King of Savoy to cross the frontier and help them in their struggle against the Hapsburgs. The King of Savoy accepted the invitation. Unlike the weak King of Prussia, he was willing to answer the call for leadership in Italy; but, though willing, he was not able to play his

part. His action estranged Pius IX., who feared the destruction of Austria, the strongest Catholic power in Europe; and the support of the Pope, as temporal prince, was lost to the new Italian cause. The King of Naples in May succeeded in restoring his power by a counter-revolution, and though this success was used, as in Prussia, with moderation, Naples gave no official help to the Savoyard king. With Rome and Naples neutral, the Austrian general was able to meet and defeat the forces which Turin, Milan, and Venice raised against him. Charles Albert was a bad general, and hesitated to attack the old Austrian marshal, whose forces were, in May and June 1849, gradually recruited from southern Austria. Waiting till his reinforcements gave him an army of 120,000 men, Radetzky attacked the Italians at Custozza on 24th July. The regular regiments of the Hapsburgs easily defeated the Italian force, which consisted largely of undisciplined enthusiasts, and Charles Albert was driven back upon Milan. Unable to defend it, he signed, on August 9, an armistice which reassured the Imperial Government of its prestige and possessions in Northern Italy.

The young Archduke Francis Joseph served in this brief campaign, and it was shortly

before its close that he was recalled to Austria to succeed his uncle on the Hapsburg throne. Before his accession, therefore, he had seen his arms victorious in Italy, and felt, no doubt, that he could defeat the ill-united forces of the Italian democrats. The revolution was not, however, ended by the battle of Custoza. Venice was not daunted by it, and, refusing to acknowledge Hapsburg authority, prepared for defence. In the autumn the Grand Duke of Tuscany was compelled to accept popular ministers, and Pope Pius IX. was driven to make concessions to the Romans which he regarded as incompatible with his temporal and spiritual authority. He retired to Gaeta in November to await restoration at the hands of Austrian soldiers.

In February 1849 republics were proclaimed in the Papal States and Tuscany, and two democratic governments were thus established between autocratic Austria and autocratic Naples. The year 1849 saw the isolated movements of 1848 replaced by a general movement for the expulsion of the Austrians and union of Italy. But the German garrison in Lombardy was still more than strong enough to maintain the sovereignty of Francis Joseph. On March 12, the King of Sardinia, coerced by no democratic fury but by a genuine out-

burst of anti-Austrian enthusiasm, denounced the armistice of August 1848, and, a week later, crossed the frontier of Lombardy. He found Radetzky and his army more than ready for him. The Italian generalship was poor and the Italian soldiery not to compare as a fighting force with the Austrian troops. On the 23rd, after an obstinate fight near Novara, the Italians retired in disorder and could not be rallied. The disappointed King of Sardinia abdicated on the morrow of defeat. It was left to the new king, Victor Emanuel, to sign with the old Austrian general an armistice which finally restored the Hapsburg power in Northern Italy.

The defeat of Charles Albert was followed by a rapid restoration of autocracy all over the peninsula. The last stronghold of Liberalism, Venice, surrendered to a Polish general of the Austrian Emperor on 27th August 1849. The victory of Francis Joseph was complete. His army had proved loyal. Moreover it had met in Italy a race whose fighting qualities were inferior to those of the Magyars.

Whilst the Austrian Government was engaged in Italy and Hungary, the politics of non-Austrian Germany passed through a critical phase. Both in Prussia and in Germany at large a movement in favour of constitutional

government took place early in 1848. In Prussia the weak king Frederick William IV. vacillated between the policy of resistance and that of riding to popularity on the wave which he could not stem. In Germany at large the little princes, thirty-seven in all, were frightened by a movement which threatened their thrones and privileges. In all matters of importance they had long looked to Austria for leadership, and had followed Metternich and the Austrian statesmen, who controlled the Federal Council at Frankfort—though not without occasional jealousies and backsliding. In 1848 these princes were left without Austrian guidance, for Austria was too busy elsewhere to attend to German affairs. When, therefore, the King of Prussia promised to give the Prussians a constitution, and declared that he would take the lead in a reform movement in Germany, the Emperor Ferdinand answered him with a declaration which simply reserved all Austria's rights. Austria was not represented at the preliminary Parliament which met at Frankfort in March 1848 to discuss a new constitution; yet when a scheme of election had been devised and a full German Parliament assembled at Frankfort in May, the Archduke John, a popular prince and brother of the Emperor Ferdinand, secured

election as *Reichsverweser* or administrator of the Empire. The habit of submission to Austria was too strong to be shaken off, and the Archduke, assisted by an able Austrophile minister, Baron Schmerling, used his position to delay all definite reform until Austria should again be free to take up her old position in Germany. Weeks and months were spent in academic discussion. The revolutionary fires died down and the championship of progress was left to the professors and lawyers in the assembly—the very last people in the world to work a revolution with success.

The majority of these were in favour of separating Germany and Austria, and of entrusting the control of a Federation in North Germany to a hereditary emperor—the policy, in fact, which Bismarck realised in 1871. At the end of March 1849 the Parliament passed resolutions to this effect, and immediately elected the King of Prussia Emperor of Germany. This step might have been a great blow to Austria, more especially as many of her own representatives voted in the majority; but the King of Prussia, Frederick William IV., was not brave enough to accept the crown which was thus offered him. He disliked arranging matters without the assent of his Austrian cousin, and he objected to becoming an

Emperor by popular election. The proffered crown was refused, the position of the Frankfort Parliament stultified, and Germany plunged again into confusion from which she did not emerge for two years. Meantime the new Emperor at Vienna, whose advisers knew exactly what they wanted, proceeded to the conquest of Hungary, and for the present contented themselves with refusing to join in any German union in which Prussia had the leadership. When Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony tried to take up the tangled threads and work them into some fabric of Government they found no support among the lesser princes, who were ever jealous of Prussian ascendancy, whilst Francis Joseph simply opposed. In September 1849 Prince Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Premier, induced the Prussian Government to sign what was called an *Interim*—a treaty by which it was agreed that Austria and Prussia should direct the common affairs of Germany until some permanent arrangement could be made. This treaty, which was signed at the moment of the close of the struggle in Hungary, marks the re-entry of Austria upon the stage of German politics. Frederick William seems to have thought it would lead to the peaceful preparation of a reformed German constitution ;

but Francis Joseph and his advisers, now free to follow the path of reaction, had different views. In March 1850, the new German Parliament reassembled at Erfurt, but, with Austria in opposition and Prussia stupidly bound to Austria, nothing could be done. In April, Schwartzenberg sent a circular to the German Governments inviting them to come to Vienna to consider what should be done when the Austro-Prussian *interim* agreement expired, and he was now strong enough to send a threatening despatch to Prussia. It meant that unless Frederick William IV. would consent to resume his place in the old framework of Germany, he must be prepared for war. In May 1850 the old-fashioned Diet of the German Confederation resumed its sittings, and though very few states sent delegates, it was in September declared to be properly constituted. In October, Francis Joseph, accompanied by his Prime Minister, had personal interviews with the Czar Nicholas at Warsaw, and with the Kings of Würtemberg and Bavaria in Switzerland. He found all three sovereigns ready to support him against Prussia. "I am an old soldier," said King William of Würtemberg, "and a man of few words. It is enough for me to say that I shall obey my Emperor's orders, wherever

he bids me march." "With such allies," replied Francis Joseph, "I fear no enemy."

The Austrian Emperor was now as strong as ever, and his army, freed from all distractions, was ready to march to Berlin. The final episodes of the story were complicated by difficulties in Hesse. There Austrian and Bavarian troops, at the orders of the revived German Federal Council at Frankfort, had intervened to support a mean and tyrannous prince against the successful efforts of his subjects. The Hessians refused to pay taxes which had not been legally sanctioned, and the King of Prussia had sent some troops into Hessian territory to help the malcontent taxpayers against their ruler. Frederick William protested against the presence of Austrian troops in Hesse, which was, no doubt, very far north in Germany, and denied that the revived Council, whose emissaries they were, had any proper authority. For a moment the Prussian and the Federal troops faced one another in the Hessian territory, and there was urgent danger of the outbreak of a war which would have anticipated the Austro-Prussian campaign of 1866. But Prussia was not strong enough to maintain her attitude in the face of threats of Austrian invasion and Russian admonitions. On

2nd November a conciliatory note was sent from Berlin to Vienna, and Radowitz, the Prussian Nationalist minister, resigned. He had anticipated the policy of Bismarck in trying to exclude Austria from North Germany, but he was before his time. Moltke had not yet reorganised the Prussian army or taught Europe the meaning of a nation in arms, and armed with modern weapons. Austria had an army which had, after a fashion, been victorious in Hungary and Italy, and was ready to fight. The little German states were timid, and would not be drawn into concerted action against her. Russia, the dominant Power in Continental Europe, was eager to put down all Nationalist movements. Their success could not but lead to the revival, in Poland and elsewhere, of questions which she dared not face. And so when, in November 1850, Prince Schwartzberg demanded that the Prussian troops should give way to the Federal forces in Hesse, and requested an answer in forty-eight hours, the Prussian Government yielded. Terms were arranged at Olmütz between Schwartzberg, who went thither at the end of the month, and the Prussian minister, Manteuffel. The Prussians bound themselves not to oppose the Federal force in Hesse, and to put their army on a

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peace footing, whilst in exchange they got only an undertaking that a conference should meet at Dresden to consider the future of Germany. The conference met shortly afterwards, but did nothing. In the summer of 1851 the old-fashioned German Diet resumed regular sittings.

Thus, after three years of warfare and of complicated negotiation, Francis Joseph found himself on the throne of his forefathers triumphant over the great revolution of 1848. His position in Italy was saved by the genius of Radetzky and by disunion amongst the Italian Liberals, who did not yet fully realise that the expulsion of the Hapsburg and the union of Italy were but one single cause. In Germany he had won a victory without bloodshed simply because Prussia was not yet ready to take the lead. Count Bismarck was already in the Prussian Diet in 1850, and consented to the humiliation of Olmütz much as Cromwell consented to the first payment of ship-money in England. In the House he defended the Olmütz treaty. "The honour of our army," he coldly said, "does not require that we should play the part of Don Quixote in Germany." In Hungary the young Emperor had met a more determined opposition than elsewhere. He had conquered only at a serious cost—

but he had conquered. No young sovereign has ever been in such a position as the youthful ruler of the Hapsburg territories at the end of 1851. The traditions on which he had been nursed, and which in 1848 seemed to be broken for ever, had been vindicated. The democrats had been vanquished. His authority, direct or indirect, stretched from Kiel to Syracuse, and from Belgrade to the Rhine. Even in France, where the revolution had upset a throne, a new Emperor had established himself by a successful *coup d'état*. With his trusted Schwartzenberg to advise him, his clever mother to give her experience, and, above all, a faithful and efficient army, Francis Joseph might well feel that the mantle of his ancestors had indeed descended on his shoulders.

Yet there were signs to show that his success was more apparent than real. Austria held her own in Italy, but it was obvious that she ruled there only by the sword. The moment her army failed to serve, her cause was lost. A large number of Hungarian soldiers had deserted from the regiments in Italy during the wars of 1848, and, with Hungary in passive resistance and only held down by armed force, the Hungarian soldiers could not be counted upon in the future. Moreover, defeat had taught Italy her destiny. The question of

her unity had become a matter of practical politics. It was clear that the Roman and Tuscan Liberals would not be satisfied with a mere restriction of the powers of their local sovereigns. It was realised that Italy would not fear recourse to arms. Her sons, if they had not yet learned to fight like the Magyars, knew, as they did, how to die.

CHAPTER II

1851-1859

The "Bach System"—The *Concordat* of 1855—The Crimean War and its results—Relations with Russia and France—Victor Emanuel—Magenta and Solferino.

It will probably occur to the reader who has read so far in this book that it has been written without a sense of proportion. A short book to describe a reign of sixty years; and yet in all this time we have got no further than the end of the year 1851! The author can only defend himself by saying that in his judgment the first three years were almost, if not quite, the most important in the Emperor's reign. They not only foreshadow the difficulties which beset him and show the weakness of his position, but they also illustrate its strength. The general course of the policy which the Emperor-King has followed in recent times is indeed very different from the policy of ruthless repression which was carried out in his name during his first three years on the throne;

but the object, though not the method of Schwartzenberg, was that of the Emperor-King to-day. To maintain a strong Catholic mid-European monarchy, with its centre at Vienna, was the chief aim of Francis Joseph's first Chancellor—the personification of that aristocratic caste and spirit which has so long surrounded the Hapsburgs. The maintenance of that monarchy is still the aim of the Emperor-King, and though he has, by time and by adversity, been taught to alter the means by which that aim is pursued, the object itself has not changed. At the end of 1851, the skill of Schwartzenberg and the genius of Radetzky had freed the Empire from those enemies who, in 1848, had challenged not only the autocratic authority of the sovereign, but even the existence of "Austria" itself. Francis Joseph was now given a breathing-space. As a young man of twenty-one, he started to govern a country in which there were many elements of disloyalty, but in which the majority was sincerely loyal. How did he do it?

The answer to this question may be given in a few words—he did it, or tried to do it, by setting up a strong and intelligent bureaucracy, by concentrating all power, legislative and executive, in the offices of ministers at Vienna who were responsible to no one but himself.

As we have already seen, the constitution which he had given to Austria in March 1849, and which had been declared to be "irrevocable," was cancelled on the last day of 1851. Its withdrawal was one of the last acts of Prince Schwartzberg's *régime*, and was quite in harmony with the rest of his policy. Indeed, it would have been difficult to maintain the constitution of 1849, which provided for the representation at Vienna, not only of what we now call Austria, but of the conquered Hungary and of Northern Italy. The disappearance of the charter-constitution of 1849 left the way open for the organisation of a system of centralised government. Its preparation and execution were committed after the death of Schwartzberg in 1852 to Alexander von Bach, who had for three years been Minister of the Interior. Bach was a lawyer of Vienna and a man of the people. In early days he was credited with Liberal sympathies, but in '49 he entered the service of monarchy, and during the eight years following 1851 was the head and centre of the system of government which will go down to history marked with his name. He succeeded Count Stadion, a man of Liberal sympathies who had been in the Austrian Ministry of 1848, as Minister of the Interior; and when the con-

stitution of 1849 was withdrawn he became the centre of a great system of administration which embraced the whole of Austria and of the conquered but reluctant Hungary. Bach was in some ways an instrument for good. Under his system the local jurisdictions of the nobility were abolished, and superseded by courts in which justice was dispensed in the Emperor's name. This reform aroused violent opposition on the part of the old nobility, but it was undoubtedly an improvement. German became everywhere the official language, and Magyar was tabooed in Hungary. The police force which was raised by Bach spoke German only, and it is said that in 1860 only one of the higher police officers in Budapest was able to speak the language of the people. The smaller provinces, such as Istria and the Tyrol, retained their old shape, but Galicia, where a Polish aristocracy and a Ruthenian peasantry were equally hostile to Germanism, and Hungary, where the language of Vienna was the language of oppression, were cut up into separate provinces. The very picture of the kingdom of St. Stephen was wiped off the map. The right of meeting was strictly limited, and all political associations were forbidden. No newspaper could be issued until a copy had been seen and approved by the police.

Slav or Hungarian journalists, even when acquitted by a jury, could be, and were, "interned" at a distance from their homes. Bach's system was not directed only against the Magyars nor designed solely to suppress that nationality. His hand lay as heavy on Czechs, Ruthenians, and Roumans, as on Magyars. Galicia and Transylvania, as well as Hungary, remained in a state of siege till 1854. The Hungarians took a gloomy satisfaction in seeing that the Slavonic race in Croatia, which had fought for the Hapsburgs in 1849, were no better treated than themselves. A historian tells a story of a Croat who one day met a Hungarian and asked him what Hungary thought of the present state of affairs. "We are pleased with it," was the reply. "The Austrians give to you as a reward what they give to us as a punishment."

In the struggle of 1848-1850 the Roman Catholic Church had formed a close alliance with the Emperor and his advisers. A popular success in Hungary was feared by the bishops, who saw in it the prelude to a crusade against the wealth and obscurantism of the Church; and in the Slavonic borders—Galicia, Croatia, and Southern Hungary—many of the Slavs either belonged to the Roman Church, or might be drawn into it if they were allowed even a modicum of

political liberty. The bishops assembled at Vienna in 1849, condemned all Nationalist pretensions, and when the Nationalist movement was crushed, they commenced an active campaign in favour of the resumption of priestly control over marriage and education. This control was fully granted them by the *Concordat* of May 1855, one of the most unpopular of the acts of Bach's administration. Roman Catholicism was by this treaty acknowledged as the religion of the State, and was granted entire independence of legislation and the right of acquiring and disposing of property. The bishops were given full power to try and censure the lower clergy, to control the education of children, and to condemn dangerous publications, which the State undertook to suppress. Civil marriage was abolished, and the State Courts deprived of the power to punish even criminal priests without giving notice to their bishops.

Such a system of government could only exist so long as it was supported by physical force. It would be unjust to lay the whole blame for it upon Francis Joseph—a young man still on the right side of thirty and brought up in bad traditions which had been challenged in arms, and, by arms, had prevailed. But the critic can hardly avoid holding him in part

responsible for these measures, which rendered his government odious, and shook the confidence and loyalty even of the most law-abiding subjects. One evil result of such misgovernment he could not prevent — financial depression. Capital drifted away from a country where men had no rights, and where even ordinary business had to be conducted under the eyes of Bach's police. In 1854 a forced loan was raised in the most high-handed manner in order to cover the cost of re-establishing a metal currency and buying back Exchequer bills; but the money was spent on military action during the Crimean War. This action was undertaken at the simple orders of the Emperor, who, early in his reign, abolished the Ministry of War and assumed complete control of the army. The expenses of the occupation of the Danubian principalities and of the preparations for the Italian war of 1859 stopped all financial reform, and though the Emperor appointed an able Finance Minister in 1855, he was unable to make any progress with the restoration of the public credit. The breakdown of the Bach system in 1859 was due to many causes, but to none more clearly than the absence of any guarantees for solvency and honesty in the administration of Austrian finance.

Whilst the direction of internal affairs was committed to Bach, the conduct of foreign relations was given to an Austrian nobleman, Count Buol-Schauenstein. He succeeded Schwartzberg as Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1852, and continued in office till the outbreak of the war of 1859. Trained in the school of Metternich and Schwartzberg, Buol was inferior in ability to either of his predecessors, and during his period of office the weakness of Austria's position became clear to the world. The favours conferred by Russia in saving Francis Joseph from his insurgent subjects in Hungary and his rivals in Northern Germany had left Austria deeply in her debt; and Russia, under the Emperor Nicholas, was in 1851 the most powerful state in Europe. The wave of revolution which swept over the Continent in 1848 broke harmlessly against her frontiers. Austria owed her salvation to her. Northern Germany was divided, and, as yet, without a leader. The moment was consequently favourable for the resumption of the old policy of Peter the Great—expansion towards the south; and the Emperor Nicholas, seeing his opportunity, reopened the Eastern Question in 1853. He demanded from the Sultan the control of the Holy Places in Palestine and the recognition of a Russian

protectorate over the 16,000,000 Christians in Turkey. The Sultan could not yield to this demand without a surrender of part of his sovereign rights, and without giving the deepest offence to his Moslem subjects. Not having received a satisfactory answer, the Czar, in July 1853, dispatched troops into the two north-eastern provinces of Turkey—Moldavia and Wallachia (which form the Roumanian kingdom of to-day). This step placed the Emperor Francis Joseph in a serious difficulty. The two provinces lay between Russia, Austria, and Turkey. Their owner would command the Danube, the great highway of Austrian trade, and would have a dominant influence in the Black Sea. Austria could not see these provinces pass to Russia without anxiety; yet amongst the Austrian aristocracy, and particularly amongst the high officers in the army, there was a powerful party which valued the Russian alliance above everything. Russia and Austria had, in the last century, made common cause against Turkey; and there was no doubt that, if Austria supported the Russian seizure of the mouth of the Danube, she might help herself to some other part of Turkish territory with the tacit approval of the Czar. On the other hand, as Count Buol impressed upon

the young Emperor, the Turkish power could not be weakened without raising insurgent movements amongst the southern Slavs along the borders of the Empire. The Czar of Russia's demand was based, not only on religious, but on nationalist grounds. He aimed at the liberation of men of Slav race and Christian faith from Mussulman rule. If his claims were admitted, and the southern Slavs in Turkey were emancipated, might not the Slovenes and Serbs in Southern Austria and Hungary rise also and demand liberties which Francis Joseph could not grant? What of the Czechs in Bohemia, a Slavonic race, who had asked in vain for liberty in 1848? Moreover, if Austria supported Russia, she would incur the enmity of the new French Emperor, Napoleon III., who could, as he very shortly did, turn the scale against the Hapsburg rule in Italy; whilst Nicholas offered to guarantee to Francis Joseph his Italian possessions. Between the two policies the Emperor hesitated for many critical months. He wrote a personal letter to the Czar, in July 1853, begging him not to occupy the Danubian principalities, and at the same time appealed to the Sultan, through his ambassador, to admit, at least in principle, the Russian claim. Both requests were rejected, and Francis

Joseph's attempt at mediation merely showed that he was not strong enough to impose his rule upon either party. He permitted the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia to take place without protest; and when, six months later, he armed against Russia, his protest had lost its force. In September and October meetings took place between the young Emperor and his Russian patron—for he may almost be called so—at Olmütz and at Warsaw, and Francis Joseph declared that he could not permit Turkish territory to be violated; but neither this vague assertion, nor the protocol which he signed to the same effect with Prussia, France, and England (5th December 1853), had any deterrent effect on Russia. The Turks declared war in October 1853, and had early successes on the Danube, which caused Russia for a moment to moderate her attitude. In January 1854 the Emperor Nicholas sent Count Orloff on to Vienna with a proposal that Russia should have a free hand in the Balkans in return for a guarantee of the whole territory of Austria, to which guarantee Nicholas offered to secure the adhesion of Prussia and the German *Bund*. The offer was accompanied by the suggestion of an Austro-Russian protectorate over the Balkan states. Count Buol advised the Emperor

to reject these suggestions, knowing that they would mean a protectorate of the Balkans by Russia alone; but it is interesting to recall the suggestion, which has been, to a certain extent, followed in modern Turkish politics so lately as 1903.

On February 21, 1854, the Emperor was at a ball in the Schwartzenberg Palace in Vienna, and for the first time showed clear determination to oppose Russia. Addressing the Russian Ambassador, who assured him that a Slav rising in Turkey would not mean the fall of the Moslem power in Europe, he said: "I thought as you do until Count Orloff came here; and I was very glad to see him. But from his first words I saw that his proposals were not identical with those about which I spoke with the Emperor Nicholas at Olmütz and Warsaw. I had consequently to take my own measures. Up till this time I was determined to remain strictly neutral."¹

The failure of Orloff's mission marks the departure of Francis Joseph from the historic Austrian policy of alliance with Russia in the Eastern question. It was followed by the mobilisation of two army corps in Southern Hungary, and in April by an Austro-Prussian treaty, in which the two Powers promised, in

¹ Friedjung, *Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische Politik* (Stuttgart, 1907), p. 19.

certain contingencies, to join forces against the Czar. In May another Austrian army corps was mobilised in Galicia, and on June 3 Francis Joseph sent an ultimatum to St. Petersburg asking that the Czar should name the date at which he would evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia. Nicholas was furious, and never forgave the Emperor Francis Joseph. "Do you know," he asked of Count Valentine Esterhazy, the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg, "do you know who were the two stupidest Kings of Poland?" And when the ambassador could not answer, he continued, "John Sobieski and myself!" For both Sobieski and Nicholas I. had saved Austria from her enemies, one in 1683 and the other in 1849, yet both were treated with ingratitude.¹

The Austrian demand, however, coupled with large military preparations, had its effect. At the end of June the Russians retired from before the Turkish fortress of Silistria and recrossed the Danube. A few weeks after they evacuated Moldavia and Wallachia, and these principalities were occupied by Austria in September and October. Thus at the close of 1854 the Emperor Francis Joseph

¹ Sobieski wanted to follow up his victory against the Turks, but the Emperor Leopold, whom he had saved from them, would not support him.

had entered definitely into the arena of Balkan politics. Had he remained content with occupying the principalities and abstained from further action in the war, his policy might have been commended. But either from ambition to play a great part in Europe or from a desire to conciliate the Emperor of the French, he allowed himself to be drawn beyond his original attitude of impartiality, and entered into agreements with the Western Powers for the further restriction of Russian power in Eastern Europe. In August he had agreed to certain propositions put forward by France and England, and known to diplomats as the "Four Points," which Russia was asked, at the point of the sword, to accept. When the Czar bluntly rejected the proposals, Francis Joseph, who was now his own War Minister, ordered his generals in the principalities to admit the Turks to free passage through them. This was followed by a general mobilisation of the Austrian army. In February 1855 the Hapsburg force on war footing amounted in all to the huge total of 327,000 men and 1096 guns.

Yet this great army was not directed by a strong military policy. It was prepared and provisioned at vast expense in deference to Francis Joseph's policy of keeping the war out of the Danubian principalities and protecting

the mouths of the Danube from the Russian occupation. Active intervention the Emperor never contemplated and never allowed. It would have been better for him had he done so. France and England would have sanctioned his annexation of the Danubian principalities had he, by actual warfare, forced Russia to sue for peace. But at the moment when he might have settled the war by prompt action, he failed to act. In the winter months of 1854 the peace party in Vienna increased in strength and drew powerful arguments from the ruinous aspect of Austrian finance. A forced loan of some £35,000,000 was raised in Vienna in the summer of 1854, to which every taxpayer was compelled to subscribe according to his means, and the unpopularity of this measure, coupled with the feeling that he was forfeiting Russian friendship, caused Francis Joseph to incline strongly in the direction of peace. England and France had forced him unwillingly along the path of strong action, and though in November he cancelled his order of October for a general mobilisation, they compelled him, by threatening to recall their ambassadors, to sign a treaty which had actually, in the first place, been drafted by his own ministers. The treaty was signed on 2nd December 1854, just five years after the

Emperor's accession. It dealt a final blow at the policy of Austro-Russian alliance, which had existed ever since the fall of Napoleon I. "After this," said the Czar, "I treat no more with Austria."

Francis Joseph did not sign the treaty without much misgiving. Count Buol, who had conducted the whole policy with a view to securing Austria's position in Europe, did indeed get his reward, for on 22nd December England and France gave him a guarantee of the *status quo* in Italy during the period of the war. But he estranged Prussia, whom by a treaty signed in April 1854 he had bound to make common cause with him. The lesser German princes, too, became suspicious of an Austrian monarch whose schemes foreshadowed an eastward expansion quite incompatible with the maintenance of his position as their leader and as protector of their fragile rights and frontiers. In January 1855 these princes refused Count Buol's invitation to join in the treaty of December, whilst at the moment when he sent that invitation the Austrian Foreign Minister vied with his sovereign in apologetic expressions and professions of constant friendship for the Czar Nicholas. Broken down by long strain and disappointment, Nicholas I. expired on 2nd March 1855.

With the disappearance of that strong and resolute ruler, the great obstacle to peace was removed. Proposals for it were at once made, and in the middle of March the five great Powers (Prussia was not present) met by their special envoys at Vienna to discuss conditions. Lord John Russell went out from England, and found Francis Joseph and his advisers in a state of contrition, which left no hope that they would agree to further action against Russia. The Emperor refused to join in demanding the removal of Russian warships from the Black Sea, and on 12th June orders were issued to place the Austrian army on a peace footing. In the remainder of the war Austria took no considerable part. The victory of the Allies at the Tchernaiia (16th August) and the subsequent fall of Sebastopol (8th September) caused no rejoicings at Vienna. The Emperor's messages of congratulation to France and England were delayed until they had only a negative significance.

It is not for the biographer of Francis Joseph to follow the final episodes of the diplomacy which brought the Crimean War to a close. The new Czar Alexander accepted the terms of peace which Austria, in January 1856, offered in the name of Europe, and a Congress met in Paris which brought about

a formal peace in March. The terms to which Russia assented, whilst humiliating to her, were to the advantage rather of England and France than of the Hapsburg monarchy. English trade profited by the "neutralisation" of the Black Sea and the removal of the Russian fleet from its waters. The new French Emperor gained, at least in prestige, by forcing the Czar to abandon his claim to "protect" the Christian subjects of the Sultan. The Turkish empire gained a new lease of life by the defeat of her nearest and greatest enemy; and, most of all, the kingdom of Sardinia, the nucleus of modern Italy, gained by her admission to the Congress of Paris as a state of equal rank with the historic Powers of Europe. Austria may be said to have gained something by the preservation of an "open door" at the mouth of the Danube—the great outlet for her trade in the East; but she failed to get possession of the Danubian principalities, which were constituted an independent state, shortly to become the modern kingdom of Roumania. On the other hand, Francis Joseph, in forfeiting the friendship of Russia, had sacrificed his most important political asset. Russia alone in all Europe was a determined enemy to Liberal and nationalist movements, and Russia had shown, by her invasion of Hungary in 1849,

that she would, if necessary, draw the sword to save Austria. Whatever else might happen, Francis Joseph could no longer count on the Czar as an ally; whilst Prussia, by refusing to take action against Russia, had earned the gratitude of the Court of St. Petersburg, which stood her in good stead in 1866.

The Emperor throughout this period was advised by Count Buol, and Buol was one of the school of Austrian statesmen who constantly looked to Austria's position in Italy and Germany and thought little of her prospects or destinies in the East. Brought up in the traditions of Metternich, he wished to keep Austria's influence in Germany and in Italy intact, and to maintain her position as the leading Catholic Power in Central Europe. Both in Italy and in Germany Austria needed the help of France, and Buol's main idea was that, by supporting the upstart French Emperor in his attempt to pose as arbiter in Europe, he would secure his neutrality for the day in which the Italians should again rise in arms against the Hapsburgs. He hoped also for French, and possibly for English, assistance in Germany, and thought that the friends whom he was making for Austria would stand to her in Germany as well as beyond the Alps. In pursuing these aims Count Buol was held back

by Francis Joseph; but though he could not be induced to join actively in the Crimean campaign, the young Emperor went far enough to lose the friendship of Russia, without gaining any compensating advantage.

In this chapter of war and diplomacy we read the character of Francis Joseph whilst he was still young and under the influence of the old generation: an honourable man, loyal at heart to his friends, yet allowing himself to be driven to and fro by circumstances, yielding alternately to his own inclinations and to the advice of ministers, and, either from indecision or from prudence, temporising. A charge of vacillating between alternative but inconsistent courses has often been brought against him. How far, upon the record of his sixty years, he is to be blamed for indecision and how far praised for prudence we shall consider in the further study of his career.

One positive result, at least, was attained by the Crimean War. Sardinia, as well as Turkey, attained the rank of a "European Power," and Sardinia was now ruled by a sovereign of a different mettle to the weak Charles Albert of 1848. It is not to my purpose to sketch the career of the great Italian, Victor Emanuel of Savoy, or of the patriot Cavour, his restless and far-seeing minister.

Sardinia alone of the Italian states was, as we have seen, under the rule of a popular and a national dynasty. Whilst the Austrian or Austrophile princes in Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, and King Bomba in Naples, crushed out the popular institutions which had found an entry into their states in 1848, Victor Emanuel retained a popular form of government. Silently, yet without concealment, he prepared for the great struggle with Austria, and at the end of the year 1856 it was clear that the Italian question was to become the question of to-morrow in Europe. In the Eastern play, one scene of which is acted in 1853-6, Francis Joseph was, as we have seen, deeply interested; yet in the Crimean episode he takes only a secondary part. In the Italian drama he necessarily plays a part of the first importance.

The success of Austria in 1849 was intensely unpopular in Italy, and the Emperor and his officers did not know how to use their success. The policy of pure absolutism which had been followed up to 1848 was resumed. Imitating the policy of the Austrians, the subservient princes in Parma, Modena, and Tuscany persevered in their autocratic courses as though the voice of revolution had never spoken at their doors. In Naples, Ferdinand II., nick-

named Bomba, reasserted to the full his sovereign rights, and though he enjoyed to the last a good deal of personal popularity, his system was one which may be well described by the old phrase, "tyranny tempered by assassination." The Duke of Tuscany held his capital with Austrian troops; these alone protected him from the knives of persons in whose eyes patriotism was a good excuse for murder. The Duke of Parma was murdered in 1854, at the time of the outbreak of the Crimean War; and when England and France had given an implied approval to the Italian cause by admitting Sardinian troops to co-operation in the Crimea, Victor Emanuel and his minister felt sufficiently strong to raise definitely the question of Italian unity. The Austrian envoys at the Congress of Paris refused to discuss the Italian question, and maintained an attitude of obstinate opposition to all the diplomatic efforts of Cavour. Count Buol, however, knew well that the day of reckoning was not far distant; and if there is any excuse for his policy at the period of the Crimean War, it is the desire to keep the peace in Italy as long as possible. But Victor Emanuel would not, perhaps could not, wait. He was certain of the friendship of Napoleon III.,—himself of Italian blood, and in early life

a member of one at least of the secret societies which were formed to liberate Italy. During the negotiations at Paris Napoleon had showed special favour to Cavour, and the peace of 1856 released France from her obligation to guarantee the *status quo* beyond the Alps. Had Francis Joseph consented in 1856 to let Modena and Parma be united with Sardinia, and to give the Duke of Modena compensation by making him Prince of Moldavia and Wallachia, the course of Italian history might, at all events for a time, have been altered. The suggestion was made by Cavour in 1856; and Europe would probably have accepted it. But the Emperor was true to an old Hapsburg principle of never surrendering territory which had once been acquired without a fight; and he scorned the idea of bargaining with Sardinia, where shelter was being given to thousands of political refugees from Milan and Venice. Had his attitude been different, we might now have a Hapsburg and not a Hohenzollern king in Roumania.

In 1857 the ill feeling between Austria and Sardinia grew apace. The Emperor loyally supported his docile relatives and allies on their rickety Italian thrones. In 1855 he had, as we have seen, concluded a *Concordat* with the Pope, which committed his country,

in all matters of spiritual doctrine and discipline, to the charge and control of the Vatican. The *Concordat* was very unpopular in Austria, where the majority were good, but not very strict, Catholics. It was also hated in the Emperor's Italian domain, where Roman Catholicism was not a creed but a policy. Victor Emanuel had refused to recognise the ecclesiastical courts in his kingdom, and during 1857 a war of newspapers broke out in Northern Italy, which resulted in November in the breach of diplomatic relations. The war with powder and shot was hastened by Orsini's attempt on the life of Napoleon III. (January 1858), and by eloquent letters written by Orsini before his execution, in which he implored the French emperor to draw the sword for Italian unity. In July 1858 Cavour visited Napoleon at Plombières, and a secret agreement was concluded. This assured Sardinia of French help provided that it should be left to France to choose the moment in the spring of 1859 for declaring war. The Emperor did not join in the Sardinian plan for uniting Italy, and looked to an Italy of four kingdoms : Sardinia, enlarged by Austrian cessions, Tuscany, Rome, and Naples. But Victor Emanuel was content. He foresaw that, once the war was commenced, Napoleon III.

would not be able to set a limit to Italian ambitions. From Plombières Cavour travelled to Berlin, and, having assured himself of Prussian neutrality, returned to Turin to await the moment when France should throw down the gauntlet.

War, however, came about by no declaration of France. Francis Joseph was deeply injured by the policy of Victor Emanuel, and on April 23rd, 1859, he suddenly demanded the disarmament of the Sardinian army, yet without giving any promise that his own army should be placed on a peace footing. The Emperor was convinced that his soldiers were a match for the Sardinians in Italy, and he took no steps to make it certain that Prussia or the German *Bund* would hold France to neutrality by a demonstration on the Rhine. Prince William of Prussia who, in October 1858, was declared Regent of Prussia, owing to the insanity of his brother, King Frederick William, was ready to support Austria by a demonstration against France. But he would only sell his co-operation at a price which Austria would not pay—the concession of the right to command the forces of the Confederation. This suggestion was rejected by Francis Joseph for reasons similar to those which had prompted his refusal to trade with Sardinia in 1856. The mission of

the Archduke Albrecht, who went to Berlin just before the outbreak of war, to secure, if possible, Prussian co-operation, was a failure. Austria, proudly refusing to give up her right to military leadership of the German forces, went into the Italian war alone. The ultimatum of April 23, 1859, was despatched to Turin on the very day on which the Archduke Albrecht left Berlin. Moreover, it was sent, not through the Foreign Office, but from the Emperor's *Militär-kanzlei*, and on his simple fiat.

The Austrian force in Lombardy was 200,000 strong. Francis Joseph believed that Sardinia was not ready to fight, and that he could advance to Turin. On April 29, Count Gyulai, the Hungarian general in command at Milan, crossed the Ticino and invaded the dominions of Victor Emanuel. But at this very moment the heads of the French columns were across the Alps, and Austria found herself without allies and opposed to two formidable enemies. It is not my purpose to follow the six weeks' campaign which followed on the familiar battleground of Northern Italy. The first big battle, Magenta (June 4) was not decisive, though the honours of the day rested with the Allies; but on June 24th the Austrians, under the nominal command of Francis Joseph, but the real control of Marshal Hess, were worsted at

Solferino. They were compelled to retire in spite of successes in one part of the battlefield, where, in a bloody action, General Benedek held the Sardinian force in check. During the period of war the three princes of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma were expelled from their thrones, and rendered powerless to help the Austrian Emperor, who had so long supported them. The young king, Francis II. of Naples, the brother-in-law of Francis Joseph, was "contained" by the French force in occupation of Rome, which could have intercepted any troops sent to support the Austrians. After Solferino both parties were ready for peace. Francis Joseph was afraid of a rising in Hungary. Large numbers of his troops (it is said six per cent of his whole force) were unwounded prisoners of the enemy, and he feared losses which might ruin his prestige in Germany. Napoleon, on the other hand, was deeply affected by the loss of 10,000 French soldiers at Solferino, and his troops were weakened by fever. Moreover, he was afraid of the Ultramontane party in France, which was strongly opposed to the further humiliation of the leading Roman Catholic Power in Europe. Thus it came about that the first offers of peace, which came from the victors of Solferino, were readily accepted. The peace of Villafranca was

signed on 11th June. Austria ceded Lombardy to France, and France in turn handed it over to Sardinia. Parma was also united to the Piedmontese kingdom. But Francis Joseph kept Venetia, and with it the strong forts of the "Quadrilateral." The Grand Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were restored to their territories, and it was agreed that Pope Pius IX. should be requested to reform the government of his territories.

The news of the peace of Villafranca caused intense surprise in Europe. Everywhere it had been thought that Francis Joseph must surrender the whole of his Italian territories, and, probably, pay a large indemnity. He was now to keep Venetia and its wealthy capital, and this would enable him to play a great part in Italian politics. Two of his subject-princes—for one may call them so—were restored to power; and his position in Germany was untouched. The Italian unionists denounced Napoleon as a traitor. Cavour, who had been dismissed by Victor Emanuel after a stormy interview as to the terms of peace, set to work to establish provisional popular governments in Florence and Modena which should still further the cause he had at heart. To review the further history of Italian unity is beyond my purpose. Here I need only notice that the

Emperor Francis Joseph, though defeated, was not disgraced. His army had shown itself well able to fight, and ninety per cent of it, though not the whole, was loyal. Austria, in fact, was still a great power. Now, as afterwards, Francis Joseph seemed like William of Orange, strongest in the moment of defeat.

It has been urged against the young Emperor that if he had taken an active part in the Crimean war, and saved France and England from the losses of the Sebastopol campaign, he might have obtained a permanent, and not a temporary guarantee of his Italian possessions ; and that if this had been granted, he would not have had to fight Marshal MacMahon and his Frenchmen in 1859. In answer to this I may say that, in the first place, Francis Joseph was, at bottom, controlled by feelings of gratitude towards the Emperor Nicholas which were honourable to him, however unworthy their cause, and for which he cannot be censured. Moreover, with France and England committed to a Liberal policy in Italy, he must have known that their guarantees, even if obtained, would be of little value. On the other hand, he seems to have nursed the hope that the German Federal body could be induced to take part in the defence of his Italian dominions. He tried to make the preservation

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of the Hapsburg interest in Italy a matter of German policy and a cause for German expenditure of men and money. This was a mistake, but one which a ruler of Francis Joseph's traditions and training might easily make. The Austria of Prince Eugene and Kaunitz had often fought with German troops in Italy and Hungary, and with Magyars or Croats in Germany, and the Emperor had been brought up by statesmen who taught him that he had only to command and the rest of Germany would follow. Had not the old King of Würtemberg said so to him in so many words in 1850? Well might he look back with reproach to those who had started him in the course of policy which now ended in mortification and defeat. The most difficult task which Fate has brought the Emperor has been the sacrifice of old traditions, and the establishment not only of a new geographical state, but of an idea, a principle, a policy, which may unite his subjects by a sense of common duty, common purpose, and mutual confidence.

As his reign and policy proceed we shall see how he endeavours to perform that task.

CHAPTER III

1859-1866

Schmerling and Liberalism in Austria—Schemes for a new Constitution in Germany—Prussia and Austria—The Schleswig-Holstein Question—Sadowa—General Benedek.

THE peace of Villafranca marks the end of one period in the public life of the Emperor Francis Joseph. The humiliation of Magenta and Solferino and the loss of Lombardy were a warning to him that there were forces at work in Europe which tended to the disintegration, if not to the destruction, of the old Hapsburg monarchy. Italian "nationality" would not be checked and confined by the antiquated government of Austrian satraps, however honestly and efficiently these officers performed their duties. The people of Northern Italy were Italians, and preferred being governed, even badly, by themselves to being well governed by foreigners. They had fought on this ground, and, with the help of the French, had established their right to govern them-

selves, well or badly. Lombardy had been lost to Austria, and it was more or less an accident that Venetia had not been lost also. The forces which had conquered the Austrians in Italy were democracy and nationalism: and the Emperor, now in his thirtieth year, observed quickly enough that if they could paralyse his rule in Italy, they might upset his authority in Austria and undermine his position in Italy, Germany, and Hungary. It was time to make concessions to the people in his remaining territories. The old Conservative advisers who had been about him since 1848 were apparently in the wrong. Under their advice the Emperor had done his best to set up an enlightened despotism and to govern the people—not by their own will, but for their own good. The result was an army that could not be wholly trusted, a nation ill-content with its government; and, lastly, an exchequer crippled by the chronic reluctance of capitalists to invest their money in the country. Hungary was hopelessly alienated, and watched the Austrian defeat in Italy with complacency. Germany caught the infection of unionism and democracy from Italy. In the hereditary Hapsburg dominions voices called for popular rights which might be disregarded for a time, but could not be silenced.

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The next seven years of the Emperor's life were devoted to an attempt to meet or control these popular movements; and the attempt was largely, though not wholly, unsuccessful. In meeting them, in attempting to maintain his position in Hungary and also in Germany, the Emperor had a certain number of resources on which he could fall back. In opposing democracy he could rely on the support of the Prussian Government, which cared for German democratic unity as little as he did. The lesser states of Germany, if they disliked Austrian supremacy, were not at all disposed to side with Prussia against the Hapsburgs. Then the Emperor had a great fund of loyalty in his hereditary dominions, whose inhabitants were quite at one with him in his determination to remain the first power in Germany. Two difficulties lay in his way. Hungary would not agree to any settlement which did not give her legislative independence of the Parliament at Vienna. Prussia would not come into any new Federal constitution which left Austria with the power of out-voting her in the Federal Council or left to Francis Joseph and his smaller German allies the control of the policy of the northern German states. In the end it turned out that the forces against the Emperor were too strong for him ;

but his attempt to grapple with them occupies an interesting and critical period in his reign. He honestly tries to meet the difficulties of the present ; but fails to do so. As he fails we see before him the difficulties of the future.

Francis Joseph began his period of reform by appointing as Minister-President Baron Anton von Schmerling, an Austrian politician who, since 1848, had been distinguished by Liberal views. Schmerling had been Austrian representative at Frankfort in 1848, and had assisted the Archduke Albrecht to keep things from going too fast in Germany in that year. He was thoroughly German in his sympathies, and hoped, after making a Parliament in Austria, to construct some all-German Parliament of the future in which Austria's primacy should be assured. After a preliminary attempt in 1860, he produced a constitution for Austria in the spring of 1861, and this was issued by letters patent under the Emperor's hand on February 27. An Upper House, composed of royal princes, large landowners, and the princes of the Church in Austria, to whom the Emperor might add life peers ; a Lower House of 343 members, who were to be elected by the local diets (85 for Hungary, 54 for Bohemia, 20 for Venetia, and so forth), and a clause for annual Parliaments, were the chief

features of the "February Patent," as it is called. It was a mere gift from the sovereign, and recognised no previous rights whatever. It again flouted the claims of Hungary, reducing her Parliament to the level of a provincial assembly, and setting up Croatia and Transylvania, which were dependencies of the kingdom of St. Stephen, as of equal rank with that kingdom itself. Of the attitude of Hungary towards this mandatory constitution I shall say more in the next chapter. Apart from the fact that the Magyars would have nothing to say to it, it was not a great success. The Emperor tried loyally to make it a success, and supported Schmerling for two years in the endeavour to work it; but he still fell, occasionally, under the influence of reactionary advisers who, after 1862, seem to have controlled him so far as Austrian domestic politics were concerned. As a matter of fact, the inflated Reichsrath of Schmerling's constitution was not by any means a popular body. Its members were to be chosen by the provincial diets of the Empire. As these were not at the time in existence and were to be nominated by the Crown, it is obvious that the inflated Reichsrath was not in the modern sense a popular body.

Baron Schmerling's ideas expanded as he

continued in office; and he tried in 1862 to realise his visions of a new Federal Parliament at Frankfort, in which all Germany should be represented. When, in December 1861, the Prussian Government issued a Note to the German Princes in favour of a North German Confederation, Austria stoutly opposed it; and in February 1862 the Austrian Government replied with a counter-proposal for a Federal Parliament and Federal Directory at Frankfort, which should have large control over the common affairs of Germany. This proposal was rejected owing to the opposition of Prussia and of the smaller states. Its importance is that it showed the Austrian Emperor to be ready to assist in a modification of the German *Bund*, and to make some concession to popular feeling. The failure of his scheme brought into strong relief the differences between Austria and Prussia. A new constitution had been proposed by the Emperor, and had been wrecked because Prussia would not consent to limit her freedom of action or to resign any part of her sovereign rights to a Federal body. It is the essence of a Federation that each constituent state should commit some portion, however small, of her independence into the hands of a supreme common authority. Federation failed in Germany because Ger-

many contained two states, each of which was a European Power, and neither of which would consent to the exercise of any part of its sovereign powers through the medium of any other authority. As a matter of fact, the Emperor Francis Joseph and his advisers knew or hoped that they would be able to outvote Prussia in the Federal Parliament; and that, in a matter of peace or war, they would be able to carry it against her. Prussia knew or feared this also. Hence her refusal to accept the Austrian proposal of February 1862. The year was darkened by the shadow of events to come.

Though we are not considering the history of Prussia, it is worth while noticing that the point at which we have now arrived—the autumn of 1862—is the moment of Bismarck's entry into the arena. He became Prime Minister of Prussia in September 1862, at the very time when the proposals of Baron Schmerling were rejected. At the first he appears as the very opposite of a popular North German leader. His appointment follows upon the refusal of the Prussian Diet to sanction military expenses which the Government desired to incur. He agrees to take office, and enforce the collection of the necessary money without the sanction of the Diet. He is most

unpopular in Prussia, the delight of a small and nervous aristocracy, the avowed enemy of the Prussian people. He is supported, somewhat timorously, by the King, his master, but hotly opposed by the Crown Prince Frederick, whose English wife, carefully trained by her father, is a friend to popular institutions. He stands out against popular government and the will of the Prussian people as expressed by the Prussian Diet. He is suspected as a tyrant throughout the North German states, the very states which, within a few years, he was to lead, through warfare, to unity and Empire.

The proposals made by Austria in 1862 were renewed in a more formal manner in 1863, when the Emperor Francis Joseph himself appeared at Frankfort to submit to the Bundestag a scheme for a Federal constitution. This scheme had been sketched out in the first place by Julius Fröbel, but it was warmly approved by the Emperor Francis Joseph, and earnestly supported by Baron Schmerling. It had, of course, a good many opponents, even in Austria. Baron Rechberg, the Tory Foreign Minister at Vienna, who hated democracy even more bitterly than he hated Prussia, opposed it with all his force, and declared that it could only lead to war with Prussia. When he

found the Emperor was determined to put it forward at Frankfört he resigned, but, on the Emperor's request, returned to office. It is one of the remarkable features about Francis Joseph and his Government—we shall see examples of it as we go further—that his ministers, if he requests it, continue in office though they desire to resign, and assume office at his request even though they do not wish to do so. We find Count Rechberg returning to office when a constitution is proposed for Germany which he declares to be absurd and certain to lead to war, which it did. Later we shall find Count Mensdorff urging peace, yet remaining in office in a war ministry, and General Benedek taking command and fighting a campaign which he has asserted must lead to disaster. To resume.—In August 1863 the Emperor proposed that the affairs of the Federation should be managed, in the first place, by a directorate of four members, three of whom should be appointed by Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria. Besides these there was to be an Upper House of Princes of the Empire, and a Lower House of delegates with very extensive powers. The proposal was not democratic enough to please the progressive sense of Germany, and was certain to be opposed by Prussia. As to its popularity, we

know¹ that more democratic proposals were suggested to the Emperor, but that he rejected them. As to the Prussian opposition, it was only to be expected; but the result of it was that the smaller German states became alarmed. The chief guarantee that their rights would be respected lay in the fact that there were two great Powers—Austria and Prussia—in the *Bund*; and when it became clear that Prussia would not come into the new Federation, they took fright lest they should be handed over to Austria alone. “*Will uns denn Oesterreich Kaput machen?*” asked George V., the blind King of Hanover, in his colloquial German. King William of Prussia was anxious to attend the Congress of 1863, and would have done so had he not been dissuaded by Bismarck, in whom he now placed complete confidence. For Bismarck’s policy the realisation of the programme of 1863 would have meant ruin. According to his view, the Austrian object was either to provide machinery for outvoting Prussia in the general affairs of Germany and prevent her from being a really independent state, or else to create an instrument for opposing democracy and throttling the spirit of German nationality. The second of these ends was fatal to Bismarck’s policy; the first was,

¹ Prince Hohenlohe’s *Memoirs*, English edition, vol. i. p. 275.

for the moment, one in which he did not care to assist. He could control the influence in Prussia, and cared for nothing else. And so, as Bismarck's master acted on his advice, Francis Joseph's large plan of 1863 came to nothing. For a few more years, Germany was left in her old configuration.

The failure of 1863 was very disappointing to the Emperor, who used his personal influence to commend the scheme in a way which is foreign to his character. He returned to Vienna in deep depression. He had made a proposal of the first importance, which Prussia had rejected and which could not be forced upon her except at the point of the sword. When Rechberg had suggested going on without Prussia and forming a new Federation, the smaller states had refused to go on. The Prussians were in the position which the Confederate States had taken up at the outset of the great struggle which was now being fought out beyond the Atlantic; but whereas in America the majority were ready to force the minority to remain in union with them upon certain terms, in Germany the majority were unwilling to support their traditional leader in forcing a new federal contract upon the minority. It was as if President Lincoln, placed at the head of the

Federal Government, should have found that the Northern States were prepared to concede to the Southern Confederacy the right of independent action in all the highest matters of policy. Well may the Emperor Francis Joseph, brought up in the old traditions of Austrian supremacy, have felt that the foundations of his political belief, and even the foundations of his empire, were trembling beneath his feet.

It is difficult to understand why, from this time onward, preparations for war with Prussia were not made. Bismarck had given warning. "Our relations must become either better or worse than they are," he said to Count Károlyi in December 1862. "I am prepared for a joint attempt to improve them. If it fails through your refusal, you will have to deal with us as one of the Great Powers of Europe." But Prussia had given no proof of a desire to make this joint attempt. She had not attended the Congress of Frankfort in 1863, and had refused even to discuss Francis Joseph's proposals. The Emperor or his advisers must surely have seen in Bismarck's attitude the indication of warlike intention; and if they did see it, it is hard to see why no steps were taken to prepare the Austrian army for the coming contest.

As things turned out, the occasion which Bismarck wanted—for breach with Austria and promotion of Prussia—arrived suddenly and with marvellous opportunity.

In November 1863 died Frederick VII., last of the line of Schleswig - Holstein - Sonderburg - Augustenburg. A question at once arose as to who should succeed him in the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. It is not without some trepidation that the author of a short book mentions the Schleswig-Holstein question. That question has now been settled for ever, and the documents about it in the Foreign Office, which are said to have weighed a ton, have, let us hope, been disposed of long ago as waste paper. If discussed from its outset it would fill many pages, and, for the most part, it is quite devoid of interest. But the settlement of that question gave to Prussia Kiel and the soil beneath the Kiel Canal, things which may prove to be of importance in the history of Europe. Moreover, the manner of that settlement involved Francis Joseph in his last great war, which opened the way to changes in Europe, whose ultimate results are still far distant in the future. Let these things excuse my speaking of it.

In 1852, to go no further back, the Powers of Europe had agreed to a convention signed

in London, providing that the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein should for ever remain part of Denmark, and that, on the death of Frederick VII., he should be succeeded by Prince Christian of Sonderburg - Glucksburg, better known to us as the late King Christian IX. of Denmark. Compensation was to be given to the Duke of Augustenburg (who, as a collateral, had substantial claims to the Duchies), on condition of his waiving his right to the succession. The duke accepted this compensation. Austria and Prussia, too, had bound themselves to acknowledge the indivisibility of the Danish monarchy, even after the then existing Danish dynasty—of Sonderburg-Augustenburg—should die out. But though the Duke of Augustenburg had accepted compensation in respect of his own right, he had not bound his heirs—nor had they bound themselves—not to prosecute their claim to the Duchies at any future time. The German Federation was not a party to the London Convention of 1852, and Schleswig was, though Holstein was not, a member of the German Federation. The Convention had stipulated that large concessions should be made to the German population in the Duchies; and these, so declared the German inhabitants and their sympathisers, had not

been made. Whether the Germans in the Duchies had been fairly treated or not was an arguable question, but the Danish constitution, which was promulgated in 1863 by the new King Christian IX., certainly paid little respect to their rights. The king signed the constitution, which had been approved by the Danish Diet two days before his accession, with much reluctance. He was persuaded to do so by a storm of public feeling in Denmark which threatened his throne, and even his life, should he refuse to sign it. Its promulgation was the signal for an outburst of national feeling in Germany. Princes and diets alike declared for the freedom of the Germans in the Duchies, and Duke Frederick of Augustenburg, riding on the favouring wave, openly appeared as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, asserting that his father's acceptance of compensation could not bind him. The Prussian Diet in December passed a resolution in favour of the recognition of the new Duke. Then came the question, What would Austria do?

The Emperor Francis Joseph could not admit the claim of the Germans. In the first place, he was a party to the Convention of London which recognised the unity of Denmark and guaranteed the integrity of Denmark. In the second place, the demand for recogni-

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tion of Duke Frederick's claim came from the Nationalist element in Germany. It was urged by men who thought that blood and race were stronger than treaties or conventions, who were filled with the ideas which only a few years ago had conquered the Austrians in Italy. Moreover, if the Duchies were joined to Denmark, they would enjoy a democratic constitution, which must create a precedent for democracy throughout Germany. The Emperor, on the other hand, was quite loyal to the discontented Germans in Schleswig-Holstein. He refused to receive the officer who came from Christian IX. to announce his accession. The new king was recognised as King of Denmark and of the Duchies; but was reminded that the liberties to which those Duchies were entitled under the arrangement of 1852 had not been granted. Thus in this matter the Emperor is found half-way between two policies. He did not warmly champion the cause of the oppressed Germans or recognise the Augustenburg prince as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. He did not, on the other hand, conceal the fact that the Germans in Schleswig-Holstein had good cause for complaint. Most important of all, he consented to deal with the question apart from the rest of the German Federation, to treat it as a matter of ordinary foreign policy.

This was a fatal error. It gave to Bismarck the chance for which he had been waiting.

The Prussian Government was at first troubled by the Schleswig-Holstein imbroglio. The demand for home rule in the Duchies was a democratic cry, and Prussia was as little democratic as Austria. Accordingly, we find that Prussia at first agreed with Francis Joseph in the matter, recognised Christian IX. as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, but demanded local home rule for these provinces. Bismarck's great difficulty was to get rid of the Treaty of London, for, so long as it stood, his master, always an honourable man, would not consent to the seizure of Schleswig-Holstein. Could not Denmark be drawn into war? If this could only be done, the Treaty of London would be abrogated by an accepted rule of international custom. Then Prussia might come forward as a candidate for the Augustenburg heritage, might take the place of Denmark, and gain an invaluable outlet to the sea. Everything happened as Bismarck had hoped; and—what was perhaps beyond his hopes—Austria consented to join Prussia in a war against Denmark, and to deal with the question without consulting the Federal Council at Frankfort. Baron Rechburg, who still advised Francis Joseph on foreign affairs, protested against this policy of

joint action, unless it were understood that the succession to the Duchies should be regulated by consent of Austria and Prussia. The Emperor, in fact, proposed that the Duchies should not be separated from Denmark without such consent. But he and his ministers were frightened by Bismarck's threat to invade Schleswig-Holstein without them if they would not go on. Austria, accordingly, joined in the attack on the Danish garrison without any guarantee as to what was to happen when once it had been expelled.

The obvious policy for Austria was to put herself at the head of the smaller German states, repudiate the Treaty of London (for which there was fairly good ground), and declare for a German prince in the Duchies. But Francis Joseph and his advisers were not gifted with the foresight and courage necessary for such a step. When, in January 1864, they undertook to co-operate with Prussia in the invasion of the Elbe Duchies, they were playing straight into Prussia's hands.

The King of Denmark was obdurate, and in January 1864 began the short war in Schleswig-Holstein. The Danes made a brave defence, and it is noteworthy that in this little war there was no sign of the great superiority of the Prussian over the Austrian

troops. The Prussian artillery had been re-armed with the needle-gun, and the Austrian officers who saw it at work recognised that it was better than anything which they had. Otherwise the Austrian force seemed quite as efficient as the Prussian. Danish resistance was conquered by the end of April. England sympathised deeply with Denmark, but she remained true to her traditional policy of not intervening alone in Europe in a case in which she would have had to confront a combination of Continental powers. As soon as the Danes were driven out, Duke Frederick endeavoured to take their place and to become *de facto* Duke of Schleswig-Holstein; but Prussia refused to recognise him unless he consented to conditions which would, in effect, make the Duchies dependent upon Prussia. Kiel must be handed over to Prussia as a naval and commercial port. She must have the right to make and fortify a canal connecting Kiel with the German Ocean, and the Duke must enter into a military convention which would place the troops of the Duchy under the command of Prussia. His soldiers must even take the oath of allegiance to the Prussian king.

The latter part of the year 1864 was spent in negotiations between the Emperor and the

King of Prussia as to the future of Schleswig-Holstein. In August King William and Bismarck visited Schönbrunn and talked the matter over with the Emperor and Rechberg. They were still on good terms, and the two sovereigns were such good friends, and so anxious to deal fairly with one another, that a breach between them seemed unlikely. Bismarck, however, prevented his master from coming to any terms as to the future of the Duchies, and shortly after the meeting at Schönbrunn Rechberg, who had been Francis Joseph's Foreign Minister since 1860, resigned. He had, however reluctantly, committed Austria to dual action with Prussia. He had done all Bismarck wanted, yet got nothing from him. Consequently he was discredited in his own country. His successor was Count Mensdorff, a nobleman of French extraction, whose forbears had risen to high place in Austria by military service and by a fortunate marriage with a Coburg princess. Mensdorff united to charming manners the conventional loyalty of the Austrian statesmen and a greater amount of foresight than most of them possessed. He was not, however, of the mettle of Rechberg, and was unable to cope with the man who now directed Prussian policy. He deprecated war with Prussia and constantly

advised against it; indeed, after the war of 1866 was over, he published documents which show that he was strongly opposed to it. His chief subordinate was Baron Biegeleben, who seems to have influenced both him and the Emperor Francis Joseph in the following year, when Austria hurried into her fatal war with Prussia. But at the critical time Mensdorff was officially the Emperor's chief adviser.

In the winter of 1864-5, Austria and Prussia remained in joint occupation of Schleswig and Holstein, Austria pressing for the admission of Duke Frederick, and Prussia objecting to it except on the terms stated above. When these were formulated in a despatch sent to Vienna in February 1865, the Emperor Francis Joseph, through Count Mensdorff, declined to agree to them. Austria made no objection to Prussia having a naval port or a fortress or two on the isthmus; but, on constitutional grounds, she refused even to discuss the proposal that the Duke of Holstein's troops should take the oath of allegiance to the Prussian king. Such an idea was, indeed, wholly subversive of the constitution of the *Bund*, which contemplated only princes with equal rights; and Bismarck now showed openly that he was not to be bound by any considerations of constitutional precedent. "If Austria wishes

to be our ally," he said in July 1865, "she must give way to us." It is probable that the war would have broken out in this year, but for a meeting between the Emperor Francis Joseph and the King of Prussia at Gastein in July 1865. A friendly arrangement, which Bismarck contemptuously called a "piece of sticking-plaster," was made between the two sovereigns which postponed war for a year. Schleswig was to be governed by Austria, and Holstein by Prussia, which thus got control of Kiel and of the roads leading to the north. At the same moment Baron Schmerling, who had guided the domestic policy of Austria in a Liberal direction for several years, was dismissed.

Schmerling's fall was due to a number of different circumstances. He was unpopular with the Austrian aristocracy on account of his Liberal views, and he was opposed by the Hungarian Liberals, who would never agree with his policy of a unified Austria sending members to a Parliament at Vienna. In domestic policy the Emperor seems to have been guided chiefly by Count Maurice Esterházy; but be this as it may, the combination against Schmerling was an unholy alliance, entered into by persons who were in no real agreement with one another. He was succeeded by Count Belcredi, a man of Conservative principles but of no force of

character. From the time of Schmerling's fall to that of the Battle of Sadowa the Emperor's chief advisers were Esterházy—a Tory of the Tories, who wanted to put back the clock to before 1848—and the polite but invertebrate Mensdorff. As a soldier Mensdorff had a wholesome respect for the Prussian army; but as a servant of the Emperor Francis Joseph he deemed that obedience was his first and, indeed, his only duty. Neither Mensdorff nor Esterházy possessed at once the foresight to estimate the dangers of a war with Prussia and the courage to dissuade the Emperor from it. Francis Joseph, nursed in the old traditions of the Hapsburgs, could not but appeal to arms when, at the same time, the ancient rights of his house in Germany and Italy were challenged. That he found himself without allies when he drew the sword is due in part to his own mistaken policy; but the blame for it must rest largely on the ministers who were too stupid to foresee, or too subservient to insist upon, the desperate risk of war.

Had the Emperor been well advised in the autumn of 1865, he might have retired from the Elbe Duchies and from Venetia on highly favourable terms. During the autumn months, offers were made to give Austria compensation in money if she would relinquish

her rights in these outlying territories. These were refused on the ground that it was beneath the dignity of the House of Hapsburg to surrender its birthright for a mess of pottage. There might have been some force in the argument if the conduct of Austria had been consistent ; but so lately as July 1865 she had agreed to sell her rights in Lauenburg, a county of the Elbe Duchies, for two and a half million dollars. Moreover, the Emperor and his advisers, besides making mistakes abroad, alienated public feeling at home by a high-handed revocation of the constitution of 1861. On September 20, 1865, after a precarious life of four years, it was revoked by a stroke of the Imperial pen ; and though a formal recognition was given of the powers of the provincial diets in Austria, and of the Hungarian Diet at Budapest, nobody was satisfied. The Hungarians throughout maintained that Hungary was not a province with a mere provincial assembly, but a kingdom entitled to a separate Parliament and ministry. The Germans in Austria resented the revocation of a constitution which had been solemnly declared to be "irrevocable." The Czechs and other Slavonic inhabitants regarded the fall of Schmerling's constitution as a victory ; but those of them who understood things knew

very well that this change brought them no nearer to the realisation of Federalist dreams.

The year 1866, the most important in the Emperor's life, opened with an angry interchange of notes between Berlin and Vienna. In the portion of the Elbe Duchies which was under her control, Austria allowed royal receptions to be given to the wife of the Augustenburg claimant. Bismarck declared that such an action was tantamount to inciting the Duchies to rebellion against the dual control, and threatened to repudiate all obligation to act in common with Austria. Throughout February and March, both parties prepared for war, and Bismarck opened negotiations to secure the neutrality of Italy. These resulted, on the 8th of April, in a treaty which placed the Italian army at his disposal for three months. Prussia did not bind herself to go to war, but it was stipulated that, if she should do so, the Italian army would support her by an attack on Austria's Italian province. If a war took place, Italy was to have Venetia, but Prussia must receive "compensation" for this either in the shape of Austrian territory or of concessions to her policy on the part of Austria. Bismarck thus bought Italian support with an offer of Austrian territory—one of the most characteristic performances in his

history. The treaty once secured, Prussia was in a very strong position, and Italy, with everything to gain and nothing to lose by war, hoped eagerly for its declaration. Nevertheless, the outbreak was delayed for three months by the reluctance both of the Emperor Francis Joseph and of King William of Prussia to appear before Europe as the aggressor. Friendly notes were exchanged throughout April, and at the end of the month the Italian envoy in Paris spoke despondently of the prospect of obtaining Venice—the coping-stone of Italian unity. The mobilisation of the Austrian army, which was ordered on April 27, was ostensibly, and, it may be, sincerely intended for defence against Italy; but the terms of the alliance between Italy and Prussia gradually became known in Austria and raised so strong a feeling in the country, that it would have been difficult for even the most pacific Government to disregard it. So soon as the nature of this treaty became known the Emperor and his weak counsellors changed their tactics. At the moment of mobilisation they instructed Count Metternich, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, to ask for the mediation of the Emperor Napoleon III. in the Italian question. Had this step been taken earlier it might have prevented the

alliance between Italy and Prussia; but the Italian Government were now bound hand and foot to Bismarck for three months. Francis Joseph offered liberal terms, first, to retire from Venetia on receiving compensation elsewhere; and later, when he was harder pressed, to retire unconditionally. But his attempt to release his Italian army for service in Bohemia failed. In asking for French mediation he made a further mistake, for, in a controversy between Prussia and Austria, France could not be impartial. The Emperor Napoleon believed, as did most people at the time, that the Austrian army, if not divided by two enemies, could easily overcome the Prussians. If, then, Napoleon should dissuade Italy from engaging the Archduke Albrecht on the Mincio, France must look forward to the defeat of Prussia and to the unquestioned supremacy of Austria in Germany, and probably on the European Continent of the future. Such a result was contrary to the policy which France had followed ever since the days of Richelieu; and Napoleon III. hesitated to take a step which might lead to it. On the other hand, he tried to use his position as a neutral to obtain concessions on the Rhine from Prussia, and allowed Bismarck to know that he had been

asked to mediate. This policy which, in addition to being stupid, was contemptible, of course prevented a fair mediation. The Italian Government refused to receive Venetia at the hands of France, and Austria's attempt to disarm Italy and concentrate all forces to strike Prussia a decisive blow was a complete failure.

Though outmanœuvred in Italy Francis Joseph had still a great position in Germany. Bavaria was on his side, though she did not actively co-operate and refused to lend her army for defence of Bohemia. Saxony was thoroughly loyal to Austria. Hanover, once the most formidable rival to Prussia in the north, rejected Prussia's request for neutrality with scorn, and Hesse and other small German states were passively favourable to the Hapsburg. The Emperor Francis Joseph appealed to several of the smaller states for help, and, as we know, Hanover and Hesse suffered for their loyalty to him. But he had made a grave mistake in allowing himself to be drawn off Federal ground, and the results of this mistake were now clearly seen. He could not invite the Federal body to settle a question which he had, in 1864, promised to settle in exclusive agreement with Prussia. Yet, on

June 1, 1866, he did call on the *Bund* to intervene, alleging that he had found it impossible to come to an agreement with Prussia as contemplated by the treaty of 1864. The Prussian Government at once denounced Francis Joseph's action as a breach of the treaty of 1864, and after issuing an insolent circular note, denounced the treaty. On the 7th, Prussian troops commenced to pour into the Duchies. They arrested the Austrian Commissioner there, who was about to summon the Diet of Holstein in order to obtain their opinion as to the future. On June 14, when the German Council resolved, at the instance of Bavaria, to place four of the Federal army corps on a war footing, the Prussian delegate declared that the resolution was contrary to Federal law, that the Federation was broken, and that Prussia retired from it. For this action there was no sort of legal justification. The decree against which Prussia protested was passed as the proposal of Bavaria, and contained no menace to anybody. On the other hand, the alliance between Prussia and Italy of March 1866 was a flagrant breach of a fundamental rule of the *Bund*—that no member of it should enter into an alliance inimical to any other. But the Prussians were now ready. On June 15th they invaded Han-

over and Hesse; and Moltke's wide-winged march upon Bohemia had commenced.

A description of the Seven Weeks' War is outside the scope of this essay. The Emperor Francis Joseph placed entire reliance on Marshal Benedek, and forced the command of the northern army upon him against his will. In acting thus he was advised by Esterházy, who warned him of the evil results which might ensue if the army sustained a defeat when under the command of the only other general, the Archduke Albrecht. Benedek was in some ways a strong man, but he was not capable of taking command of 200,000 men and of fighting a great campaign in Bohemia. It must be remembered that he from the first modestly and firmly protested his inability. He knew Italy well, he said, but could not fight a campaign in the north with success. Once committed to the task he did his best, but from the first he misinterpreted the designs of the Prussian generals.

The concentration of the Austrian army in Moravia was due to a fear that Prussia would attempt a direct attack on Vienna by way of Glatz. Benedek remained in Moravia gathering his forces together when he should have been in Bohemia to interrupt the Prussian concentration and establish connection with the Saxon

army to the West. The Austrian concentration was necessarily slower than the Prussian owing to the fact that the Austrian regiments were, for political reasons, not kept near the place at which they were recruited. Thus, recruits from Venice had to go to Hungary, and recruits from Galicia or Transylvania to Bohemia, in order to join their colours. Despite these difficulties, however, Benedek ought to have reached the scene of action much earlier than he did; and even a few days before the decisive battle he had a very favourable prospect of throwing his whole force against the eastern Prussian army under the command of the Crown Prince. On the morning of June 28 his army was quartered in and about Josefstadt, and was in that position, beloved of Napoleon, which enabled him to strike first at one and then at the other of two converging enemies, in each case with superior force. This was pointed out to General Krismanitch, Benedek's adviser, on the morning of the 28th by at least one officer, who took the bold step of advising his superiors¹ to strike first at the eastern arm of the Prussian attack. The advice was rejected. It seems certain that the Austrian army could have reached and

¹ Friedjung, *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland*, ii. 85, 86.

attacked the Crown Prince late on the 28th, whilst he was still half entangled in the passes of the mountains, and the "Red Prince," Frederick Charles of Prussia, was two or three days' march away. The chance which was thus offered did not occur again.

The Emperor awaited anxiously the result of the first engagements. He was ill-informed as to the course of events until June 30, when Benedek told him of the recent retirement to Königgrätz. The general attributed the necessity for this retreat to the "*débâcle*" of the 1st and Saxon army corps, who had fought an unsuccessful engagement with the Prussians at Yitchin on the 29th. This was scarcely just, for both the corps here engaged, though defeated, had retired in good order. The Emperor was surprised, but with the courage which never deserts his house at such times, sent an encouraging reply to Benedek hoping for "favourable results" from his "energetic leadership." On the night of the 30th a hurried and disorderly retreat of the whole army took place. In the next forenoon, as his tired men found their new positions about Königgrätz, Benedek sent an urgent telegram to the Emperor begging him to make peace at any price, and announcing that a catastrophe was unavoidable. The Emperor

replied at 2 P.M., "To make peace is impossible. If a retreat is necessary, let it be made. Has there been a battle?" The last words of the telegram show that Francis Joseph was little aware of the course of events at the front, but its first words go down to the bottom of the Hapsburg creed. He would never make peace whilst the enemy was in his territories and he had an army wherewith to expel them. The result, which has already been the subject of many histories, needs no description here. The Prussian forces, which scattered widely for the advance, converged on July 2, and on the next day attacked Benedek in overwhelming force. The Austrian and Saxon armies lost in killed, wounded, and captured, over 44,000 men and 174 guns; the victors, 300 officers and less than 9,000 men. Benedek withdrew his scattered army towards the east, and so, through Moravia, southwards towards the Danube. But for the reckless bravery with which a portion of his cavalry and artillery covered his retreat, the losses of the Austrian army must have been much heavier.

Benedek was removed from his command in July when his army had withdrawn to the Danube, and was ordered to attend a military inquiry into his conduct of the campaign. The court of inquiry presented a preliminary

report to the Emperor, which was not published, and Francis Joseph, having read it, suspended all further proceedings against him and his subordinates, Krismanitch and Henikstein, by an order of December 4. A few days earlier Francis Joseph had sent to Count Clam-Gallas, the unsuccessful cavalry general, a letter which exculpated him from all blame. Krismanitch re-entered the service in 1876 and was given command of a fortress. Benedek retired to Gratz in Styria. Whilst awaiting news from Vienna he was visited on November 19 by the Archduke Albrecht. The Archduke asked him to give a written undertaking not to publish any correspondence which had passed between himself and his generals, or between himself and the Emperor, and not to make any public vindication of his conduct. Benedek gave this undertaking; and was surprised by the appearance, shortly afterwards, of an article in the official *Wiener Zeitung*, in which he was condemned. After referring to the fact that there was no law which punished incompetence, the article proceeded: "For the rest, the loss of the confidence of his Imperial master, the destruction of his military reputation before the world of to-day and of the future, the recognition of the immeasurable misfortune that, under his command, has befallen the army,

and, through its defect, has befallen the whole monarchy, must be a heavier penalty for the high-minded man that Benedek always was, than any punishment which could have come upon him by continuation of legal proceedings."

Benedek deeply resented the publication of this announcement after he had given a promise of silence ; and in his will he declaims against it as contrary to right and justice. He never forgave the Archduke Albrecht, and Field-Marshal John, whom he believed to be responsible for it. He never saw the Archduke again, and refused to see General John. In 1873 the Crown Prince Rudolf came to Gratz and wrote saying that the Emperor had requested him to bring news of Benedek's health : but the old general asked for no audience of the young Prince, merely saying that he wanted nothing but rest. He died at Gratz in 1881. His will contained a special direction that his corpse should not be laid to rest in Austrian uniform.

It has often been stated that the Archduke Albrecht persuaded Benedek to take the command in Bohemia by saying that if he did not do so and he (the Archduke) were appointed and defeated, the dynasty would be threatened, whilst if Benedek took it and failed, he alone

would be sacrificed. It has further been stated that the Emperor Francis Joseph always refused to receive the defeated general after his withdrawal to Gratz. These statements, so far as I have been able to discover, rest on the evidence of the general's widow contained in a memorandum which she wrote in 1886;¹ and on them the critics have framed a serious indictment against the Emperor. It does not seem to me material whether these facts be true or untrue. We know that Benedek was very unwilling to take the command in Bohemia and that he took it at the Emperor's command; and it is absurd to say that a general may refuse at any time to take a certain duty upon himself because he thinks that he may not be able to conduct a war with success. If such a doctrine were admitted into military law or custom, there would be an end of all discipline in the highest ranks of the army. It is admitted that Benedek was an unsuccessful general; and his champions have not proved, though they have sometimes asserted, that his hands were not really free whilst he was in command of the northern army. On the other hand, the mission of the Archduke Albrecht to Gratz in December 1866, and the binding of Benedek to silence by a written bond, is a pro-

¹ Friedjung, *Der Kampf*, etc., ii. 579.

ceeding of which it is difficult to believe that the Emperor was ignorant. The article in the *Wiener Zeitung* of 8th December 1866 could hardly have been published without his consent; and the silence with which he allowed it to circulate must be taken, by reasonable men, to be tantamount to approval. If the Emperor did approve the publication of this article, his approval conflicts with the rule of common justice that a man should be allowed to defend himself in public before he is publicly condemned. It is further inconsistent with the Emperor's own actions in ordering proceedings against General Benedek to be stayed. If the Emperor did not approve of the article, could he not have either informed his general of the fact or have permitted him to vindicate himself either in public, or, at least, personally before his sovereign? It is impossible, on a fair view of the matter, to conclude that the Emperor treated his general fairly; and the reasonable conclusion is that there was something to conceal.

Speculation as to what that something was is interesting, but idle. In cases of this importance it may be that the necessities of State override even the ordinary principles of justice. The Austrian Government allowed their diplomacy to outrun their defensive preparations and plunged Austria into a war for which she

was ill prepared. The Austria of the day was an autocracy, and autocracy can only submit to the trial of public opinion if it is certain of a favourable verdict. The Emperor must, however, have had something serious on his political conscience if he thus allowed a faithful, though inefficient, servant to be bound to silence, and then, in his silence, condemned. And, justice apart, it was an undignified thing to permit an article of this kind to go forth under the *imprimatur* of the Government. Whatever other mistakes they may have made, the Hapsburgs have rarely been wrong upon a point of dignity.

After Sadowa Francis Joseph soon sued for peace, which, after preliminaries at Nikolsburg, was signed in the *Blue Star* inn at Prag on August 23rd. Austria ceded Venetia and the "Quadrilateral" forts to Napoleon III., who handed them over to Italy; and so Italy, though defeated on land and sea by Austria, gained unity by Francis Joseph's defeat. Austria recognised the new German Confederation in which she should have no part. She ceded no Hapsburg lands and paid but a small indemnity. Generous terms, on which Bismarck insisted against the will of his master, lest Austria should be estranged for ever. Even in 1866 he was preparing for the war with France.

CHAPTER IV

1861-1867

Deák and the Hungarian Liberals—Passive resistance in Hungary—The negotiations of 1865—The result of Sadowa—The *Ausgleich* of 1867.

WE must now return to Hungary, which for sixteen years had been ruled by German officials from Vienna as a mere province of Austria. The defeat of 1849 had, as I have said, been followed by the introduction of the Bach system. Bach not only disregarded all the rights and privileges of the Hungarians, but actually cut up the kingdom into districts. For ten years Hungary disappeared from the map, and ceased to be even a geographical expression.

The Bach system was one of the most interesting and able attempts at bureaucratic government which has ever been tried in Europe; but a description of it would be out of place in this book. When the defeat came in Italy in 1859, Bach was dismissed, and Schmerling, who succeeded him, did his utmost

to induce the Hungarians to co-operate in working his constitution of 1861. Schmerling's policy would have reduced the Hungarian Parliament to the level of any one of the provincial Diets of Austria. "We acknowledge," said the Rescript promulgating his constitution, "that the Hungarian Diet will, in deviation from former law, deliberate on all questions concerning taxation and liability to military service and its regulations henceforth only in common with the other constitutional representatives of the Empire." This was the essence of Austrian Liberalism in 1861. During the summer of that year the Hungarian Diet was convened to elect members for the Austrian Parliament. Debates took place upon Schmerling's proposal, and the Hungarians refused to accept it. The Hungarian Parliament replied to his invitation in two remarkable addresses which are the work of Francis Deák, and which set out the Hungarian claim at great length; and a Royal Rescript of August 1861 expresses the views of Francis Joseph, as advised by Schmerling, upon them. The Hungarian address shows that, for reasons which I have already described, Hungary could not accept Francis Joseph as King until he had legalised his position in the country by coronation. He must further admit

the legality of the Parliament of 1848 by assenting to the laws which had been passed in that year, and to which his predecessor had promised assent. Coronation with the Crown of St. Stephen and recognition of the legality of the 1848 Parliament were the two things which Hungary must have. But apart from them, she did not admit the right of Schmerling's bogus Parliament to vote Hungarian taxes, and would not take part in the proceedings of any Diet in which the representatives of any other country but her own were present. Her leaders were, however, ready to make terms with the Emperor as to the small matters in which they could make concessions. Their attitude throughout was as loyal as possible; but on some points they would make no compromise. The leaders, moreover, were men of the first ability and knew how to wait. In patience, moderation, and resource they compared favourably with the Viennese ministers.

The Emperor would not listen to the addresses of the Diet, and dissolved it on 21st August. The dissolution caused profound discontent, and a conspiracy to refuse to pay taxes spread rapidly. The Emperor replied to this combination by billeting soldiers in the towns and villages of Hungary, and the taxes, when collected by force, were at length sullenly

paid. The country, in the autumn of 1861, resigned itself again to political inaction and arbitrary rule. The results of this treatment of Hungary were seen in 1866 when the Hungarians looked on in silence at the defeat of Austria by Prussia.

It is difficult to say how far the Emperor was responsible for the maintenance of the Schmerling policy. In German affairs he seems to have supported Schmerling's views, at all events till the end of 1863, when the failure at Frankfort proved to him that the idea of a Great Germany with Austria at her head was impracticable. Towards the Hungarians we know that he always had gracious intentions, and there are reasons for thinking that he did not altogether approve of the foolish policy of attempting to govern Hungary by means of Austrian ministers. A certain number of noble Hungarians were always about his court, and his beautiful wife was a constant friend to the champions of Magyar rights. The amnesty which he granted in 1862 to all political offenders in Hungary was given at the request of Count Forgach, the Governor of Hungary, and did not come through the ministry at Vienna. About the same time he spoke a few words to a deputation representing the Hungarian Landowners' Association which made a great impression. "It

is my wish," he said, "to satisfy Hungary not only in material respects, but in other matters also."

But until Easter 1865 nothing more was done to satisfy the Hungarians "in other matters also." The Hungarian question again came upon the carpet when Deák wrote his famous "Easter article" in the *Pesti Naplo*, a newspaper which reflected his views. This article and a series of letters with which Deák followed it up were of great importance as showing that the Hungarian Liberals were ready to admit the existence of "common affairs" as between Austria and Hungary. Whilst discussions raised by the Easter manifesto were occupying his advisers, the Emperor in June paid a visit to Budapest, and was received with great enthusiasm. He made a friendly speech, which gave no promises, but assured the Hungarians of the sympathy of their King. Moreover, he spoke in Magyar, which was at the moment tabooed by his own officials. The good impression caused by this speech was confirmed by the appointment of a Hungarian nobleman, Count Mailath, as a Court chancellor; whilst the ancient and honoured post of *Tavernicus*, or Treasurer of Hungary, was given to Baron Sennyei, a Conservative magnate who had long been in favour of a compromise with Hungary. These changes synchronised with the decline

and fall of the Schmerling ministry in Vienna, of which I have said something in a previous chapter. That event affected Hungary only to this extent, that Schmerling was essentially a German, and his constitution was framed so as to bring about a government by the middle classes and the *bourgeoisie*. Hungary, at that time a country of aristocrats and peasants, had no middle class, and was profoundly hostile to the idea of German middle-class government.

Count Belcredi, who succeeded Schmerling in July 1865, was a Moravian, a Conservative, and, above all, a Federalist. Under his advice the Emperor, on September 2, published a remarkable manifesto. This document may be recommended to those who desire to become masters in the art of obscure expression. The gist of it was that the Emperor suspended the Schmerling constitution, and exchanged the policy of a strong central Parliament and powerless provincial Diets for one in which a large measure of power was given to the Diets and the central authority proportionately weakened. This change was due in part to a feeling in Vienna that it was hopeless to go on with Schmerling's Parliament if the Hungarians would not send deputies to it. The Emperor's speeches of 1865 at Budapest have this behind them; and the Conservative advisers who

surrounded him in that year had never been so hostile to the Hungarian claims as the middle-class German Liberals. Esterházy, his confidential friend and adviser at the time, was, of course, a Magyar by blood though a cosmopolitan by taste and training. Mensdorff, the Premier, was first of all a soldier ; and, as a soldier, knew that, difficult as it would be for Austria to wage a successful war with Prussia, a success would be impossible without the cordial co-operation of Hungary. For the second time in a single year Francis Joseph visited Budapest in December 1865, and the speech which he made in opening the Diet showed that he was anxious to come to terms with the Magyar leaders. "We are now come," he said, "to finish the work which our feeling of the duties of government compelled us to begin. Our object in coming among you in person is more effectually to remove those scruples which till now have prevented the solution of the political questions with which we have to deal." Proceeding with his speech, the Emperor formally abandoned the doctrine, long maintained by the extreme Austrians, that Hungary had forfeited her rights by the insurrection of 1848. He admitted the existence of the Pragmatic Sanction, and consequently, the conditions upon which it was accepted by the kingdom of St. Stephen. He

asked the Diet to take its stand upon that law, to consider the constitutions of October 1860 and February 1861, and the recent manifesto of September 1865, and—this was the most important point—“to revise or reform that part of the laws of 1848 which refers to the exercise of our rights of sovereignty and the limitations of the attributes of government.” “Only when this has been done,” continued the Emperor, “will it be possible for the King with a quiet conscience to take the Royal Coronation oath to the Hungarian constitution . . . and be solemnly invested with the diadem of St. Stephen, our Apostolic forefather, with that sacred crown in which we would fain insert, as its most precious jewel, the prosperity of our kingdom of Hungary and the unbroken love of our people.”

This speech was a great advance upon anything which the Emperor had yet said to Hungary, but it did not go far enough to satisfy Andrassy and Deák, now the recognised Hungarian leaders. The acceptance of the constitution of 1860 or 1861 would have reduced the Hungarian Parliament to the level of the provincial Diets of Austria, and would in consequence have left no room or function for an independent Hungarian Cabinet. The Magyars held out for the right to surround

the Emperor — as King of Hungary — with Hungarian advisers, who should be responsible to a Hungarian Parliament. They were determined now, as in 1849, to resist the inclusion of Hungary in any parliamentary system which might be set up in Austria. They knew that such a system, if set up by an autocrat, might at any time be withdrawn at will, as had been the case with the constitutions of 1849 and 1861. They refused to imperil their time-honoured institutions by exchanging them for paper-made rights which might be cancelled in a moment. The reason for this is obvious. If the Hungarians came to a Parliament in Vienna they would always be in a minority. They would be unable to legislate for their own country, and must take laws framed by the deputies representing the rest of the Empire. Above all, they would be prevented from preserving the Magyar "nationality" by legislation as to language, franchise, and education. In the history of Francis Joseph's life we read a great deal about constitutional law and constitutional machinery. Such things are only a means to an end. The Hungarian end was to prevent their place and nation from being expunged from the map of Europe, as Poland had been wiped out eighty years before. All the disputes about the "laws of '48," "con-

tinuity of right," diplomas, patents, and so forth, had this, and this only, for their object.

The address in reply which the Hungarian Diet presented to the Emperor (February 24, 1866) was framed with these views in mind. The Hungarians admitted that there were matters which were common to the Kingdom of St. Stephen and the other lands owned by the Hapsburg dynasty. They promised that a Bill should be introduced to make provision for the definition and treatment of these affairs, and that the revision of the laws of 1848 should be considered; but it required as a *sine qua non* that the proposals for revision of those laws should be laid before the Diet by a responsible Hungarian ministry. "The land," they said, "still remains under absolute rule. Sanctioned laws to which even your Majesty allows that no objection can be raised on the score of legality are treated as if non-existent. . . . We therefore plead for continuity of right above all in respect of our laws, for parliamentary government and for a responsible ministry. . . . All we demand is the restoration of the law: for a law not enforced is a dead letter."

Such was the answer which Hungary gave to the Emperor in February 1866. Francis Joseph received it in the audience chamber of the palace on the hill at Buda. His answer

was short. The interest and the peoples of Austria required that the principles laid down in the speech from the throne of December 12, 1865, should be respected. So saying, the Emperor turned and left the chamber. He did not meet the Hungarian leaders again until the Prussian legions were on the road to Vienna.

Though their demand for a ministry was thus rejected, the Diet, at Deák's advice, did not refuse to consider the preliminaries of a possible settlement. Deák drew up a scheme for the management of the foreign affairs of Austria and Hungary and submitted it to a large committee of the Diet. The House also proceeded to discuss the revision of the laws of 1848. They were engaged in these tasks when on 18th June Prussia and Italy declared war on Austria. After the Austrian victory at Custozza on 24th June, the Emperor, however, thought himself strong enough to meet his enemies without having to concede the points demanded by Hungary. On 24th June the Magyar Diet was dissolved whilst Magyar regiments were marching to the battle-fields in Bohemia. On 3rd July the battle of Sadowa was fought and lost.

Two weeks after the defeat in Bohemia the Emperor summoned Deák to Vienna. The Hungarian leader arrived late in the evening.

He was at once admitted to an audience, and found Francis Joseph alone and lost in thought. After a short time the monarch turned round and said abruptly, "Well, Deák, what shall I do now?" Deák answered, "Your Majesty must first make peace and then give Hungary her rights." "Will the Hungarian Parliament give me men to carry on the war if I give the constitution at once?" asked the Emperor. To his great credit be it said that Deák refused. The Emperor again waited for some time, and finally said, "I suppose it must be so."¹ The interview terminated at once, and, without seeing any officials, Deák returned to Budapest. His answer to Francis Joseph's request was one which only a strong man could have given. The Hungarian Liberals had admitted that in the conduct of foreign affairs Austria and Hungary should and could act together; and surely the defence of the monarchy might be said to be a matter of common interest. But the war of 1866 had been brought on by the mistakes and weakness of the old absolutist *régime*, and Deák refused, even if Hungary were now satisfied, to involve Hungary in a war which was undertaken before that satisfaction was given.

¹ *Francis Deák: a Memoir* (Macmillans, 1880), p. 237. I am much indebted to this admirable book.

The defeat of Sadowa led, not unnaturally, to a change of ministers at Vienna. Count Mensdorff resigned, and Count Beust, till lately Minister-President in Saxony, succeeded him. As to Count Beust's views and policy in Austria proper something will be said elsewhere. With regard to Hungary, his view was that the Hungarian terms must at all costs be accepted. These terms were embodied in the draft constitution prepared by Deák which had been discussed by a committee of the Hungarian Diet for some time before its dissolution. The Diet reassembled shortly after Sadowa, and took up the scheme; but opinion in Hungary was divided as to its merits, and a strong party in the Parliament thought that it went too far in the path of compromise with Austria. These men proposed to have no connection at all with the Hapsburg territories except the mere fact that the same man should be Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. They were led by Koloman Tisza, afterwards for fifteen years (1875-1890) Prime Minister of Hungary, who, though inferior to Deák in logic, prudence, and consistency, was more than a match for him in eloquence and the craft of Parliamentary leadership. Deák saw that Hungary must make some allowance for Austrian susceptibilities and difficulties. Tisza

wanted to make none, and Tisza's position was strengthened by the fact that, in spite of Beust's advice, the Emperor was still slow to admit the Hungarian claim in its entirety. The debates in Hungary, which took up the rest of the year 1866, cannot be detailed here. At its close public opinion in Hungary was embittered by the procrastination of the Emperor, but in the first weeks of 1867 his reluctance was gradually conquered. Early in February Count Belcredi resigned office at Vienna, and on the 18th a royal Rescript was issued restoring the constitution of Hungary, and cancelling the autocratic decrees for military service,—thus accepting the Hungarian military law of 1848. Count Julius Andrassy, a Liberal nobleman who had been condemned to death in 1849 as an accomplice of Kossuth, was entrusted with the formation of a responsible Hungarian ministry. Almost at the same time a decree was issued at Vienna, signed by Count Beust, convoking a Parliament for the Austrian dominions of the Emperor. The new Parliament was not to discuss the Hungarian constitution at all, or to alter the arrangements made for regulating the common affairs of the monarchy. It was to accept them as an accomplished fact.

This decree evoked angry protest from the

several provinces of the Austrian Empire. These provinces relied on the promise of the Emperor contained in the manifesto of September 1865, which said that the arrangement with Hungary should be submitted for approval to the provincial diets. The institution of a central Parliament for the whole of non-Hungarian Austria was, it was urged, a breach of faith. About the objections of the Bohemians and other nationalities I shall say more in another chapter. Here I need only say that Deák's policy was accepted by the Emperor and Count Beust. It consisted in establishing two nationalities—the German in Austria, the Magyar in Hungary—as supreme in Austria-Hungary. These two were to be dominant races. The others were to be subject to them.

The main provisions of the constitution of 1867, which still endures, may be described in a few words. Austria and Hungary became two states of equal rights and powers. Each was to have a Parliament of two houses, and in each a ministry was to be appointed to advise the sovereign, and to answer to the Parliaments for his acts. Certain matters—the conduct of war and diplomacy, and the expenditure of money necessary therefor—were recognised as common to Hungary and

Austria, and were removed from the competence and discussion of both Parliaments. Three "Austro-Hungarian" ministers were to be appointed to advise the Emperor—now the "Emperor-King"—on these matters. These were to be responsible, not to either Parliament but to two bodies of sixty men called "Delegations." Of the sixty delegates forty were in each case to be elected by the Lower Houses of the Parliaments, and twenty by the Houses of Peers. These Delegations were to meet year and year about at Vienna and Budapest, and to sit and debate apart. The idea of their meeting and debating together was strenuously opposed by Deák, as such a joint meeting would surely form the germ of a single Parliament. The Delegations communicate by means of messages, and only meet if, after three messages and answers, they are unable to agree. Should such a meeting take place, the members simply assemble and vote *without discussion*; and the Emperor has a casting vote. The army, navy, and diplomatic service being the only subjects of joint expenditure are supported by a fund composed of, first, the yield of the customs, and then of moneys contributed by the two states to the common exchequer.

In addition to the "common affairs" of

Austria and Hungary certain things are declared by the constitution of 1867 to be matters for similar legislation by the Parliaments of the two countries, and for arrangement by treaty between the two nations. These are the customs, indirect taxations, currency, banking, and the fixing of the proportions in which Austria and Hungary shall contribute to the common expenses of the monarchy. Austria originally agreed to pay 70 and Hungary 30 per cent. The treaty made between the two nations in 1867 lapses every ten years, and has since been renewed. It was renewed in 1878 and 1888, and has since been prolonged so as to last till 1917. The discussions as to its renewal raised violent controversy between the two parties to the monarchy, of which I shall have to say something in a later chapter. The Hungarian "quota" of common expenses has been slightly increased by modern changes, and is now about 34 per cent.

The enactment of this constitution was the most important event in the reign of Francis Joseph. The history of its subsequent years is the history of an attempt to work out the compromise which it effected, and to use its machinery for the government and preservation of a great mid-European

monarchy. In one sense the compromise was an admission by Francis Joseph of the principle against which he had long contended—the principle of nationality. It granted to the Magyars the fullest recognition of ancient rights or claims, and admitted that neither the surrender of 1683 nor the conquest of 1849 had extinguished them. But this grant, or rather recognition, of Magyar rights was in reality very different from the recognition of the nationalist claims of Poles, Croats, Czechs or Slovaks which have so frequently been put forward in modern times. Hungary had a very firm basis of historic right for her demands. She was not, like Ireland, a country inhabited by tribes alien to the dominant race, but which had never had an organised government separate from England. She had for many centuries had her own King and Parliament, and from the year 1000 had held, by grant from the then author of all political sovereignty, the right to elect and crown independent sovereigns. The compromise of 1867 was a recognition of this right. It gave to Hungary nothing which she had not had before. Their demands conceded, the Hungarians admitted on their part that their acceptance of the Hapsburgs as Kings of Hungary carried with it certain

obligations to the other subjects of that dynasty. These obligations they fulfilled by committing the control of their army and the conduct of their relations with foreign countries to an authority over which they could not exercise complete control. The Emperor and the aristocratic caste which represented, which *was*, the old Austria, looked upon the preservation of the Hapsburg dynasty and dignity as paramount to all considerations of popular liberties or nationalist aspirations. To the maintenance of their principle, the existence of a single army and the control of that army in peace or war by the Crown was vital. In the compromise of 1867 the Hungarians admitted that respect was due to this conception of public law. This compromise, therefore, was a compromise in the truest sense of the word. A way was found to combine liberty with discipline and reconcile two conflicting theories of state. Like all compromises—the institution of the Church of England is a case in point—it was open to criticism by men of pure logic: but as compromise is latent in the nature and character of men, it is also latent in the nature and character of states. The question for the future was whether this compromise would last. It has yet to be answered.

On the 8th of June 1867 the Emperor was crowned with the Crown of St. Stephen in the cathedral of Buda. Escorted by a long procession of the nobles of Church and State dressed in the splendid costume of that order, he went from the church of coronation to the Coronation Hill in Pesth. Mounted on a white horse, he ascended the hill, and, in accordance with ancient ceremony, waved his sword to the four points of the compass, to symbolise the readiness of the King of Hungary to meet his subjects' enemies, from whatever quarter they might come. An English writer¹ has described the feelings of the Hungarian nation on this great occasion. "To those," she writes, "who could recall the bitter experiences of war, oppression, and acute helpless misery which their country had been doomed to undergo . . ., who had followed with keen anxiety the hopes and disappointments of the last six years, and the slow but patient advance of Hungary towards recovery of her ancient and never-forgotten rights; to them the ceremony of the 8th of June was something more than an imposing pageant. For beneath the quaint symbolism, the gorgeous trappings that seemed more befitting the glories of the Field of the

¹ The author of *Francis Deak*, quoted above, p. 116.

Cloth of Gold than the sober usages of the nineteenth century, might be felt the beating of a nation's heart. Every detail in the stately and elaborate ceremony was fraught with genuine significance to those in whose minds the traditions of their past history were so closely interwoven with the events of present politics, as to be matters not of antiquarian interest, but of actual practical importance. It is not often that in this prosaic age the deepest realities of national life and feelings have their true expression in so picturesque a form as on the coronation day of the Hapsburg King of Hungary."

CHAPTER V

1867-1878

Federalist Movement in Austria—The Hohenwart Ministry and its Failure—Home Rule in Croatia—Tisza's Ministry—Austria and France in 1870—The Russo-Turkish War—Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

THUS, after many attempts and many errors, did Francis Joseph at length make a successful stroke in politics. The new monarchy, which was created by the compromise of 1867, has since existed, and has become an important member of the society of European states. It cannot be said that the compromise solved all, or nearly all, the difficulties with which the Emperor had to deal; but nobody can deny that it has resulted in a great accession of strength to the states who were parties to it. The defeats of Solferino and Sadowa, which were supposed to be nails in the coffin of Austria, have turned out to be something quite different, and preluded the entry of Austria and Hungary into a new position,

and a new importance in Europe. During the ten years following 1867, Austria does not appear on the stage of European politics. She is neutral during the Franco-Prussian war, yet she does not, like the France of Napoleon III., try to sell her neutrality for territory or compensation. The Emperor retires from the field of Europe, and his country endeavours to realise its new character and position. The process takes much time and causes many difficulties. Let us review the period first in Austria and then in Hungary; and lastly, in 1878, look once more abroad.

One of the most important sections of the act of Compromise declared that Hungary could only deal with Austria so long as she was in possession of a representative system; that is to say, of an elected legislature to which the Austrian ministry was responsible. This provision made it necessary to call a Parliament in Austria, where there had been no central legislature since the Belcredi manifesto of September, 1865. In the summer of 1867, accordingly, a Reichsrath was summoned, but it could only accept, and not modify, the agreement made by Francis Joseph with Hungary. The Austrian Parliament did so, and, at the same time, submitted a new form of constitution for itself, which on December

12, 1867, received the Imperial approval. This scheme prohibited further suspensions of the constitution of Austria, and provided for the independence of the judges. The franchise law, which had been devised by Baron von Schmerling so as to ensure a majority of Germans, was left untouched. Prince Charles Auersperg assumed office as Prime Minister, and was supported by a Cabinet of German *bourgeois*, who observed the compromise with Hungary and acted loyally to it in the arrangement of those questions which had been declared to be matter for treaty between the two countries. A treaty was made in 1868 to last for ten years, and the Austrian Parliament passed to local matters which called for urgent treatment. The control of the Church over marriage and education, which had been secured to the priesthood by the *Concordat* of 1855, was recovered for the state. This step raised a violent clerical agitation in the country which, coming at the same time as the Bohemian protest, occupied the attention of the Austrian Ministry for many years.

The Czech leaders in Bohemia promptly opposed the compromise of 1867. In August 1868 they issued a declaration which may be said to mark the formal commencement of an agitation that has since passed through many

phases but is not yet satisfied. The men who signed this declaration had been returned by the Czech constituencies to the Bohemian Diet of 1868; but, owing to the peculiar provisions of Baron Schmerling's electoral law, they were in the minority in the Diet though representing the majority of the population. They consequently refused to attend the Diet, and issued their declaration. It said that Bohemia was united with Austria only by the personal tie of a common sovereign, that the "Austria" recognised by the compromise of 1867 was a mere invention and had no political existence, that the revolution of the Austrian Reichsrath could not bind Bohemia or impose any burdens upon her, and that the kingdom of Venceslas must be entitled to a just franchise law, and an "honest election" in order that the will of her people might be expressed in the Diet. Moravia, a Czech province of Austria, followed suit with an even stronger declaration, and in the winter of 1868-9 the agitation against the compromise became so violent that in the following spring the Emperor had to declare a "state of siege" in Prag. In Galicia the Polish aristocracy had no historic rights to go upon, but in September 1867 they claimed a position similar to that asked for by the Czechs, and demanded

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a ministry responsible to their own local Diet. Thus we see that the example of Hungary was followed by the outlying provinces of Austria in which races alien to the German had a numerical majority. The claims of these races were never recognised to the full by Francis Joseph. In Galicia the population consists of the aristocracy of Roman Catholic Poles and a numerous peasantry and working-class of Greek Orthodox or Greek-Catholic Ruthenians. In the old days of the Polish kingdom, and indeed up to 1867, the Poles lorded it over the Ruthenians. When, therefore, the Poles put forward the demands of 1868, they were opposed by the Ruthenians, who feared that their Polish overlords might become too powerful. Indeed, the Ruthenians liked the idea of strong central government to help them against their overlords. The Emperor refused to make the concessions demanded by the Poles. The chief result of their agitation was that an Imperial visit to Galicia, which was planned for the summer of 1868, was abandoned. Small concessions were made to Galicia by allowing the use of the Polish language as the official tongue in the province, by appointing a special minister "for Galicia" in the Austrian Cabinet, and by extending slightly the competence of the Galician Diet: but

beyond this the largest province of Austria which "marches" for many hundred miles with Russia, has remained completely subject to the Parliament and Government at Vienna. In Dalmatia the Servians claimed the same rights as the Poles, and here again there was a contest between the Italian gentry or nobility and a peasantry who are of Servian race. The Servians took up arms in 1869, and the Government of Vienna had to send soldiers to suppress them. The Dalmatian revolt was not suppressed till the close of 1869.

The Emperor was determined to make no concessions in Galicia or Dalmatia, but in Bohemia the Czechs had a certain amount of "historic justice" to support their claim,¹ and after waiting for a year or two, he appointed a Federalist ministry with the avowed intention of meeting their demands. Count Hohenwart, formerly Governor of Upper Austria, became Premier. He was a staunch German by tradi-

¹ In 1522, Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria and afterwards Emperor, married Anne, the heiress to the Crowns of Hungary and Bohemia, and succeeded her brother, Louis II., as king of both countries in 1526; but, waiving his hereditary right, stood for election, and was elected in October 1526. He was crowned at Prag in 1527, and promised to respect the laws and customs of Bohemia. The Bohemians, eighty years afterwards, disowned the Emperor Ferdinand II. as King of Bohemia, and elected the Elector Palatine, son-in-law of James I. of England, as king in August 1619. He was only king for a winter, however (the "Winter King"), and deserted his kingdom after the defeat of Prag (November 1620). The Government of the Hapsburgs was then restored, and all Bohemian rights abolished.

tion, but he called two Czech politicians into his Cabinet and appointed to the Ministry of Commerce Dr. Schäffle, a Professor of Tübingen University, who had been expelled from his chair for publicly expressing his hatred of the Prussians. This ministry entered into negotiations with the Czech and German leaders, and the negotiations went on satisfactorily during the early months of 1871. The Germans in the Reichsrath, however, protested violently, as they have since done, against any concession to the Czechs, and, on May 26th, passed a vote of no confidence in the ministry. The Emperor, now committed to a Federalist policy, waited until the Budget was passed, and then prorogued the Austrian Parliament. This step was followed by a decree of dissolution on August 10, and at the same moment by the dissolution of the Diets of Silesia and Moravia, in which the Germans had a majority. On September 14 the Bohemian Diet was opened at Prag, and the Czech deputies for the first time took their seats and found themselves in a majority. The Emperor's speech at the opening was conciliatory, and promised that the kingdom of Bohemia should be recognised.

"Recognising the political importance of the Crown of Bohemia," said the Emperor,

“calling to mind the renown and glory which that Crown has conferred upon our predecessors, and full of gratitude for the fidelity with which the Bohemian nation has supported our throne, we are ready to recognise the rights of the kingdom, and to repeat this recognition by the coronation oath.” But Francis Joseph stated that he was already under certain obligations to the other races of the monarchy, and could not go back upon his acceptance of the Hungarian compromise of 1867. He therefore invited the Diet to consider means of agreement between Bohemia and the rest of the monarchy in conformity with that compromise.

The Czech party in the Diet were delighted at this message. Left alone by the secession of the Germans, they elaborated “fundamental articles” which were submitted for the approval of the Crown. Bohemia was to have special representatives in the Austrian Delegation, and these were to be chosen, not by the Parliament at Vienna, but by the Bohemian Diet. A council composed of delegates from the Austrian provincial diets was to be established with power to legislate as to the common affairs of non-Hungarian Austria; and the franchise and distribution of seats, now regulated in the interest of the Germans by Schmerling’s laws, was to be revised so as

to give to the Czechs the seats to which their numbers and property entitled them. If these proposals had been accepted, the Austrian Parliament must have ceased to exist. The Emperor, though he received them with goodwill, saw that it was not possible to accede to them. He begged the Czech leaders to secure the return of Czech deputies to the Austrian Parliament, and to thrash out the matter in that Parliament. "I will *octroyer* no more constitutions," he said. It was on this point, the recognition of the Austrian Parliament as competent to deal with Bohemian affairs, that the negotiations with the Czechs came to grief. The Bohemians, and more especially the Czech aristocracy, refused to recognise it, and whilst the attempts were being made to wean them from this view, Hungary intervened. Count Andrassy, the Hungarian Premier, appeared in October at Vienna and entered a firm protest against the policy of submitting the Act of 1867 to the approval of the Bohemian Diet. After long discussions and many meetings of the Austrian and Hungarian Premiers, the Magyars carried the day. A ministerial council was held on 20th October, and directly afterwards the Czech leaders were informed that the Emperor could not be crowned at Prag unless the Austro-Hungarian compromise were

first accepted *in toto* by their followers. The Czechs refused to accept it, and on 30th October the Federalist Ministry sent in its resignation. Count Hohenwart's Ministry was ultimately succeeded by a Cabinet of anti-Federalists under Prince Adolf Auersperg. The Bohemian Diet was asked to send deputies to the Parliament which was summoned to meet at the end of November. Copies of the Emperor's address, in which he promised to recognise the rights of Bohemia, were seized by the police and destroyed. The Bohemian Diet was dissolved. Although the Federalist deputies stayed away, a *quorum* was obtained at Vienna, and the dual system was restored as if nothing had happened since 1867.

Hohenwart's resignation was soon followed by the retirement of Count Beust, who, during the whole of these negotiations, had been Foreign Minister and Chancellor of the dual monarchy. The actual reasons for Beust's retirement have not been made clear, and his own memoirs throw little light upon them. Beust was a strong opponent of the Federalist policy; and yet at the moment when the Federalist policy is condemned he retired and was "side-tracked," as the Americans say, to the embassy in London.

Beust was, however, a strong opponent of the clerical party, and the clericals, though they had lately lost much ground, were still powerful in the *entourage* of the Emperor. The Chancellor was, moreover, suspected of being a strong friend of the Germans in Austria, and after his friendly meeting with Bismarck at Gastein in May 1871 was often charged with complaisance towards the great Prussian. Of this there is no evidence, but it may be that the Emperor, having decided against the Czechs and other Federalists, wished to placate them by sacrificing a minister whom they believed to be their enemy. On at least one other occasion in his reign he took this course. To accept the principles or measures of a statesman and to sacrifice the minister who has fought for them is one of his favourite moves in the game of politics. It secures a material victory for the side which he considers right, and allows the defeated party to console itself with something which passes for a personal triumph.

That the Emperor has on so many occasions made the move with success speaks well both for his own judgment and for the loyalty of his servants. To the modern critic it is perplexing. It is possible, however—I suggest this as an explanation of the disappearance of

Beust — that the Chancellor had not really opposed the policy of concession to Bohemia, but had allowed it to go forward. It did, in fact, go forward, and that, too, at a time when he was able to stop it, or to resign if the Emperor proceeded in it. He did not resign, and we are therefore entitled to suppose that he consented to the Hohenwart programme, if nothing more. Then the Hungarians spoke. Andrassy came to Vienna and said he would not have a triple monarchy ; and Beust, whom nobody could take for a strong man, wobbled and supported Andrassy. One can well suppose the Emperor saying to his Chancellor, "Very well, if you won't advise the coronation at Prag, I shan't go on ; but, as you have supported me in this policy, I won't have you as Chancellor any more. I appoint you my Ambassador in London." And so Beust goes, and, as we know, goes without bitterness. This is merely a suggestion offered to explain a strange move in the game. The Emperor is the only man now alive who could say whether it is correct.

Count Andrassy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, was appointed to succeed Beust as Chancellor on November 14, 1871 ; this appointment closes the history of four eventful years. His entry into the inner counsels of

the Emperor-King marks the establishment of the Hungarian domination in Austria-Hungary. In 1867 the Hungarians had succeeded in being placed on equal footing with the Germans of Austria as a ruling nationality. In 1871 they secured that no other nationality should have a similar position.

The Emperor, now no longer under the advice of the old school, appears in this period as a moderate and judicious ruler. The Hungarian compromise had not been obtained from him without many searchings of heart ; but, once his word was pledged, he loyally adhered to it. Although the Czechs regarded his policy at the end of 1871 as a breach of faith, it must be remembered that he had promised to be crowned in Bohemia only upon certain conditions, and that these conditions had not been fulfilled. Francis Joseph hoped that as the Hungarians had framed a constitution which he could accept without breaking up the military and diplomatic unity—if I may use these terms—of his monarchy, so the Czechs would find some means by which he could satisfy their demands without violating either the unity of the monarchy or the constitution of 1867. But the Czechs did not recognise the constitution of 1867, and claimed that in 1871 they were dealing with the Emperor as a free

agent. He was no longer free, for he had undertaken in 1867 to maintain a Parliament for *the whole* of Austria. He could not, therefore, agree with the Bohemians who would not, and did not, recognise that Parliament. Some critics have said that Francis Joseph was wrong in not bringing on the two questions together. If he was going to acknowledge the separate rights of Bohemia at all, he should, they say, have recognised them in 1867 before closing with the Hungarian leaders. In one sense, therefore, his policy of 1867 may be blamed for shortsightedness. After 1867 the need for an agreement with Hungary was, from one point of view, no longer pressing, and he might have been able to effect a double bargain with Bohemia and Hungary. But it is a moot point whether the Magyars would have accepted a constitution which gave to Bohemia a place in the monarchy equal to theirs. The closest observer of Hungary's policy must doubt that they would ever have done so. Evidently, this was Francis Joseph's view.

k If the Federalist action of the Hohenwart and Potochni ministries was unpopular, their action in repudiating the *Concordat* of 1855 was quite the reverse. The history of Italy and of Rome does not, after 1859, concern

Francis Joseph so closely as before; but Austria, as a whole, was deeply interested in the proceedings of the Ecumenical Council of 1870, and her representatives amongst the Bishops took a distinguished part in its debates. Cardinal Schwartzberg, Archbishop of Prag; Cardinal Rauscher, Archbishop of Vienna, who had been his tutor, and Bishop Strossmayer, of Diakova in Croatia, were amongst the most distinguished members of the Liberal opposition, and constantly spoke and voted against the pretensions of the extreme Ultramontanes. Count Beust supported this attitude in despatches to the Austrian Ambassador at Rome. The repudiation of the *Concordat* of 1855 took place on 30th July 1870, and is an event of great significance. Austria had from time immemorial been a close friend and political patron of the Holy See. Her influence had supported the Pope as a temporal monarch. Francis Joseph, and Pius IX. had a common enemy in Victor Emanuel, and a common interest in the disintegration of Italy. Even after Sadowa, the Austrian Emperor maintained considerable influence in Italy merely by force of tradition. But this now ceases. The repudiation of the *Concordat* happened, though by an accident, to synchronise with the withdrawal of the French

troops from Rome, the occupation of Victor Emanuel, and the final completion of the work of Italian unity. At this moment Austria shakes off her partial servitude to the Pope, and her liberation prepares the way for a *rapprochement* with the new kingdom of Italy. In the events of 1870 we see premonitory signs of the new Triple Alliance which is a striking feature of the Emperor's later policy.

Between 1872 and 1878 Austria remains at peace within her borders. After the fall of the Hohenwart ministry the internal politics of the country enter upon a period of repose. Prince Adolf Auersperg became Premier and remained in charge of the affairs of the country for eight years. The year 1872 was devoted to electoral reform, and on March 1873 a new electoral law was passed which abolished the old system of indirect elections by diets of the provinces, and divided the Austrian electors into four classes or colleges. The great landed proprietors, the municipalities, the chambers of commerce, and the country districts each returned a certain number of members; and this old-fashioned system prevailed in Austria until the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907. The Poles of Galicia objected strongly to the change, and the Italian members for the Trentino, a "circle" of the Southern Tyrol,

also protested ; but as these last were only two in number, the Emperor was able to disregard their objection. He favoured the Poles by appointing the Mayor of Lemberg a minister without portfolio in his Cabinet, as a mark of his "constant solicitude for the affairs of Galicia." The cynical observer of the nationalist movements must observe with delight how often and how easily provincial patriots have been induced to forgo the pleasures of liberty by a taste of the sweets of office.

In October 1873 elections took place under the new electoral law. They resulted in a centralist victory, the central group getting a majority of over 100 in a House of 353. In 1875 the clerical policy of the Emperor was completed and the last vestiges of the *Concordat* disappeared. When the first decade of Austria's parliamentary life closed the Parliament at Vienna was well in hand and the Premier could count on a good majority.

In Hungary the ten years following 1867 were not without important events, but as these have no direct bearing upon the subject of this essay they need no long notice. Deák remained the ruling statesman in Hungary till his death in 1876. Andrassy, Premier till 1876, was his fast friend, and after Andrassy's promotion a series of Premiers took office, ending

in 1875 with Tisza, whose Premiership began in that year and did not end till 1890. During all this time the Liberal party was in power in Hungary. It took office in 1867 and held it without interruption till 1904. In 1868 Hungary turned to Croatia, whose claims to a separate government she had always recognised, and asked her to formulate her claims. "Here is a clean sheet," said Deák. "Write on it what you will, and so long as it does not violate the unity of Hungary we will agree to it beforehand." After a negotiation unusually short, generous terms were given to the Croats. Three departments of state—justice, education, and domestic affairs—were handed over to local control, and local ministers, called chiefs of sections, were entrusted with their management. The collection and imposition of taxes remained in the competence of the Hungarian Parliament, and of the revenue collected in Croatia 55 per cent was kept for the Hungarian Budget, whilst the remainder was handed to the local authorities for local needs. Hungary guaranteed, however, that Croatia should always have 2,200,000 florins for her own use, and if 45 per cent of the Croatian revenue does not, in any year, make up that sum, the payment to Hungary is reduced so as to allow to Croatia the guaranteed sum. If, on the other

hand, 45 per cent of the Croatian revenue comes to more than 2,200,000 florins, Croatia gains by the surplus. A special clause in the 1868 constitution provides that Croatia shall not be bound to repay out of the surplus of one year any sum which Hungary may have had to remit out of the 55 per cent in a previous year. Thus Croatia knows for certain what her minimum revenue will be. The Ban of Croatia, an officer of ancient traditions, became Lord-Lieutenant of the country and at the same time chairman of the Diet, and, one may say, Prime Minister of the country. He is appointed by the King of Hungary on the recommendation of the Hungarian ministry, and therefore comes and goes with the Hungarian ministry. He answers questions as to the general policy of the Government and makes ministerial statements from the Speaker's chair. The Diet sends twenty-nine delegates to the Hungarian Lower House and two to the Hungarian Chamber of Peers. These attend and debate on common affairs, but leave the House when a matter of purely Hungarian interest is under discussion. They have the right of speaking in Croat, but do not now exercise it. In the Cabinet at Pesth there is a special minister for Croatia.

If I have made too long a digression to

explain the Croatian Act of 1868, my excuse must be that it is the one big experiment which has been used in Austria-Hungary in concession to nationalist claims; and that it has often been cited as a precedent for others. The Czech leaders in Bohemia often appeal to it as a precedent for a concession to Bohemia, and it has been cited as a precedent for Home Rule in Ireland.¹ It has not been altered since 1868, and generous as it was, it was resented as unfair by a substantial party in Croatia. Panslavist feeling is very strong in this south Slav province, and the Panslavists had for many years the assistance and guidance of the famous Bishop Strossmayer, who was constantly a thorn in the side of the Hungarian unionist party. The Croats have often objected to the fact that their railways have been preserved as part of the Hungarian state-railway system and have never been placed under local control. The Magyar Government has, however, held

¹ When I was in Agram in 1894 one of the *Sektions-chefs* told me that some years before, I suppose before 1886, an emissary of Mr. Gladstone had come to Croatia to get information about the Croatian constitution, but that he had afterwards heard that Mr. Gladstone considered the financial arrangement so generous to Croatia that he could not use it as a precedent in his Home Rule scheme. Mr. Gladstone publicly cited the Croatian case in 1893, and he, as a financier, must have been aware that the financial provisions such as it contained would not be readily accepted by England and Scotland. If any of my readers should have followed Irish affairs, they may remember Mr. Gladstone's fiction of the "over-taxation" of Ireland which afterwards led to so many absurdities.

that the railway system for the whole kingdom of St. Stephen must be under one control, and, in spite of much opposition, still maintains that view. No further concession has been made to the subject-nationalities of Hungary. A "law of nationalities" was passed in 1868, but whilst promising justice and equality to all races, it practically asserted the primacy of the Magyars. It made their language the sole language of the state, relegating the others, at the best, to use in municipal affairs of non-Magyar towns.

In 1869 and 1872 general elections took place, and in both of these the Liberal party, which was under Deák's real leadership and, of course, loyal to the compromise of 1867, was returned. The King of Hungary visited his dominions twice in 1872, and, during his first visit, went for a tour in the south-eastern parts, which he had never seen before. He was everywhere well received by the Magyars, and his visit did much to obliterate bitter memories upon the scene of the fiercest fights of 1849. It is interesting to notice that Francis Joseph was met at Temesvar by an envoy from the Sultan. The meeting symbolised the old friendship between the Magyars and the Turks. Men drew from it an assurance that the new King of Hungary would preserve the traditional

policy of alliance with Turkey against Slavonic aggression.

In 1873 and 1874 Deák's influence was gradually withdrawn, owing to his illness, and with his disappearance the need for fresh leaders for the Liberal party became apparent. After some short or provisional ministries, M. Tisza, the ablest of the opponents of the Compromise of 1867, took office. In doing so he assented to the programme of his former opponents; that is to say, he undertook to carry on the Government in loyalty to the agreement with Austria. M. Tisza remained Premier of Hungary until 1890, and by his force of character and brilliant eloquence became in these years a very prominent statesman in Europe. He is of course open to the charge of inconsistency which may be brought against Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain, to mention no smaller men in England. Inconsistent or not, he was undoubtedly of great service to the Emperor-King in carrying out the arrangement of 1867. In promoting the growth of Austro-Hungarian citizenship and unity, in combating the idea that Austria and Hungary are opposite states, he did the highest service. In January 1876 Deák died at Pesth. Royal princes went to his funeral, and the last procession in his honour, which was four miles long, was a striking

tribute to this truly great man. Without either the advantage of noble birth or the gift of eloquence, which are given to many of his fellow-countrymen, he possessed honesty, consistency, good judgment, patience and resource in a degree rarely found in a public man. He took his stand on the long-established rights of Hungary, and he would yield none of those rights except in return for something from the other side. He had a profound belief in the efficacy of law and reason. Though not a friend to war, his moral courage was imperturbable. He was conciliatory in 1848 when no one else was so. It was his policy of obstinate consistency, coupled with judicious conciliation, which won a great and honourable triumph for his country and made her the dominant power in the Dual monarchy.

In the wider field of foreign affairs Austria plays no part in the years 1867-77. The expenditure caused by the war had been great and the army needed remodelling and a new gun. A great deal has been written about the attitude of Francis Joseph at the time of the Franco-Prussian war. Some writers have accused his chief minister of pursuing a policy of *revanche* against Prussia, and even of having betrayed France into hopes of Austrian co-operation against the common enemy. These

accusations are, I believe, unfounded. Beust was a Saxon, and deeply resented the treatment of Saxony by the Prussians in 1866. He wished for a strong southern confederation in Germany, and he was no friend to Bismarck and his ways. But I cannot find that he ever gave positive assurances of Austrian help for France. Nor would he have been permitted to do so by the Emperor, who, in matters of so great importance, leaves nothing to his ministers. If Count Beust had some general discussions with the French as to the possibility of common measures, they never got beyond that stage. The Chancellor's despatch of July 11, 1870,¹ to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Paris proves that Francis Joseph did not allow the French Government to remain under any delusions as to the attitude which would be maintained at Vienna should war break out between Prussia and France. Beust admitted that Austria had agreed not to make any agreement with any third party without the knowledge of France, and said that she would not do so ; but he repudiated all idea of action against Prussia even were it only to go so far as the placing of a *corps d'observation* in Bohemia. If Russia joined Prussia in the war, Austria would intervene ; but in case of a war

¹ Beust's *Memoirs* (1887), vol. ii. Appendix C.

between France and Prussia alone, she would remain neutral.

The Emperor-King was, however, in some difficulty in the matter. A strong party in Austria called for measures of revenge against Prussia. Moreover, it was by no means certain that if France were reduced to making terms alone with Prussia a bargain might not be struck which would be disadvantageous to Austria—involving, perhaps, the loss of the German portion of Bohemia. At the same time the Emperor was forced to look to the mouths of the Danube and the Black Sea, where Russia was about to repudiate the restrictions placed upon her in 1856. Prussia could not help her to resist the Russian action in this direction, but France, with her traditional interest and influence in Eastern affairs, would no doubt be able to do so. All these reasons moved the Emperor to take up a sympathetic attitude towards France. On the other hand, the Germans in Austria and the ruling Magyars in Hungary were now good friends to Prussia. For them a Prussian victory meant the strengthening of the Teutonic element in Central Europe, which alone could balance the influence of Panslavism, both within and without their borders. Deák, as we have seen, had refused to implicate Hungary in the war of

1866. Andrassy, the friend, and I may perhaps say, the pupil of Deák, was strongly against any action in the war of 1870. Moreover, Austrian finances were only beginning to recover from the great expenditure of the war of 1866. The artillery was being re-armed with a breech-loading gun, and provided with a new equipment. Even had Francis Joseph and his subjects wished for war in 1870, they could not have placed an efficient army in the field.

In the early seventies Austria-Hungary was beginning to recover from the waste of warfare, and until 1878 no military expenditure interferes to prevent the recovery of her finances. The Emperor-King, advised by the Liberal Hungarian nobleman who succeeded Count Beust, engages in no further European wars, and the new Austria-Hungary begins to realise her position and quietly renew her forces. In May 1873 the exhibition of Vienna was opened, and though its success was marred by a financial crisis and by the prevalence of disease in Vienna, it served to attract large numbers of visitors to the capital and to publish the commercial possibilities of Austria and Hungary. The two sovereigns who had conquered Austria in successive wars—William, now Emperor of Germany, and Victor Emanuel, King of United Italy—visited their former

enemy in his capital, and old rivalries were forgotten in good fellowship and the exchange of friendly assurances. In the autumn of the following year Francis Joseph visited Bohemia, which, three years before, had been smarting under a sense of broken pledges. He was well received. His uncle and predecessor, the ex-Emperor Ferdinand, was still living in the Hradschin Palace on the hill overlooking the Moldau at Prag, but was too ill in body and mind to make any public appearance. In the following year the Emperor visited his southernmost province of Dalmatia, where the population, of Italian race, had long resented incorporation in the Austrian empire; but his reception was, on the whole, good. Afterwards he went to Venice, a former pillar of his Italian power, but now contented in union with Italy. The reception given him there showed that a few years had sufficed to extinguish the hostile feelings of the past.

The year 1875, too, was one when many links with the past were severed. The ex-Emperor Ferdinand died in June. "*Ich hab' kein' Constitution, und ich mag' kein' Constitution*" had been his favourite saying in the old days before 1848; but he had lived on, a weak and useless old man, to see the Austria which he had ruled twice

defeated and reformed into a new and progressive state. His funeral procession in Vienna took place without any marks of public regret. The heirs-apparent to five Kingdoms followed him to his last resting-place beneath the Capuchin church; but the populace of Vienna was indifferent. In the same year died Francis, the expelled Grand Duke of Modena, a Hapsburg of the Este branch, one of the last of the little tyrants who, under the protection of Austria, had stood out against union and freedom in Italy. The exiled Grand Duke had long ceased to interest the public. He left no children and no friends behind him; but some curiosity was felt as to how he would dispose of the valuable Este estate in Central Italy which was his private property. This he bequeathed to the Emperor's nephew, the young Archduke Francis Ferdinand (born in 1863) and the present heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne.¹ At the same time the Emperor lost his old tutor and valued friend, Cardinal Rauscher, Archbishop of Vienna. Rauscher had taught him politics when he was in his 'teens, and the Emperor owed his strict Conservative views as much to the courtly priest as to

¹ Exaggerated reports were circulated at the time as to the wealth of the Grand Duke. The Este estate, at the time, was worth rather over £1,000,000.

Prince Metternich. The Cardinal was constantly at his pupil's side in 1849 and 1850, but in later years had adopted moderate views. He never belonged to the extreme Ultramontane party which was so powerful in Austria, and, at the Ecumenical Council of 1870, had protested strongly against the issue of the Bull of Infallibility. Though he actively opposed the suspension of the *Concordat* and the laws which gave to the civil government control over marriage and education, he did not dispute the validity of those laws when once passed. In his last years he was the most popular of the Emperor's older counsellors.

Whilst these men of the old school were leaving the stage a new scene in the European drama was about to commence. The Eastern question was re-opened by the insurrection against Turkish rule in Servia and Montenegro, and by the advance of Russia to help—as she said—her oppressed co-religionists in Turkey. The outbreak and course of the Russo-Turkish war are matters outside the scope of this book, but they were of great interest to the Emperor Francis Joseph, and were observed with mingled feelings by the different races under his sway. The Slavs of all kinds, except the Poles, were heartily in

sympathy with Russia, and looking at Austria as a Slavonic empire, urged the Government to take action in favour of the oppressed Slavs in Turkey. Demonstrations of friendship for Russia took place in the outlying provinces, and the Russian Hymn was played by military bands at Agram in the presence of an Austrian Archduke. In Hungary, racial sympathy with Turkey is stronger than any religious sympathy which might have joined the Magyars and the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Feeling at Pesth ran strongly in favour of the Moslem. In January 1877 a band of Hungarian students went to Constantinople to present a sword of honour to a Turkish general who had had some success in putting down the Servian insurrection ; and the general made a speech cursing all the wars which had ever taken place between the Magyars and Turks, and declaring eternal friendship. The Germans in Austria were honestly neutral, and though the Emperor's personal inclinations favoured Russia, he decided to take no part in the war. Lord Salisbury, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the English Cabinet, passed through Vienna in October 1876, on his way to Constantinople, and met Count Andrassy in conference. Both statesmen agreed that the Christian subjects of the

Sultan were being badly treated, but they agreed also that Turkey must, in the last resort, be supported against Russia. After seeing Count Andrassy, Lord Salisbury was received by the Emperor who, in the course of the interview, observed, "Our interests are identical." Francis Joseph had already, in 1854 and 1855, made one unlucky venture in Eastern politics, and he was determined to avoid, if possible, another intervention of the same kind. Moreover, with one-half of his subjects urging him in one direction and one in another, he realised that his newly-made monarchy was not yet capable of pursuing an active foreign policy. Before the outbreak of war the Russian Government promised Count Andrassy not to make Servia the scene of military operations. Turkey gladly gave him a similar assurance. These promises, secured by diplomatic action, helped to prevent a general rising of the southern Slavs, which must surely have spread across the Emperor's frontiers. It was greatly to Austria's credit that such security was easily obtained. The declarations made by M. Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, and Count Andrassy, the common Foreign Minister, at the end of 1877 made it clear that Austria-Hungary was in a far stronger position in that year than in 1853,

when the Eastern question had last come upon the carpet. She was now able to declare her policy of neutrality, her desire to localise the war, and her opinion that the Sultan must reform his Government; yet she was not to be cajoled by England (as she had been by France in 1854) into hostile action against Russia. She had no rising in Italy or Hungary to fear, no enemies behind her in Germany. In 1853 and 1854 we saw a halting and diffident policy actuated in turn by the Emperor's gratitude to Russia, by the fear of Slav uprisings in the south, and by the veiled threats of France to stir up discontent in Italy. We now find a fixed and steady policy of neutrality coupled with constructive proposals for Turkish reform and a firm vindication of Austro-Hungarian rights on the Lower Danube. Francis Joseph feels no need to go into the arena, either at the bidding of friends whom he cannot afford to displease or for the aversion of dangers which he cannot face. He stands aside and allows time to pass. When the diplomats meet at Berlin to correct Ignatiev's map of the Balkans, he sends his able Magyar minister to the capital of his old rival, to receive two valuable provinces from a congress with the consent of his old enemy, Bismarck.

In England the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina was attributed to a suggestion of Lord Salisbury. If he was the first to suggest it at the Congress, it had certainly been mooted before, and Hungarian ministers had discussed it in the Parliament at Pesth.¹ The idea of the occupation was at first resented in Hungary, where it was construed as a move against the Turks, and as likely to encourage Slav aspirations elsewhere. Tisza boldly defended it as a counterblast to Pan Slavism, and in the end opposition at home was silenced or overcome. It was otherwise in the provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina themselves, where a hardy and courageous population of Moslems vigorously opposed the occupation. Turkey had yielded the provinces to Austria, and did not openly interfere; but she sympathised with the Moslems, and her sympathy assumed in some cases a material form. The army of occupation, under Generals Filipovitch and Szapáry, began operations in July 1878, and did not complete its task for three months. Austria-Hungary had at one time as many as 200,000 men and 480 guns operating against

¹ As Prince Bismarck states (*Recollections*, English edition by A. J. Butler, vol. ii. p. 232), the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina was really agreed upon in a secret treaty of January 1877 between Austria and Russia. Russia consented to it in order to secure Austria's neutrality.

the mountaineers. All organised resistance was, however, at an end when the two Parliaments met on the last day of October. The ministers in both halves of the monarchy, in thanking the troops for their services, could say that peace now reigned in Bosnia.

The occupation of these territories was the finest diplomatic stroke in the reign of Francis Joseph. Coming after many defeats, it restored the prestige of the monarchy in Europe, and it opened new possibilities of expansion whose realisation has only just commenced. Europe has already tried many other prescriptions for curing the (so-called) "Sick Man." She began in 1856 by admitting the Turks to the Concert of Europe. This meant, so far as it meant anything, that the fate or future of Turkey was to be a matter of common concern to the whole of Europe, and not to be decided by Russia alone. This was the fundamental principle of the policy of Napoleon III. and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the two moving spirits of the Crimean war. It was re-asserted at Berlin in 1878 when Europe insisted on its right to intervene between Russia and Turkey. In 1856, too, the Concert of Europe devised three expedients for securing peace and justice in the Turkish territories. One was to establish areas of local Home Rule (as in Bulgaria);

another to sever such areas from Turkey (as in the case of Roumania, and, earlier, of Greece); a third was to obtain from the Porte promises of good government, and to take such measures as were possible to see that these promises were carried out. A fourth expedient was tried in 1878—that of commissioning one of the Great Powers to take charge of a portion of the Sultan's territory and to supersede his Government. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Turks had long been, as they have been elsewhere, a dominant race. They always will be a dominant race, and if the attempts made by outsiders to reform Turkey have failed, it is because the Turks will not forgo their privileges. In 1878 the Turkish Government was expelled from these two provinces, but they were not given Home Rule. They obtain no Diet like their neighbours in Croatia, no Skupstchina like their other neighbours in Servia. They were placed under the control of a dominant Power, which continued to rule them autocratically, but with justice and enlightenment. That power is not Austria, nor is it Hungary. It is Austria-Hungary. The authority which rules in these new provinces is the Power which has come into being under Francis Joseph's rule. The Bosnian regiments are neither Austrian nor

Hungarian. The Bosnian officials are "dual" officials, and are controlled by a minister not of Austria or Hungary, but of the whole monarchy. Austria-Hungary, lately recognised by Europe, is now formally approved; and, at the same time, a common stake and interest is given to the two states which have hitherto had nothing in common but the sovereign and the army. Here, at least, Austria and Hungary can meet, not in rivalry or jealousy, but in sincere co-operation for an important and interesting task. Here Germans and Magyars, and Czechs too if they qualify for it, can work side by side as public servants, and each can learn, in the friendly intercourse of officials, that the others are after all not so bad as they were painted. It is too soon, as yet, to say what the ultimate results of the Hapsburg mission in the Near East will be. We know that the occupied provinces are very well governed, and that they present an aspect of peace and progress which is, unhappily, not common in the other European territories of the Sultan. Radicals may object that there is no Parliament in these provinces. If that great panacea for all ills is denied them, they have at least been free from the public murders, the organised butcheries, and the wholesale corruption which mark the swing of the pendulum in the consti-

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tutional governments of the Near East. What the future will bring forth we do not know ; but the step taken in 1878 has hitherto proved successful.¹ That it was taken, and that it has so succeeded, is a strong indication of the prudence and policy of the Emperor King.

¹ The Bosnian administration pays its own way, and the last figures obtainable show a revenue of 51 million francs, and a slight surplus. Austria-Hungary incurs some expenditure for the maintenance of troops in Bosnia. This was in 1906 7½ million francs, but in 1907 £187,000 was put down in the Bosnian Budget as expenditure for the common army of the Monarchy.

CHAPTER VI

1879-1893

Auersperg and Taaffe Ministries in Austria—The Liberal Party in Hungary—Tisza—Progress of the Nationalist Question—The Balkan Question again—The Emperor's Policy.

GREAT as were the advantages secured to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by the occupation of Bosnia, the step was not popular either in Austria or Hungary. Politicians of the provincial or parochial school have little inclination to think about questions of Imperial expansion or politics at large, and are apt to resent them as distracting attention from the meaner controversies which rage round the parish pump. In Austria and Hungary parochial politicians abound; and if they consider larger questions at all, they look at them from the point of view of the party or nationality to which they belong at home. They approve or disapprove the moves on the great chessboard of Europe according as these seem

to them to favour their chances in the little game which they are playing with one another. In Austria the Germans resented the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina as importing a fresh and vigorous Slav ingredient into the composition of the Dual Monarchy. The war of occupation had been costly. Lives had been lost, and the general result of the new move was to encourage the *Drang nach Osten*, which has never been popular with the stay-at-home politicians of the German provinces. The Czechs and other Slavs did not like to see a new Slavonic race put into the monarchy as subject to the dominant Germans and Magyars. By these two objections the position of Auersperg, the Austrian Premier, was weakened. In the winter of 1878-9 the solid phalanx of German groups which had kept him in power since 1871 gradually fell to pieces. In February 1879 he resigned.

Auersperg's resignation brings to an end the first period of constitutional rule in Austria. During the eight years of his administration the German groups had been able to keep a majority in the Reichsrath, and, if they were aided occasionally by different sections of the non-Germans, it may yet be said that up to 1879 the old primacy of the Germans was maintained. After 1879

we find a change. During the years 1871-9 the Slavs in Bohemia had been increasing in numbers, wealth, and education. The Emperor knew from the outset that if a constitutional system was to be kept up in Austria, it could only be so by the help of all, or at least of the majority of, the Nationalists. He waited patiently until the Bohemians who, after 1871, had refused to attend the Parliament of Vienna should have so far forgotten their grievances as to be amenable to reason. Their abstention caused him much uneasiness during the years of Auersperg's ministry. He could not forget how many Slavs or Magyars had been found unwounded¹ in the hands of his enemies in Italy in 1859, and he knew by experience that it was not practicable to construct a popular state in Central Europe, and to equip it with a strong and loyal army, unless all the races of his Empire of Austria were reconciled to the existing order of domestic government. To the Poles in Galicia he had already granted concessions, somewhat greater than were allowed to Bohemia. There was, as I have said, a minister for Galicia in the Cabinet, and the Galician Diet had wider powers of legislation

¹ A valuable article in the *Contemporary Review* for February 1893, to which I am much indebted, states the number at 15,000, or six per cent of the Austrian fighting force.

than the other provincial assemblies. These concessions could be given in Poland without fear that they would lead to separation; for the Poles were next door to tyrannous Russia. They could see across the frontier to where their brother Poles were crushed under the despotism of the Czar; and they wanted nothing better than a strong and just Austrian Emperor who should protect them against a similar fate. Of all the nationalities in Austria the Poles had been the most prudent and the most loyal to the Austro-Hungarian idea. Whilst not losing sight of their Nationalist claims, they had consented to take part in the government of centralised Austria. Friendly to the Austrian Germans, and allied by ancient tradition to the Magyars, they have greatly assisted the Emperor in his task of making a new country in Central Europe, and are to-day amongst the most trustworthy of his citizens.

The Czechs in Bohemia were not in the same position. They had never recognised the Constitution of 1867, and were rivals both of the Germans and the Hungarians. They were strong Federalists, and hated the German language as sincerely as the Hungarians. It was therefore more difficult and more dangerous to entrust the government to them than to the Poles; but as neither

could govern Austria alone, the Emperor gradually formed the intention of committing the care of the Empire to a combination of them, assisted by the Clerical and Conservative deputies from the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, and southern Austrian provinces. These last had stood aloof from the Liberal German *régime* inaugurated by Auersperg.

The team once selected, it became necessary to find a man who would drive it; and a driver of extraordinary skill was discovered in Count Taaffe. Edward, Viscount Taaffe of Corran and Baron of Ballymote in the county of Sligo in Ireland, and Count Taaffe in Austria, was the son of a noble Irish family who had long been distinguished in Austria for gallantry in war and successful administration in peace. One member of the family had been ambassador of Charles II. at the Imperial Court, and in 1667 an ancestor of the new Premier had been made Count of the Empire as a reward for bravery. The Taaffes had from the first been members of the Court aristocracy, a small coterie of noble servants immediately surrounding the Emperors, and placed somewhat apart from the great feudal nobles who formed a "country party." A characteristic saying has been attributed to a member of this coterie—"Mankind begins

with the barons and ends with the monarch." If in the old days such a maxim had been theirs, the Count Taaffe who lived in the Austria of the 'eighties certainly did not subscribe to it. His motto may be said to have been, "Mankind begins with the monarch and ends with the last man who can be induced to support his government." He had been a playmate of Francis Joseph's early youth, and the influence of his family was so strong at Court that he might have aspired to high office in early life. Yet he commenced his public service at the bottom of the Civil Service ladder, and it was due to a chance meeting with the Emperor that, after some years, he obtained quick promotion. He was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1867 under Beust, and had been even Minister-President for a short time, but in 1871-9, during the rule of Auersperg and the Germans, he was Statthalter of the Tyrol, a post of temporary retirement which might lead to anything. In 1879 he was called upon to take up the position of Minister-President, and with it the Ministry of the Interior.

The new Premier was a man whom the Federalists might certainly claim for their own. He was a Catholic, and therefore popular with the loyal Catholics; but he was no thorough-

paced Ultramontane, and had voted against the *Concordat*. He had been in the citizen ministry of the first Prince Auersperg in 1867, so that even the Liberals, who were now in opposition, could not think very badly of him. When the Emperor dissolved the Reichsrath, in May 1879, before Taaffe took office, the Germans lost forty-five seats, and the Federalist gains were opportune for the task which he was about to undertake. From the first he showed extraordinary skill in smoothing over difficulties and inducing recalcitrant deputies to postpone grievances or fads. He received angry deputations of Czechs or Clericals who wanted concessions to the language in Bohemia or to the Church in the control of schools. He listened to them politely, told them risky stories, mimicked the attitude of their enemies with a humour which had survived two centuries of absence from the west of Ireland. As for their complaints, these were serious, but as the matters in question were too important to be discussed by a single minister, he would lay them before the Cabinet and see what could be done. In the meantime he suggested that they should reserve these questions and take part in the government of the country. This course would make them eligible should occasions for promotion arise. The usual result

was that the deputations went away satisfied, or cajoled into acquiescence. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that these were the means by which Count Taaffe maintained a Government in Austria for fourteen years. He was a pure opportunist and a confirmed cynic, believed that every man had his price, and knew no principle and had no policy but unswerving loyalty to his master.

It is not necessary to describe at any length the political landmarks of these fifteen years. We find them a succession of protests by Czechs or Germans, riots in Bohemia between Germans and Czechs, or in Dalmatia between Croats and Italians, concessions made to one or the other, a minister appointed here because he is a Czech, a judge there because he is a Croat. The general trend of Taaffe's policy was to give more power to the Slavonic provinces in the management of their affairs, to teach them that Austria was able to satisfy all their reasonable grievances, and to associate them in the support of the established order of things. Thus, in 1879, a Pole and a Czech were brought into the ministry, but it also contained one German Liberal. In 1880 another Polish minister is introduced, and slight concessions made in the matter of the use of Slavonic languages in official corre-

spondence. In 1881 two German ministers leave the Cabinet and two Federalists come in, whilst in the same year a Czech University is set up in Prag beside the old University. The establishment of the Czech University was an event of great importance, and undoubtedly gave an impetus to a movement which ultimately upset Count Taaffe's Government—the rise of the "Young Czech" party in Bohemia. The old Czechs, whilst loyal to their race, were loyal also to the Emperor. They were Roman Catholics, and Roman Catholicism has always been a strong unionist force in Austria. The young Czechs were Slavs before everything else. They were anti-Clerical, and not bound to the Hapsburg dynasty by the old ties of tradition and service which held the Czech nobility. Yet the institution of a Czech University could not have been withheld, especially by a sovereign whose object was to satisfy all just claims. The Emperor hoped, as he still hopes, to form a middle party in Austria which would recognise the compromise of 1867, and form the new Austrian half of the monarchy. This hope or policy lay behind the schemes and jokes and compromises of Count Taaffe. His ministry was a bold attempt to mitigate the violence of the racial malcontents in Austria and give them

time to become reasonable. It cannot be said that he succeeded ; but he gained time.

In 1883 the Bohemian Diet was dissolved, and the elections resulted in sending a Czech majority to Prag, but the anti-German agitation was still kept under by Taaffe's dexterous hands. Socialism began to grow rapidly in Austria in these years, and strong measures had to be taken against the Socialists in 1884. Possibly the fear of Socialism was one of the causes which gave the ministry a small majority (192 votes in a House of 353) at the Austrian elections in 1885. The Premier had, however, not sufficient support to enable him to get on without successive concessions to the Czechs, and these were strenuously opposed by the Germans. Occasionally local riots took place. At Königinhof in Bohemia, in August 1885, several people were killed, and the hatred between Germans and Czechs began to find expression in severe criticism of the foreign policy of the monarchy, now firmly based on the friendship with the new Empire of Germany. It is highly characteristic of the condition of Austrian politics at the period that the Austro-Hungarian Government was able to inaugurate and carry out a foreign policy of friendship with Germany which was keenly opposed by the Slavonic majority in the Reichsrath, whilst

the Germans, who were in opposition, warmly approved it. The policy of Germany in expelling Polish or Ruthenian workmen from German territory also gave a handle to the Slav deputies in the Reichsrath, and Count Taaffe was more than once placed in a difficulty by interpellations on this subject.

Taaffe's ministry lasted as long as he could keep the Czechs in hand by concessions. The old Czechs were contented with these, but the young Czechs were not so, and in 1889 the advanced party conquered their opponents in the elections for the Bohemian Diet.¹ Before 1889 the young Czechs had had only a few seats, but after the election of this year they returned 37 members, and at the end of 1870 their force had increased to 42. In November 1889, the new Diet met, and the German deputies absenting themselves, the young and old Czechs stood face to face. The young Czechs introduced a motion to erect a memorial tablet to John Huss in the Bohemian Museum. If anybody could be expected to support such a proposal it would be, we might think, the "old Czechs": but this party was under Clerical influence, and the name of the great Protestant reformer of Prag was

¹ By the Schmerling constitution there were 236 elected and 6 official members of the Diet. The elected were originally divided as follows: Great landowners, 70; Germans, 69; Czechs, 99.

anathema to the Roman Catholic Church. The Czech nobles and old Czechs rejected the motion, and the young Czechs immediately set the country on fire with agitation against clericalism and feudalism. They were so powerful in the Landtag and the local administration that Taaffe had to control them, if the government of the country was to go on. By the Emperor's direction he invited Czechs and the moderate Germans to a conference at Vienna. The old Czechs and the Germans attended, but the young Czechs held aloof, and for once Count Taaffe had met a party in Austria which would not yield to his blandishments. A compromise was made at Vienna which, if it had been executed, would have kept peace for a time. The provincial councils for agriculture and education were to be divided into Czech and German sections. Electoral districts were also to be divided so that as far as possible each district should contain people of only one race, and petty sessional districts were to be divided in the same way. In June 1890 the Emperor approved this scheme. The old Czechs agreed to it; but the young Czechs opposed it with all their strength, and it was never put in force. The difficulty of carrying out such an arrangement was great. Speaking roughly, the Czechs occupy the east of Bohemia and the

Germans the west, but modern developments, especially the growth of factories, have brought about a condition in which the two races are inextricably intermingled. Thus it was estimated in 1890 that out of 216 petty sessional districts in Bohemia there were only five in which the population was not mixed. Yet, even had it been easy to carry out the scheme, the young Czechs would never have accepted it. It would have firmly rooted the German element in Bohemia and have given to Germanism a fixed sphere of influence. It is the policy of the Czechs not to permit this. Their numbers had grown rapidly during the Taaffe administration. In 1856 Prag contained 73,000 Germans and 50,000 Czechs and was practically a German town. In 1890, including the suburbs, it contained 264,000 Czechs, 40,000 Germans, and 21,000 Jews.¹ In 1890 there was not a single Teuton in the Town Council of Prag nor a single German representative of the city of Prag in the Reichsrath. All were Czechs. It is scarcely to be wondered at that the Slavonic majority would make no terms with an enemy whom they expect to be able to destroy.

¹ I take the figures for 1856 from the article in the *Contemporary Review* cited above, and for 1890 from M. Chéradame's *L'Europe et la question d'Autriche*, etc. (Paris, 1906), p. 233.

The failure of the compromise of 1890 virtually put an end to Count Taaffe's administration. He remained in office till the autumn of 1893, but after the rise of the young Czechs to power in Bohemia it was realised that his period had come to an end. His policy, if it failed to conciliate the Czechs, was hateful to the various German groups, and the German Liberals, now ably led by Dr. von Plener, were strong enough to make further concessions to Federalism impracticable. In 1891 Taaffe was, indeed, hoist with his own petard. The Tyrol had in 1890 caught Nationalist fever from Bohemia, and early in the new year the twenty-five Italian members of the Tyrolese Diet resigned because the Government refused to separate the Italian and German parts of the Tyrol. Ministers could not govern the province without a Diet, and the action of the Tyrolese brought about the dissolution of the Reichsrath (20th January 1891). The most significant event of the elections which followed was the success of the young Czechs. They returned 38 members to the Reichsrath in which they had not previously been represented. The German Liberals, revived by twelve years in the shade of opposition, came back 110 strong, whilst there were 58 Poles, 17 German Nationalists, and a number of smaller groups. By forming a temporary

alliance with the German Liberals Taaffe managed to keep a majority until 1893, in which year the agitation of the Czechs for concessions to their language became too fierce for longer dalliance. Originally they had demanded only a fair number of Czech teachers in schools, and a guarantee that persons who were tried for any offence should be tried in their own language ; but as time went on their demands grew. They now demanded that all officials should after a certain time be bi-lingual, and even attempted to control the language in which official correspondence was carried on. On May 17, 1893, during a debate in the Bohemian Diet, a number of Czech deputies attacked a German member whilst he was speaking. There followed one of those scenes at which Englishmen merely laugh—language which no publisher would permit in these pages, ink poured over Germans by Czechs, and Czechs beaten with bluebooks or rulers by Germans. Scenes of this sort are indeed very funny to those who do not read their true meaning, which is that Parliamentary government in Austria is very difficult to maintain, and may at any time break down altogether. The Emperor has honestly and conscientiously endeavoured to get the Austrian Parliament to do its work. He has given to the various nationalities as

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much as can be given without dissolving Austria into a confederation, and he has earnestly sought to let all the Nationalist leaders see that he is ready to trust them and to commit a share in the government of the country to their hands. It is unfortunate that some of the Austrian deputies, and more especially the firebrands of Bohemia, have not merited the Emperor's confidence. But it must be remembered, and the Emperor no doubt remembers, that these deputies are new men, and that the Austrian Parliament is a new Parliament. It takes time for such men to learn the manners and moderation of debate, and to discover that they do not advance their cause by throwing ink over those whose opinions do not coincide with their own.

The scene in the Diet was followed by disorders in Bohemia which had a somewhat anti-dynastic colour ; and in the summer, *Standrecht*, or a modified state of siege, was proclaimed in Prag. In recent years proclamations of this kind have more than once been necessary in Bohemia ; and they generally have the desired result. Their effect is to suspend the liberty of the Press, the right of public meeting, and trial by jury. When, under the observation of police and military, people have had time to get cool, they feel rather ashamed

of themselves, and the pulse and temperature of the body politic returns to normal temperature until the next attack. In 1893, however, the state of Prag was serious, and when, on the day after the conflict of May 17, the Emperor closed the Diet, riots took place which were not suppressed without bloodshed.

Taafe, who never knew when he was beaten, proposed to popularise the Government by introducing a Bill for partial universal suffrage. Under this scheme the nobles and chambers of commerce¹ were to elect members as heretofore, but in the towns and country divisions all male citizens of a certain age were to have a vote. The Bill was stoutly opposed by the German parties under von Plener, and it aroused considerable opposition in Hungary. The Hungarians had, of course, no more right to speak in the matter than the English or the Turks; but Hungary is always afraid that any step of this kind which may be taken in Austria may be used as a pretext for demanding similar action by the Government at Pesth. The supremacy of the Magyars in the Hungarian legislature depends on the maintenance of a

¹ At this time the Austrian Parliament was elected by four orders, the large landlords, chambers of commerce, towns, and rural districts. The first two returned 85 and 21 members respectively out of a total of 353. This old constitution was of course superseded by the introduction, two years ago, of direct universal suffrage.

high suffrage; or, at least, the Hungarians themselves think so. With the Germans hostile to this measure, and to his policy as a whole, the Czechs calling out for more concessions, and the Hungarian government silently hostile, Count Taaffe had no option but to resign.

And so, in October 1893, this brilliant and attractive figure quits the crowded stage on which we are trying to observe what is going on. The Emperor parted most reluctantly from a near friend of his early youth, who had served him with unflinching loyalty and with consummate ability. Taaffe had so controlled the Reichsrath that for many years the Emperor had enjoyed unrestricted power. In the years before 1891 Francis Joseph was more autocratic in Austria than at any other time in his reign. His Prime Minister interested a sufficient number of groups in the Government to be sure of a majority; or, if a few deputies became recalcitrant and refused to come to heel, he could always manage to bring in a few men from some other group, who knew that there was no real chance of upsetting them. He maintained constitutional rule, and thus satisfied the conditions of the Constitution of 1867. During his term of office the Customs and commercial treaty with Hungary was renewed for a second period (1887-1897) and, in business and finance,

the country prospered. It is true that, when the fifteen years of his government were over, the Nationalist feuds again broke out in Austria. It is true that Taaffe did not put an end to racial or religious differences, or secure the final acceptance of the new idea of a state which it has been the Emperor's duty to promote. But it is also true that he showed how, in spite of Nationalist feuds and rivalries, the government might go on. He gave time for young men to grow up under the new system, and for men of different creeds and races to live together and find out that it is possible to exist without fighting. Had his tenure of office been thirty years instead of fifteen, Austria would have been much the better for it; for in the formation of a new State and a new citizenship time and repose are above all things necessary. During the fifteen years the new Austria was trying to make up her mind what manner of state she was going to be. She did not then make up her mind, and has not yet, so far as we can see, finally decided what her own constitution is to be. In the last few years circumstances have occurred which have disturbed her reflections, so that to-day she is still undecided. But so far as the form of Dual Monarchy is concerned, it may be said that Count Taaffe's fifteen years were most

useful in that they enabled the Constitution of 1867 to grow up in, at least, comparative peace. Whatever may be the ultimate destiny of the Dual Monarchy, the fifteen years' breathing space which the Emperor and Taaffe secured for her must be counted to them for righteousness.

We turn to Hungary. A survey of the history of that kingdom during these fifteen years shows us that the King of Hungary has a different sort of reign from the Emperor of Austria. Here there is no need of cajoling different groups or sections, or reconciling ethnographic zealots to a state of affairs which they hate, but tolerate. The dominant Magyars are really a dominant race—not quite half of the population in numbers, but in intelligence, wealth, and political power three-quarters or more of the whole. Whilst the dominant Germans are diminishing in Bohemia, and are out of power at Vienna, the Magyars are undisputed masters in Hungary. Croatia they have quieted by the concession of Home Rule on terms which, to an unprejudiced critic, must appear generous. Roumanian claims to provincial independence they do not recognise, and though there is no suppression of the Rouman language, Magyar is enforced everywhere as the one language of the state. The

Liberal party in Hungary, the most powerful political organisation in any constitutional state in Europe during the nineteenth century, was supreme during the period which we are now considering. Again and again it came successfully out of the battle at the polls. Its enemies were the "Independence" party, who did not recognise the Compromise of 1867, looked still to the exiled Kossuth as their leader, and wanted separate armies and ambassadors for Austria and Hungary; and a middle party, who accept the Compromise as a whole, but desire a change in its details. Neither of these parties had, however, any large following in Parliament, and neither of them had a leader who, for ability and personal influence, was a match for Tisza. From 1875 to 1890 Tisza was the acknowledged champion of Magyar Liberalism. During that period his position was unassailable; and the confidence given him in Hungary not only made him one of the most important of the Emperor's advisers, but gave him for a time a great position amongst the Liberal statesmen of Europe. He was disliked by the highly-placed Clericals who surround the Court of Vienna, and by the Court aristocracy of that capital; for he was neither of noble birth nor of the Roman faith; but the Emperor-King trusted him. His policy was

devoted to the maintenance of the Compromise of 1867, and the preservation of the Magyar rule in Hungary. In Austria-Hungary he wished to build up a strong and united monarchy around the citadel of the ancient empire of Austria. To this work of construction he brought the ready co-operation of a free and prosperous Hungary.

In 1881 the Liberal party were given a new lease of power by the constituencies, and with Tisza at the helm and a Hungarian, Count Kálnoky, at the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, the Magyars provided two out of the three first statesmen of the monarchy. Count Kálnoky, however, though a Hungarian by race, was Russophile in policy. He had been ambassador at St. Petersburg, and throughout his tenure of office (1881-96) was suspected of Russophile and Clerical leanings. The Hungarian Government, with Tisza at its head, was, as always, anti-Russian. Hungary is an island in a sea of Slavs, and anything which tended to increase the influence of Russia, in the Balkan States or elsewhere, was strenuously opposed at Pesth. The Hungarian Parliament was not, as yet, strongly anti-Clerical. No movement for the disestablishment of the Church has found popular support there, although the vast estates and revenues

of the Church were a bait which might well tempt a Government anxious to increase its income, and secretly opposed by reactionary Clericals at Vienna. In 1882 the Emperor appointed Herr von Kállay, a Hungarian official, to be Common Minister of Finance, and as this post carried with it the control of the occupied provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, Magyar influence is extended into these dependencies also. The dual occupation of Bosnia had been at first unpopular in Hungary simply because it added more Slavs to the Empire, and when in 1882 a rising in the Herzegovina brought about a month's warfare and much expenditure, Tisza found it difficult to obtain the approval of the common budget at the hands of his followers. As time has passed, however, the Hungarian objections have disappeared. Hungarian officials are now amongst the ablest of the civil servants which have made Bosnia a model to the other provinces successively cut away from the Sultan's dominions. In 1882 also, reforms of the army took place which made it territorial—that is to say, the regiments were to be raised from this or that part of the monarchy, and to have their depôts there. This step was a distinct gain for the Hungarians, since it enabled them to say that certain regiments

were Hungarian and not Austrian. In considering the last ten years of the Emperor's reign we shall see that this change led to a contest of vital importance, the final result of which will be written in the history of the future.

Although the Liberal party were firmly seated in office, and were again successful at the polls in 1884, difficulties were experienced in this and the following years, which showed that the nationality question in Hungary, though latent, would at some time have to be faced. The anti-Magyar minority in Croatia, led by M. Starchevitch and encouraged by the arch-Panslavist, Bishop Strossmayer, became restive, and in 1883 and 1884 riots took place owing to insults offered to the Hungarian flags or escutcheons which are placed on public buildings in Croatia. At the end of 1884 the lobbies of the Hall of the Diet at Agram were occupied by police, and the opposition members were summarily expelled. During the following years the subject Slavs here and there broke out, and had to be repressed. An annual occasion for Panslavist or anti-Magyar exhibitions takes place at Pesth in May, when the anniversary of the death of General Hentzi comes round. This officer, a Croat, defended the castle of Buda in 1849 against General Görgei, and fell with three hundred men when

the Hungarians captured it. When the anniversary came round in 1886, an officer of Croat blood in the garrison at Pesth placed a wreath on his tomb. An angry crowd of Hungarians attacked his house, and broke the windows with a shower of stones. Tisza was interpellated as to the action of this officer, which was condemned by the commander-in-chief of the Honved.¹ He replied censuring the "want of tact and foresight" of the officer who had placed the wreath, and the terms of his reply gave a good deal of offence at Vienna. The Emperor shortly afterwards placed the commander-in-chief of the Honved on the retired list, and promoted the Croat officer whose action had caused the disturbance. His Majesty's conduct caused profound discontent in Hungary, and Francis Joseph afterwards explained it in a letter to the Premier, which was made public. He regretted that certain changes amongst officers should have led to misunderstandings. "The spirit of the army," he wrote, "is that of its chief commander, which is the best guarantee that it will zealously perform its duties, stand apart from all political parties, keep order in the land, guard the laws, and thereby the constitution."

The movement for the separation of the

¹ The local army of Hungary.

Hungarian from the Austrian portion of the common army took its rise in these years. Though it has only become important in recent times, its beginning caused much difficulty to Tisza. Loyal to the Emperor and the Compromise, he was not less loyal to Hungary, and he was acute enough to foresee the difficulties which must follow in the wake of an agitation for military separation. In 1889 an establishment for the common army was laid before the Houses of Austria and Hungary, whose Parliaments had never lost control of the recruiting and terms of service to be prescribed for the soldiery of the common force. It was found that the draft establishment was not, as theretofore, limited to ten years. The change was probably due to the fact that the Austrian Government found difficulties in getting the establishment passed in Austria, and wished to pursue a continuous military policy undisturbed by the inconvenient necessities of Parliamentary approval. The Hungarians objected to the change as tending to diminish civil control over the army. Their opposition was so vigorous that the Crown had to give way, and the ten years' limit was again introduced into the Army Bill. The Magyars had another victory, as they deemed it, in 1889, when they succeeded in having the title "Imperial and Royal" sub-

stituted for "Imperial-Royal" as the official name of the Austro-Hungarian army. The presence of the little word "and" at the heading of official notepaper and notices may seem to be a trifle. Outside critics laughed when they heard that the Hungarian Cabinet made its insertion a question of confidence. In fact, the alteration was important, for it involved the admission that the common army was not one army, but two joined together under a supreme head. In the survey of the most recent years of the Emperor's reign we shall see that it was the prelude to episodes of much interest.

Before tackling the question of the common army, however, the Hungarian Government were anxious to alter the law as to marriage, which was at the time controlled by the Catholic Church; and the introduction of Dr. Wekerle and M. Szilágyi, a Lutheran and a Calvinist, into the ministry in 1889 was an indication that the question of Clerical control would be dealt with by the Liberal party in the immediate future. As this question led to a controversy between the Hungarians and the Crown, I postpone it to the next chapter.

Tisza's long period of Premiership came to an end in 1890. It is interesting to observe that his fall was ultimately due to the force

of the traditions of 1848. With these he had flirted in his early days in opposition (1867-1875), but he had deserted them when he came to lead the Liberal party. In 1890 Kossuth was still alive, and an exile in Italy, and owing to the state of the law of nationalisation he would cease to be a Hungarian citizen unless he returned to Pesth in 1890 or acknowledged the existing Government. This he consistently refused to do, and Tisza declined to make special provision by law for preserving Kossuth's citizenship, and maintained that a man who did not recognise the existing constitution, and who considered the King of Hungary to be an outlaw and a traitor, could not expect special privileges at the hands of the Hungarian Government. It is impossible to quarrel with this view, but in Hungary, as in other countries, politicians are not always reasonable, and Tisza's declaration produced such an outcry that he was soon compelled to resign. Though he was for many years a considerable power in the Liberal party, he did not again take office. His fifteen years of premiership were years when Hungary enjoyed peace and prosperity. The country, whilst maintaining all its rights, worked in harmony with Austria and assumed in partnership with her the position and duties of a great European Power.

The policy of amity with Austria was highly beneficial to Hungary, and was of great service in developing the idea of Austro-Hungarian citizenship. The Emperor-King therefore had good reason to be grateful to the clever old Hungarian who kept power in his hands by methods very different from those of Taaffe in Austria—but not less successful. The disappearance of Tisza closes a period of harmony and good-fellowship. That of his successors saw the commencement of a long and complex conflict between Austria and Hungary. It is not yet decided.

Before concluding our observations of this period we turn to the wider field of foreign affairs. The Emperor of Austria has many difficulties during this period, and the King of Hungary has few; but the Emperor-King of Austria-Hungary has a long holiday, during which he profits by the sound policy of 1878, does the duties which Europe has assigned to him, and maintains and improves the position of his country amongst the nations of Europe. Before Count Andrassy retired from the Foreign Office in 1879 the advance guard of the army of occupation in Bosnia pushed down into the Sandjak¹ of Novi-Bazar. Thus the contact

¹ In Turkish *sandjak* means a "flag"; but the word is also used for a district.

between the dominions of the Sultan and those of the Emperor-King, which had been severed to the southward by the establishment of the minor Balkan states, is permanently established to the western side of the Balkan peninsula. Even after the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by Austria the belt of Slav territory between Turkey and the rest of Europe might have been completed from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, if only this rugged little tongue of land had fallen into the hands either of Serbia or Montenegro. The Dual Monarchy had, however, stretched down to join hands with Turkey, and after 1879 it has always been possible for Austria and her allies to join forces with Turkey without crossing the territory of any other Power, whether hostile or not. The occupation of Novi-Bazar had been sanctioned by the Treaty of Berlin; nevertheless, the Czar was extremely angry at Francis Joseph's advance. The attitude of the Russian press, which was at that time strictly controlled by censors, became so threatening, that Austria and Prussia drew together in fear of a Franco-Russian alliance. Prince Bismarck and Count Andr ssy had met at Gastein in the summer of 1879, and a treaty for mutual defence, on the basis of the Berlin Treaty, was prepared and agreed upon between

them. Francis Joseph signed it on the understanding that the German Emperor would do so; but the German Emperor's assent was not very readily given, for he was opposed to any arrangements which might be construed as implying hostility to the Czar. The conclusion of the treaty was no doubt accelerated by the militant attitude of Russia. Italy gave her adherence to it in 1881,¹ and it forms the foundation-stone of the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary in modern times. Thus the Dual Monarchy stands hand in hand with the two powerful neighbours who had defeated her in 1859 and 1866, and is, for the moment, in opposition to Russia, who had saved Austria from the Hungarians in 1849. Count Andrassy, who, at the time of his retirement, ranked second only to Bismarck in the hierarchy of European statesmen, retired in 1879 and gave place to Baron Haymerle. Haymerle's period of office was short, but not undistinguished. In 1881 he died, but not before a visit of the King of Italy to Vienna had been arranged. King Humbert was cordially received at Vienna on October 27; and his visit was assumed to mean that Austria and Italy were

¹ Count Kálnoky, the Common Foreign Minister, announced the adhesion of Italy to the Delegations in October 1883; but it was obtained by his predecessor, Baron Haymerle, who died suddenly on October 10, 1881.

now allies. Haymerle was succeeded by Count Kálnoky, and whilst he was in charge of foreign affairs the foreign policy of Austria pursued a vigorous and successful course. The attempt of Roumania to control the mouths of the Danube, which had been placed under an international commission by the Treaty of Berlin, was checked, and in the autumn of 1883 Count Kálnoky said in his speech to the Delegations that if Austria and Russia should ever go to war, Austria would not stand alone. The conclusion of the Triple Alliance established a powerful concert of Powers in Central Europe. From Kiel to Syracuse, and from Orsova to Metz, stretched the territories of these States who were agreed as to the prevention of aggressive war.

Shortly after Kálnoky's appointment, Austria and Russia entered into an agreement with regard to the questions of the Near East which concerned them. The report of this agreement elicited hostile criticism in Hungary, where the very name of an agreement with Russia gives rise to suspicions, and where Kálnoky was suspected of too warm friendship for Russia. Dr. Szilágyi, now a rising politician in Hungary, questioned Kálnoky closely about it in the Hungarian Delegation in 1884, but

was reassured by the statement that Austria-Hungary had written obligations with no Power except Germany. The Russian agreement was at all events beneficial to Austria-Hungary, since it put a stop to the little risings in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which were attributed, with some show of justice, to Panslavist intrigue. Francis Joseph's position in Europe was never stronger than at this time; and when, in the autumn of 1885, the Bulgarians in Eastern Roumelia rose and proclaimed their union with Bulgaria, Austria was able to take a decisive action without eliciting any opposition from Russia. Since 1879 he had maintained friendly relations with Prince Milan of Servia. Austrian financiers helped the Prince to build the railway from Belgrad to Tzaribrod on the Bulgarian frontier, which, by the Treaty of Berlin, he had been directed to build; and when in 1882 the Prince, born of recent swineherd ancestry, suddenly declared himself King, he was recognised by the most punctilious Court in Europe. Though married to a wealthy Russian lady, Milan was a determined Western. Francis Joseph has many Servian subjects, and it was desirable to keep on good terms with Milan, who might cause trouble in Southern Hungary and elsewhere were he to call the Serb race to join in the formation of a

"Great Servia." The revolution of the autumn of 1885 in Roumelia set the idea of a "Great Bulgaria" actually on the road to realisation. Milan was jealous of the success of the gallant Battenberger in the rival principality, and invaded it on November 14, without a declaration of war, claiming "compensation" for the expansion of Bulgaria in the Balkans. Few wars have been shorter than that of Servia and Bulgaria in 1885. Prince Alexander marched his army across Bulgaria in two days, and on the 17th put the Servian army to flight at Slivnitza. On the 26th the victorious Bulgarians entered Servia, and must have occupied Belgrad if they had not been ordered by the Emperor Francis Joseph to halt. By this summary order the short war of 1885 was brought to a close. Into the subsequent diplomacy at Constantinople we need not enter. Bulgaria was, practically, enlarged as the insurgents desired, but Russia soon found that Prince Alexander and his stout minister, Stambouloff, would not allow her army to become a division of the Russian host, or her revenues and railways to be exploited by a financial coterie from St. Petersburg. The kidnapping of Prince Alexander followed, and, nine years afterwards, the murder of Stambouloff. In Servia we have the divorce and

attempted expulsion of Queen Natalie, the abdication of King Milan, and other episodes which put to shame the fancy of Mr. Anthony Hope. But these events, interesting as they were for the Emperor-King and his subjects, lie beyond the limits of this book.

The period which we are now considering closes without further important action in foreign affairs. As we look back over it we see that Austria-Hungary is re-established as a Great Power, and is, indeed, the centre of a system of Great Powers, all of which are on the best terms with her. She is still the mistress of many races who, if nationality and sovereignty were always to be united, would quit their Austrian or Hungarian citizenship, and join the territories of the various surrounding states. There are Italians in Trieste and the Trentino who sometimes ask for incorporation in Italy; Germans, a few of whom are beginning to think that union with Germany would be preferable to death by drowning in a sea of Slavs; Roumans in Transylvania, who want home rule from Hungary, and send congratulatory telegrams to the King of Roumania; Serbs yearning for the august patronage of King Milan. Yet, with all these surrounding Powers, Austria has

contracted alliances. Germany and Italy are her most intimate and important friends. Russia, in spite of her Balkan pretensions, has been drawn into friendship, and the Emperor-King is able, in October 1886, to speak to the Delegations of an Austro-Russian understanding in the most cordial and confident terms. Roumania has given her adhesion to the Triple Alliance; Servia is docile, and Bulgaria, for the time at least, shows no inclination of going over to Russia. Thus, in 1890, Francis Joseph, who for forty years had looked round his frontiers to see only actual or potential enemies, could say that he was on good terms with all his neighbours. This happy state of affairs had been reached without great sacrifices of men or money, and without the giving of any inconvenient promises. Moreover, in the course of these years the territory of his Empire was increased, and new lands opened for expansion, whilst on the virgin soil of Galicia and Hungary agriculture and commerce were growing apace. It is the habit of the Emperor's detractors to say that he does nothing but wait, vacillate, temporise. They do not realise, as he has done, that there are cases in which mere patience, and even delay, are the wisest policy. The patient period of 1867-93 in the Emperor's life was one

when his subjects prospered and gained knowledge of one another. That period did not put an end to all difficulties, but it showed that co-operation was possible; and that if there were difficulties, they were not insurmountable. This was no small thing.

CHAPTER VII

1893-1908

Civil Marriage in Hungary—Progress of Events in Austria—
The Badeni Ordinance and its Results — The Army
Question in Hungary — Decline of the Hungarian
Liberal Party—The Renewal of the *Ausgleich* in 1897
and 1907—Conclusion.

WHEN the year 1893 opened the Emperor-King was in a position of great strength abroad, but the outlook at home was uncertain. Taaffe's premiership in Austria came to an end during this year, and he was succeeded by Prince Alfred Windischgrätz, one of the chiefs of a noble house who in olden times had been devoted servants of the Hapsburgs, and whose possessions and dignities raised them to semi-royal rank. Prince Windischgrätz was a distinguished member of the Conservative party, who by his conduct in the Reichsrath had earned the respect of all men save only a few extremists. His ministry was strengthened by the co-operation of Dr. von Plener and

two Polish Ministers. The young Czechs were still in opposition, but the Emperor hoped that with time their demands might be moderated, and for the time being nothing was done. Prince Windischgrätz held office for two years, but his ministry saw no events of great importance. The agitation in Bohemia simmered, but nothing more. It was not till 1897 that any important change of policy took place in Austria.

But in Hungary the year 1894 saw an interesting crisis of which something must be said. In 1892 the Hungarian Liberals took up the question of civil marriage, and this speedily led to the disappearance of the Premier, Count Szapáry (Tisza's successor), who, as a loyal Roman Catholic, would not be a party to measures disliked by the Roman Church. Under the existing law as to mixed marriages the children were educated in the religion of their father if they were boys, and, if girls, in that of their mother; but this law was perpetually evaded by the Roman Catholic priests, who either refused to celebrate mixed marriages, or else declined to do so unless the parents gave, at the altar, a pledge that all their children should be brought up in the Roman Catholic faith. As the registers of marriages were kept by the clergy, the law required that a

clergyman who married persons of different faiths should communicate to the priest of the other faith the fact that he had performed the service, in order that it might be entered in the registers of his church. This law had also been evaded by the Roman priests; and owing to their action, the number of illegitimate connections was scandalously large. People who would not bind themselves by the pledges demanded at the altar often went into married life without any ceremony, and owing to the irregularity with which the registers were kept, proofs of marriage and legitimacy were often unobtainable when wanted. Certain religions were recognised by the state; but persons holding to the unrecognised creeds could not legally marry. The Hebrew faith was not recognised, and the injustices and scandals which followed in a country where there were many Jews may easily be imagined. In 1884 a Bill was introduced into the Lower House of the Hungarian Legislature for legalising marriage between Jews and Christians, but though it twice passed the Lower House, the Magnates, who were in these matters under the control of the Roman clergy, rejected it. The grievance of the Jews, and indeed of the Catholics who wished to marry Protestants, became so obvious in the early 'nineties that

action could not be delayed, and at the general election of 1892 many of the Liberal candidates put compulsory civil marriage into their programmes. The elections, which took place in mid-winter (January 4, 1892), caused extraordinary scenes. The lower clergy threw themselves into the fray with a zeal unknown before, and went among the peasants, crucifix in hand, asking pledges from their flocks as to the children of mixed marriages. But despite the exertions of the priests, the Liberal party, which had been in power ever since 1867, again carried the day at the polls; and the majority of the Cabinet were now prepared to deal with the question. The three great issues were: Should the priesthood be allowed to forbid mixed marriages; should they be allowed to retain control of the registers, and should they be permitted to exact pledges at the altar as to the religion of children yet unborn? The Catholic Premier, Szapáry, might have supported a moderate measure, but he would not consent to compulsory civil marriage, and, in November 1892, as I have said, he retired. He was succeeded by Dr. Wekerle, a bourgeois minister whose family had originally come from Würtemberg, and who had gained a high reputation by his reform of the Hungarian currency. The strongest man in the

Cabinet was, however, the Calvinist Minister of Justice, Desiderius Szilágyi, who, from the Bar and a professorial chair, had come to the House and had rapidly forced his way into the front rank of the Liberal party.

The Emperor is no friend to Ultramontaniam, but he is a loyal Roman Catholic, and was for a time opposed to the introduction of a compulsory Bill. The speech with which he opened the Hungarian Parliament in February 1892 urged moderation in this and other matters in words whose true meaning could not be mistaken. During 1893, however, he was gradually gained over to approve the introduction of the measure, and at length, in the first week of December, it was laid before the House. It provided that no marriage should be legal unless the civil form were used, and imposed a fine of £50 on any clergyman who married persons before this contract of marriage had been signed at the civil registry. Various details were imported from the French civil code, which brought divorce within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and allowed decrees of divorce to be given on grounds not recognised by the canon law. Thus a divorce was to be obtainable for "deliberate neglect of matrimonial duties," and power was to be given to the judge to

prohibit marriage of a divorced wife or husband with the co-respondent in the divorce suit.

The Bill was fiercely opposed by the Roman Catholic Church, and although Cardinal Vaszáry, Archbishop of Gran and Prince Primate of Hungary, took no active part against it, the bishops as a body and the lower clergy stopped at nothing—not even at the use of the confessional—to stir up feeling against the ministry. After long debate, in which Szilágyi again and again distinguished himself by magnificent speeches, the Bill was passed in the Chamber of Deputies on April 7, and sent to the Upper House; but, on May 10, was rejected by a majority of twenty-one. As the House of Peers contains twenty-nine Roman Catholic bishops, it was plain that the clerical vote had turned the scale. Wekerle, using an English precedent, asked the King of Hungary to create a sufficient number of peers to out-vote the bishops. The King refused, and, on May 31, the Cabinet resigned. The country was now in a condition of great excitement, and for the first time for many years words hostile to the dynasty were used in Hungary. But they were premature. The King was in a difficult position, which may well be compared to that of the late Queen Victoria when Mr. Gladstone insisted on her signing the Bill

for the Disestablishment of the Irish Church. Before using his constitutional powers Francis Joseph desired to be assured that the Civil Marriage Bill really represented the will of the Hungarian people. This he did, not by dissolving the Parliament, but by summoning Count Charles Khuen-Hederváry, the Ban of Croatia, and asking him to form a ministry. Count Khuen was a good Liberal. Had he not been so, he could not, of course, have been Ban of Croatia under a Liberal *régime*. He was, however, a marked man for promotion, and held views as to the formation of ministries and governments which savoured rather of Taaffe than of Wekerle or Szilágyi. Count Khuen's attempt did not last many days. He was unable to get any substantial following in the Parliament; and, having heard his views, Francis Joseph loyally, if reluctantly, gave way. Dr. Wekerle was reinstated, and on June 11 read a message in both Houses,¹ in which he declared, on royal authority, that the passage of the Civil Marriage Bill was regarded by the King as a "political necessity." He hoped, therefore, not to be forced to use his constitutional powers in order that it might pass.

The bishops and clerical magnates now surrendered; and the Civil Marriage Bill passed

¹ In Hungary Ministers can speak in either House.

both Houses, whilst before the end of the year other measures of the Wekerle-Szilágyi code (providing for the children of mixed marriages and for civil registration) were placed on the statute book. The passage of these Bills was a great triumph for the Liberal party, and was not the least, though it was almost the last, of their many achievements. The Royal assent was given to the three Bills on December 9; and when giving it the King of Hungary asked for the resignation of his Hungarian Ministers. I was in Hungary not long after this event, and was told on good authority that the King regretted this step, but said, "I am pledged to a change of persons." The Ministers, though they had a majority in the House, resigned on December 21. A new Ministry, composed of some lesser lights in the Liberal party, was formed under Baron Bánffy, a Protestant, who had made his reputation as Prefect of a restless department of Transylvania. Dr. Szilágyi afterwards became President of the Hungarian Parliament (which, in Hungary, is a party office), and distinguished himself there by his profound knowledge of constitutional law and his great force of character. To-day, Wekerle is again Premier in Hungary, but in company with men who were at one time his opponents. Szilágyi is in his grave.

The resignation of the Liberal leaders at a moment of triumph is an event which must excite the curiosity of people who have the ordinary English notions about constitutional government. Undoubtedly the position of these leaders was weakened by their victory on the civil marriage question. The majority of Hungarians are loyal Roman Catholics, and their bishops and priests had used every effort to undermine the Wekerle Cabinet. In this they succeeded, and they were no doubt aided by Roman Catholic influences at Court. Francis Joseph had been in 1894 placed in the most difficult position in which a man can find himself,—when faith and duty conflict, and he has to choose between the course which his spiritual advisers command and that which is required of him in his position of constitutional King. In Austria the Emperor has always looked for the support of the Roman Church, which is, in the main, hostile to Nationalist pretensions and Radical change. If it is easy to criticise his conduct in dismissing the victors of 1894, it is not difficult, I think, to appreciate the difficulty in which he was placed. By parting with Wekerle and Szilágyi he retained the support of the Roman Church in Austria, yet without sacrificing the liberties which had been gained for his Hungarian subjects. When

Wekerle and Szilágyi retired they put the Roman Catholic Church in its place for the present generation, and that without raising any such general hostility to her as has been seen in the Germany of Bismarck and the Italy of Crispi. They had done more than this : they had, if I may say so, vindicated the liberty of all the unborn children in Hungary.

After the fall of Wekerle and Szilágyi the Liberal party continued in power under Baron Bánffy, who held office till 1899. Bánffy completed the programme of the party by passing the remaining religious Bills, and his followers did not again have to measure their strength against the clerical reactionaries in Austria. The ill-feeling which existed between the Hungarian Liberals and the Ultramontane faction at Vienna was, however, illustrated in 1895 by the “Affaire Agliardi,” which led to the downfall of the Foreign Minister of the monarchy, Count Kálnoky. Mgr. Agliardi was the Papal Nuncio at Vienna, and during a visit to Hungary in the spring of '95 he took occasion to speak openly against the Liberal party and the recent acts, and freely encouraged resistance to the law. His utterances became so violent that questions were put in the Hungarian House of Commons. Baron Bánffy, who had previously communicated his

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views on the matter to the Foreign Office, said that a note would be sent to the Vatican by the common Government of Austria-Hungary demanding an explanation of the Nuncio's conduct. No such note had been sent, but Bánffy had assumed that a demand in the substance of his communication to Count Kálnoky would, as a matter of course, be despatched. Count Kálnoky had delayed in the matter in order to satisfy himself by independent inquiry of the accuracy of the Hungarian Premier's information on the Nuncio's conduct. He now issued an official note saying that Baron Bánffy's statement was a breach of confidence, and tendered his resignation to the Emperor-King on the ground that he could not usefully co-operate with the Hungarian Premier. Francis Joseph at first declined to accept the resignation, but shortly afterwards did so, thus vindicating the action of the Liberal leader. The affair was attributed to personal animosity between the two men, into which it is needless for us to inquire. Its real importance, and the reason why it has a place in a survey of the Emperor's reign, is that it involved the admission of Hungary's claim to deal with Foreign Powers through the medium of the Foreign Office, and not only by action in the Delegations, according to the provisions of the

Constitution of 1867. Questions such as those put to Bánffy in the Hungarian House should have been put to Count Kálnoky in the Delegations; and these, in fact, were about to meet at the time when the dispute arose. Here we find a case where a question involving diplomatic relations is put, not in the Delegations, but in the Hungarian Parliament, and answered by the Hungarian Premier. The action of the Emperor-King in accepting Kálnoky's resignation admitted this procedure, and the episode may at any time be used as a precedent. So long as a Hungarian Premier has the confidence of his House at Pesth he may, it seems, disregard the provisions of the constitution which commit foreign affairs to the care of the Delegates.

Turning to Austria, we find the strife of nations still rampant in the 'nineties. Prince Windischgrätz, who had succeeded Count Taaffe in 1893, retained office till the summer of 1895. In June he fell, and after a short provisional ministry under Count Kielmansegg (the first Protestant Premier in Austria), Count Badeni took office in October. Badeni came in with a programme which may be stated in the words, "Austria first, the nationalities afterwards." He began his period of office by adding to the four *curiae* of electors to the

Reichsrath (nobles, chambers of commerce, urban voters, rural voters) a fifth *curia* on the basis of universal suffrage. This was a step towards the introduction of universal suffrage in Austria which, as my readers are probably aware, was instituted in 1906-7. The fifth *curia* was to elect 72 members, so that the total number of deputies was raised from 353 to 425. The elections of March 1897 resulted in the return of no less than twenty-five parties to the Reichsrath, amongst whom the Czechs (61) and the Poles (59) were the strongest groups. Count Badeni could count on their support if he put Czech and German on level terms in Bohemia. As he needed a majority in order to carry through the renewal of the terminable portions of the Austro-Hungarian compromise, he issued in April ordinances for Bohemia which required a knowledge of German and Czech from all officials. The ordinances were afterwards toned down so that the obligation should not arise until 1907, but even in their modified form they were opposed by the whole force of the German population. The new rules inflicted no hardship on Czech officials, for a knowledge of German had always been required from them.¹ In Bohemia every

¹ Valuable articles on this subject appeared in the *Quarterly Review* for October 1901, and in the *Nineteenth Century* for December 1899.

educated Czech knew German, but the Germans, with the exception of the officials in Czech districts, did not know Czech. The Germans now raised an agitation which seriously threatened the peace of Bohemia. Riots took place at Eger, a centre of German industry, and elsewhere, and on 4th and 5th November took place a famous all-night sitting of the Reichsrath, in which the German opposition surpassed even the worst performances of previous years. Badeni resigned in November, though not until he had challenged a German firebrand and been wounded in a duel. He was succeeded by Baron Gautsch, an official of the Vienna bureaucracy, who modified the language ordinances; then by Count Francis Thun, who (in March 1898) renewed the terminable parts of the Austro-Hungarian compromise by Imperial decree; and then (October 1889) by Count Manfred Clary, who repealed the ordinances altogether. The repeal marks the end of a second period in which the Emperor tried to induce the Federalists to support his rule in Austria. The attempt had two results. It caused the Germans to appeal for help to the various societies in Germany whose institution and efforts, taken altogether, are summarised in the word "Pan-Germanism." It also prevented the constitutional

renewal of the Austro-Hungarian compromise. The renewal should have been approved by the Reichsrath in 1897; but the Reichsrath and the Hungarian House did not give their sanction for several years. The first of these results is of great importance. If I deal with it shortly it is because it raises a question of to-day and to-morrow which, being as yet only in its early stages, cannot be fully discussed in a book which is designed for biography.¹ The German societies are of different ages and sizes, some founded early in the last century, some later; but their activity as to Austria became observable in the period of Taaffe's ministry, and has since constantly increased. There are in Austria, and especially in Bohemia, a number of sister societies,² mostly founded in the years 1890-1900, whose object is the maintenance of the German language and German supremacy in Bohemia. Counter societies have been formed by the Czechs, and the rival organisations have kept up a fusillade of pamphlets, speeches, and demonstrations in which tons of paper, hogsheads of ink, and a great deal of money have been expended. The formation

¹ A great deal of information on this subject will be found in M. Chéradame's *L'Europe et la Question d'Autriche* (Paris, 4th edition, 1906). The book is frankly hostile to Germany, but, taken as such, is highly instructive.

² Chéradame, *op. cit.* p. 130.

and work of these societies show how great is the importance attached by the Germans and Slavs to the conflict in Bohemia. In that kingdom two of the great races of Europe stand face to face, and it is there that the battle between them will be fought out. The prophets who predict an ultimate disruption of Austria see in the German societies, in their preachers and pamphleteers, in their school-teachers whom they subsidise, in the very Christmas trees which they provide for German children, the advance-guard of the Hohenzollern. The Germans see in the Czech societies the advance-guard of Panslavism, and fear that, at some future time, the Emperor of Russia may follow them up and declare himself the protector of all Slavonic races in Francis Joseph's dominions. Since the Russian Government became involved in the Far East and suffered reverses there, the advance of Panslavism in Europe has been checked. The agreement between Francis Joseph and Nicholas II. as to non-intervention in the Balkans, made in 1897, has been loyally observed in St. Petersburg, and the abortive Bulgarian rising of 1903 found no practical support in Russia. These circumstances have given to the Emperor-King, and his Government much relief from the Slavophil intrigues

which were long a source of difficulty, and which greatly encouraged the young Czech movement of the nineties. On the other hand, the marvellous growth and prosperity of Germany has drawn Austria-Hungary to a certain extent under her influence, and has compelled the Emperor-King to adopt, both at home and abroad, a policy consistent with the desires of the Emperor William. It would, however, be wrong to assert that Austria-Hungary is simply the vassal state of Germany. On more than one occasion, notably in the case of complaints made by Austrian Poles of their expulsion from East Prussia, the Austrian Premier has taken up a firm attitude; and if the Emperor-King is always found on the side of the Emperor William in the councils of Europe, the fact is due to identity of interest and policy, and not to any subservience of one to the views or aims of the other.

In the Bohemian question Francis Joseph has always hoped that time would bring moderation and a solution acceptable to reasonable men. There is no real reason why Czechs and Germans should not agree together. They are for the most part Roman Catholics (though there have recently been many conversions to Protestantism among the Germans), and are by no means so divided

as the Poles and Ruthenes in Galicia, who differ both in creed and race, or the Croats and Serbs and Italians in southern Austria and Croatia. The Emperor has constantly and patiently waited, giving as much as could be given with safety, withdrawing his gifts only when he found that they went too far, and trying to teach his people to be Austrians first and Czechs or Germans afterwards. The lesson, however, is being but slowly learnt, and, except for the year 1901, when the dexterity of Baron Gautsch produced a temporary truce, the Czechs and Germans have been at daggers drawn ever since the time of the withdrawal of the Badeni ordinance. The necessary arrangements with Hungary were prolonged from year to year, by decree, but parliamentary action was paralysed, and the country was frequently without a legalised Budget or legally raised recruits.

In 1906 the Emperor, tired of his prolonged efforts in the cause of good citizenship, readily acceded to the demand for universal suffrage which followed the grant of a constitution in Russia. Early in 1907 a Parliament met in Vienna, elected by no privileged classes of voters, but by all male Austrians over twenty-four years of age. Thus the Francis Joseph who began his life with a paper promise of

representative government, but who ruled for nearly twenty years without a Parliament at all, has lived to see a legislative assembly in Austria, against which even the most advanced democrats can make no complaint. Strange to say, the institution of universal suffrage has considerably improved the Reichsrath. The new Parliament is not strongly marked by the old lines of cleavage between races or nationalities. It looks as though it might fall into two large parties, Christian Socialists on the one side and Social Democrats on the other, which will mean ultimately a conflict between the Roman Church and the anti-clerical elements in the country. However this may be, the Emperor of Austria has certainly had his hands strengthened for purposes of dealing with the Parliament of Hungary. At the present moment he is at the head of a democratic state in Austria, whilst he is waiting for the dominant Magyars to introduce universal suffrage in Hungary. Until they have done so, the questions at issue between the Crown and Hungary have been postponed.

Of these the most important is the army question. During the long *régime* of the Liberal party little question was raised as to the management of the "common" army.

In 1889 a nominal recognition of the fact that the Austro-Hungarian army is two armies was given by a change in its formal title,¹ but the Liberals did not complain of the use of German as the sole language of the army or armies, whichever be the correct word. The "National" party in Hungary, brilliantly led through many years of opposition by Count Albert Apponyi, had always pressed for the use of Magyar in the Magyar regiments of the army, and with the decay of the Liberal organisation, the advance to power of the National party and the Independents, who were now led by the son of Louis Kossuth, the question came to the front. A Hungarian Act of 1868 provided that recruits raised in Hungary should be enlisted only in Hungarian regiments, and a royal decree of the same year directed that Hungarian troops should be commanded by Hungarian officers. These provisions were not strictly carried out, and in the higher military schools German was the only language used. Hungary has, of course, a large militia of its own, called the *Honved*, a most efficient force, and containing some of the finest cavalry in Europe, but without artillery. Count Apponyi's followers constantly com-

¹ Above, pp. 188-189.

plained that the training given in the Honved schools was not good enough. Some improvements were effected whilst Baron Bánffy was Premier; but it was not till 1903, when a Recruits Bill came before the House, that the present agitation began in earnest.

The Bill of 1903 asked for an increased number of recruits, in order that Austria-Hungary might keep pace with the military preparations of her neighbours. Francis Kossuth, the leader of the extreme Left, opposed the increase in order to protest against the whole system of dual government. Apponyi's followers joined in the opposition with a demand that Magyar should become the language of drill and command in all Hungarian regiments. The Crown refused assent, and the Premier, M. de Szell, resigned. Count Khuen-Hederváry, who was again summoned from Agram to try to form a Government, failed to do so. The country was left without recruits and without a Budget in the last half of 1903, and it was necessary, in order to maintain the peace strength of the army, to keep time-expired men under the colours. In September the Emperor went to Galicia to attend the autumn manœuvres, and on the 14th he issued at Chlopy a remarkable army order.

He declared that, as commander-in-chief, he "must and will hold fast the existing organisation of the army" which was "threatened by one-sided aspirations." The order was received with acclamations in Austria, but with defiance in Hungary, and it was found necessary to tone it down by a conciliatory message to the Hungarian House of Commons. In October 1903 a compromise was arrived at which provided that Hungarian standards and emblems should be placed beside those of Austria on all military buildings, that instruction should be given in Magyar in all military schools, and that all Hungarian officers in Austrian regiments should be transferred to Hungarian regiments. Other small concessions were made, and Count Stephen Tisza, son of the Premier of 1875-1890, took office and tried to carry on the Government.

Obstruction was, however, too strong for him, and the debates became so angry that strong, and even illegal, measures had to be taken to stop them. "The Tiszas are like chimney-sweeps," said one of the most polite of the new Premier's opponents; "the higher they go, the blacker they get!" In March 1894 Count Tisza suspended the measures for meeting obstruction, and the Recruits Bill was passed, mainly in order to

allow time-expired men to return to their homes; but the Premier's proposals for dealing with obstruction, revived after its passage, led to a long and heated controversy, and ended in an appeal to the country. The elections, which took place in January 1905 in the depth of winter, put an end to the Liberal party. After a life of thirty-seven years it was vanquished at the hustings.

The Emperor was not discouraged by the Liberal defeat. He appointed an old soldier, Baron Fejerváry, Prime Minister, and the country was governed through 1905 and up to April 1906 without even the semblance of Parliamentary sanction. The most remarkable feature of the elections of 1905 was the appearance of a new party, consisting of some twenty members, who represented the Roumanian population in Transylvania. This province, situated in the south-east of Hungary, is inhabited by three races—Magyars, Saxons who immigrated long ago from Germany, and Roumanians, who are brothers to the adjacent population of Roumania. Up to 1905 they abstained from sending members to the Hungarian Parliament as a protest against the centralist Government of Hungary and the use of Magyar as the only official language in their district. They now entered the field,

came to Parliament, and propounded a programme of universal suffrage, redistribution, and the use in each regiment of the language to which the greatest number of soldiers in it belonged. The demand for universal suffrage was taken up in 1905 all through the kingdom of Hungary, and was most embarrassing to the majority, now led by Kossuth and Apponyi. Though unassailable in point of numbers, they were simply disregarded by the stout old soldier, Fejerváry, who carried on the Government as best he could without them. Suffrage in Hungary is the highest in Europe ; and out of 17,000,000 inhabitants, less than 1,000,000 have votes. If universal suffrage were granted, the Magyar supremacy would be almost certain to come to an end, and the ancient Parliament of Hungary would probably be reduced to the humble level of the Austrian assembly. Yet the leaders of the majority, who claimed to represent the national will, could not very well oppose a change which was about to take place in Austria. Francis Joseph, with his usual sound judgment, saw this. In his negotiation with the Hungarian leaders in April 1906 he made dexterous use of it. Summoning Dr. Wekerle, the ex-Premier of 1894, and Kossuth, whose father had, in '49, proclaimed him a traitor and an outlaw, he entrusted them in April with the

formation of a ministry. Apponyi, now the first orator in Hungary, became Minister of Education, and it was agreed that the army question should be postponed until manhood suffrage had been established in the western half of the monarchy. The Hungarian leaders have thus been left to settle amongst themselves the question of electoral reform in their country. They refused to carry on the Government unless concessions were made to which Francis Joseph could not consent. They appealed against the King to the will of the people. To the people, said Francis Joseph, let them go; but to the whole people. It may have been his Majesty's last card; but it was a good one.

Before the truce of 1906 was arranged the Hungarian ministers agreed to pass the laws which were necessary to renew the terminable parts of the compromise of 1867. This has since been done, and the present arrangements will last till 1917. After that date Hungary and Austria will have free hands, and it has been settled that the treaty-obligations which bind both of them to foreign countries shall terminate at the time when they gain freedom from one another. The Emperor-King has undertaken not to enforce any fresh commercial treaties by decree, so that in 1917 no treaty may be in force to fetter the free action of both states in

their tariff arrangements with foreign states. To speak accurately, Austria and Hungary are now in theory independent, but they have agreed to maintain free trade with one another for ten years, and to charge similar duties during that period upon imported goods.

A full discussion of this complicated subject would be out of place here.¹ Austria and Hungary are two countries whose commercial interests are by no means the same. Austria was in 1867 an old-established and highly-developed industrial country, with factories, highly specialised industries, and a great accumulation of capital. Certain parts of Austria, such as the great province of Galicia, were, economically speaking, in their youth; but on the whole she was a full-grown state. Hungary was almost wholly agricultural—a vast prairie, with land of great fertility but without industries or manufactures. It can easily be seen that, if there is free trade between two countries in these conditions, it will tend to prevent the agricultural country from developing manufactures. If any industrial undertaking is started in Hungary, the Austrian manufacturers, by making an agreement, can undersell for a time the Hungarian-made

¹ An article on this topic from the pen of Count Joseph Mailáth appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for September 1908.

product and choke the new industry in its early days. So long as the Hungarians are unprotected by a tariff this must be possible. The result must be, indeed to a great extent has been, that Hungary has remained, commercially speaking, an appanage of Austria. One can easily imagine that if we in England had never permitted our colonies to protect themselves by a tariff wall against us, whilst they were protected against other countries, they would have remained to this day in complete dependence on us for all manufactured goods. They would still be prairies. In the case of our earliest colony, Ireland, this course was adopted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The discontent which it caused in the younger and weaker country has, as we know, continued down to our own day. In the nineteenth century we did not attempt such a policy. The later colonies have set up tariffs against us, and, owing to them, have commenced industrial life. In Hungary this could not be done, and it is chiefly due to the ingenious devices of successive Hungarian Governments that Hungarian manufacture has made considerable progress in spite of Austrian competition. Thus the Government at Pesth has offered free land, partial exemption from taxation, and the first refusal of Government contracts to

Austrian manufacturers if they would transfer their plant to Hungary. When this offer has been accepted, the manufacturer has come over to Hungary and given employment and training there whilst he was, of course, still able to keep his Austrian custom.

The Austrians think this is not fair play, and most people will agree with them. When I was in Pesth in 1896, at the time of the Hungarian Millennial Exhibition, I heard the matter discussed at some length. The King of Hungary was there at the moment, and I remember that on one occasion when I was talking over that subject with some friends, His Majesty had just been going round the industrial part of the Exhibition. I was told by a person who had good reason to know that he repeatedly asked of those in charge, "Who are your principal customers?" In almost every case they answered, "Sire, your Majesty's Government." This answer was significant. It helps outsiders to understand one of the causes of commercial jealousy between the two states. Again it is easy to imagine cases in which a duty, where it may be approved in industrial Austria, may be disliked in agricultural Hungary. The one wants the newest agricultural machinery, from England or the United States, to come in as nearly free as

possible. The other wants a high duty on such machinery, so as to make a preference in favour of her home-made machinery. One wants a duty on food products, so as to favour home-grown produce; the other does not, and so forth. These matters, however, take us far away from the life of the Emperor-King. For an essayist it is enough to mention that there is, and must always be, a certain divergence of economic interest and policy between the two states. Its presence adds to the difficulty of Francis Joseph's task—the task of welding the two peoples into a single and solid monarchy peopled by citizens who are willing and able to work together, each for the good of the whole.

And now, in 1908, we turn to look back over the period which we have considered. As the sixtieth year of his long reign draws to a close we find this old monarch still at his post, patient, watchful, zealous in all that is for the good of his subjects, anxious to trust them as far as he may, risen far beyond the traditions of his early life, the sovereign of a new monarchy wholly different from the Austria of his youth, the accepted of democracy in Austria, and actually, by a freak of fortune, the champion of democracy in the vaunted home of Liberty beyond the Leitha. The Austrian Franchise Bill not only permits universal

suffrage, but enables the provincial diets to make it compulsory. In Hungary the King asks his Hungarian ministers to introduce a similar measure; yet they hesitate.¹ Here, then, is this autocratic Hapsburg, the grandson of Francis II., who confined the earliest Italian patriots in dungeons and took from them the sparrows which they had tamed to share their solitude, the pupil of Metternich, the executioner of Batthyány, not only asking his subjects to share his powers, but actually cramming political power down their throats; begging the very son of Louis Kossuth, who declared him an outlaw and a traitor for tyranny in 1848, to permit the whole of Kossuth's country to share in its government. At the time of writing, the newspapers tell us that Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have hitherto been only "occupied and administered," are to be formally annexed; and this because it is intended to give them a constitution. Surely no born autocrat has ever undergone so remarkable a conversion!

It is usual for a biography to end with some final judgment on the life and work of its subject. I do not approve of this custom. If the biography has fairly stated the facts of

¹ From recent ministerial utterances it appears that a bill will soon be brought forward in Hungary; but not for "one man, one vote."

the case, those who read it may well be left to draw their own conclusions. It would be a mistake to say that Francis Joseph is a great man ; but it is certainly, I believe, a mistake to imagine that he has had no policy at all, and has merely lived from year to year, meeting difficulties one by one as they arose, without any idea as to what may happen in the end. The true view seems to be that Francis Joseph began his reign as one who had been reared in an atmosphere of autocracy, in a school where the old Hapsburg traditions prevailed. In the first three years of his reign he saw those ideas challenged and vindicated. From 1849 to 1859 he continued in them. In 1859 he suffered his first defeat, and in 1866 was defeated again. Yet in 1859 he was able to make peace on very easy terms, whilst in 1866 his enemies again made peace with him upon conditions which might easily have been more severe. The year of Sadowa is the turning-point in his reign. One may almost say that he has had two reigns—the first, of twenty years as an autocrat ; the second, of forty as a constitutional sovereign. The introduction of constitutional government is always a difficult process, never accomplished, even in England, without bloodshed ; and in Austria-Hungary it was much more difficult than else-

where. It was followed by a long period of cautious and patient administration, the main object of which is all along visible to any careful observer. It is the education of a vast and varied population in the duties of citizenship, the development of the state-idea in races or small nations which have long been rivals or enemies and which are distracted from Austria by external states. In a case of this kind great results are difficult of attainment in a short time; final results are unattainable. The full significance and effect of this reign cannot, therefore, be realised, or even well estimated, until long after it has closed. What Francis Joseph has done for Austria-Hungary is to give her time. In political pathology time is invaluable; and those who, like our own great Queen Elizabeth and the Emperor Francis Joseph, realise that time and rest are necessary for political development, and who secure for their subjects that long period of time, are wise and good rulers.

To those who agree with this view it is a cause for gratitude that the Emperor-King has been spared to rule at Vienna and Pesth for sixty years. They can desire nothing so much as that he should reign for a century. As this is not to be, we can only hope that the fine example of judgment and patience which

he has shown will not be forgotten by those who, I trust at a very distant date, may be called upon to succeed him. In our own lives we see constantly that the example of men and women who have lived well is not touched by Death, and remains a valued possession after they have gone. And that which is true of ordinary men should also be true of Kings. In this case, at all events, let us hope so.

APPENDIX A

THE foregoing pages had been written and were ready for printing when the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina was proclaimed. The annexation caused some surprise in Europe, and, oddly enough, evoked a great deal of hostile comment in this country. It was denounced as a breach of the Treaty of Berlin, as though Austria-Hungary had been put under some restrictions by that Treaty, whereas in fact no restriction of any kind was placed upon her. Those who denounced her action seem to have forgotten (if they ever knew it) that the commission to Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer Bosnia and the Herzegovina was given at the suggestion of Lord Salisbury, the junior delegate for England at the Berlin Conference, and that this was done in the execution of the traditional policy of England in the Near East, which is to preserve an even balance between the contending parties there, and to take all possible measures for the better government of the population of those parts. Before 1875 the government of Bosnia and the Herzegovina was extremely bad; but the conflict of races and creeds was so keen that it was impossible to establish Bosnia and the Herzegovina as a principality after the manner of Bulgaria. The population consists largely of men of Slavonic race, the Ottomans being in a small minority. After the Turkish conquest, which was completed about the year 1480, many of the Slav inhabitants were converted to Mohammedanism, and in course of time many others were converted to Roman Catholicism or joined the Greek Catholic Church, (which holds the Catholic doctrine but has services in the vernacular and permits its priests to marry). The Moham-

medan Slavs had in course of time become quite loyal to Turkey, and it was they who gave the Austro-Hungarian generals so much trouble in the campaign of occupation which took place in the late summer of 1878. The Greek Orthodox Slavs looked to Serbia or Montenegro, and positively hoped for union with one or other of these States. The Roman or Greek Catholics were attracted by religion rather towards Austria or Italy. The Turks knew that they could not satisfy all these aspirations, and consequently adopted their usual expedient of not satisfying any of them. Apart from that, their government was extremely bad. The taxes were farmed to extortionate undertakers. The land laws were oppressive, and tithes were frequently raised to an unjust extent. The difficulties and scandals in connection with the law courts, which always occur where Mohammedans are judges and Christians are litigants or witnesses, were rampant throughout the country. Something had to be done to remedy these evils; yet, as I have said, the people of the country were even less fit than the Bulgarians and Servians to govern themselves. Fortunately this was understood. The mistake of entrusting men who have been freed from a long period of Turkish misgovernment with a paper-made democratic constitution has been made more than once. It is the worst remedy for the ills of the Near East. The impotence, corruption, misgovernment, and murder which have dogged the steps of popular government in the Balkans do not justify the tyranny of the Sultan; but they impress those who have followed the history of the Balkan States with the dangers which may follow if races who have just been freed from tyranny are at once let loose upon themselves. A humane and judicious despotism is undoubtedly, so far as experience goes, the best form of government for such people.¹ It has been tried in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and has not been found wanting.

¹ Some interesting observations on this matter will be found in Mr. Miller's excellent book, *Travel and Politics in the Near East* (London, 1897).

The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 was, as every schoolboy knows, prefaced by a rising in Montenegro and the Herzegovina, where the tithes had been suddenly raised. The Sultan, after quelling the insurrection, endeavoured to meet the reasonable demands of the insurgents by issuing a Firman and an Iradé (in October and December 1875), renewing and confirming in their favour the privileges granted to the Christians in Turkey by two charters known as the Hatt-i-sherif of Gulhané (1839) and the Hatt-i-hamayoun (1856). The rising in the Herzegovina caused considerable trouble in Austria-Hungary, where any Slav movements which take place outside the Dual Monarchy are apt to awaken sympathetic echoes. Count Andrassy, then Foreign Minister in Austria-Hungary, accordingly invited the co-operation of the Powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris to take steps for securing to Bosnia and the Herzegovina that the privileges promised them should be really and honestly conceded. His proposals were framed in a circular sent to the Powers in December 1876, and usually known as the "Andrassy Note." Its suggestions were based on the charters of 1839 and 1856, and it asked for guarantees of religious liberty, for the abolition of tax-farming, the regulation of the tithes, and the appropriation to Bosnia and the Herzegovina of all revenue raised by direct taxes within their borders, and other things. The Porte accepted these proposals, and in February 1876 issued a Firman embodying them. The insurgents were, however, not yet content. They held out for a reduction of the Turkish garrison, the appointment of Austro-Hungarian and Russian agents in six towns in the provinces to supervise the execution of the reforms, and the right to keep their arms in their hands till they should be carried out.¹ The Porte agreed to these demands, but in fact it did nothing, and the situation in Bosnia and the Herzegovina remained unchanged. The preliminaries of Adrianople agreed upon between Russia and Turkey gave home rule to the provinces, and provided that two years' revenue should be hypothecated to restoring

¹ I take the facts from Spalaikovitch's *La Bosnie*, etc. (Paris, 1897).

the refugees, wiping off the arrears due from the local taxpayers to the Turkish Exchequer, and giving the people a fresh start. When the arrangements between Turkey and Russia were revised at Berlin, Count Andrassy openly expressed the view that in Bosnia and the Herzegovina home rule would be impracticable.¹ He drew attention to the rivalries between Christians and Mussulmans there, which had been the first cause of the late war, and declared that these rivalries would be rather increased than diminished by local home rule. The independence or semi-independence of Serbia and Bulgaria was sure to be used as a precedent in demanding Bosnian independence; and the demand must lead to an agitation which Turkey could not quell. Further, if Serbia and Montenegro should be extended so as to adjoin one another, the commercial interests of Austria-Hungary would suffer, and the Congress must keep this in view. Austria-Hungary bordered on Bosnia, and had suffered great losses owing to the perpetual disturbances in the province. She had in the last two years had to support 200,000 refugees at a cost of nearly £1,000,000, and had had to keep a large army on the frontier to prevent incursions.

Lord Salisbury followed Count Andrassy, and at once proposed that the provinces should be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. He declared that the Porte could not restore or keep order in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and that the provinces were of no use or value to Turkey. Moreover, he declared that if a large part of it fell into the hands of one of the neighbouring principalities, *a chain of Slav States* would be formed which would extend across the Balkans from sea to sea, which would be a menace to other races occupying territories to the south of that chain. Lord Salisbury's proposal was supported by France and Germany, and, after some hesitation, by Italy. Count Andrassy declared that Austria was ready

¹ The debate on this subject at the Congress of Berlin (June 28, 1878) is well reported in Samwer and Hopf, *Recueil de Traitts*, etc., 2nd series, vol. iii. at pp. 331-340.

to occupy and govern, but said that, although for the purpose of keeping open a commercial road to the south she must have the right of garrisoning the district of Novi-Bazar, she had no desire to occupy that portion of Bosnia. Turkish authority might therefore remain in force there.

This discussion was embodied in the Treaty of Berlin. Nothing was said, aye or no, as to the permanence of the occupation. It must be remembered, however, that Prince Gortchakoff, when assenting, for Russia, to the occupation, explained that the Russian vote "*s'applique exclusivement aux termes de la motion de Lord Salisbury*"; that is, it was a vote in favour of occupation and administration, but of nothing more.

It is fairly clear from these facts that Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, though they did not say that the occupation should be permanent, meant that it should be so. If Gortchakoff had not felt that this was the sense of the meeting, he would hardly have made the reservation which I have just mentioned.

The diplomatists at Berlin had, in fact, to decide who should exercise the humane despotism over Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Such a despotism was necessary in order that these territories might recover from the effects of ancient misrule, and from the exhausting war in which their inhabitants had tried to oust the Turks. Lord Salisbury's speech, which I have already mentioned, shows England's reasons for not entrusting Russia with the mission. His objections to the extension of a Slavophil chain across the Balkans, would, of course, have applied with equal force to an arrangement by which Russia herself would have formed or held a link in that chain. Such a chain would sever Turkey from Europe, and would greatly increase that influence of Russia in the Near East which it had been our object in 1856 and 1878 to prevent. Lord Salisbury was strongly opposed to a course which would enable Russia and her vassal states, by a judicious policy of railway tariffs, to cut off Turkey altogether from Europe.

The English statesmen of 1878 thought this a great danger. In the Victorian age Russia was still regarded by England as the most formidable Power in the Near East; and had often shown that she was so. We had not yet occupied Egypt or Cyprus, which protect the great road to India and Australia, and the fear that Russia, by absorbing Turkey, might assume a position which would enable her to block that road, was a constant and genuine motive to our diplomacy. The problem of 1878, therefore, was—how to secure good government in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, without magnifying Russian influence in the Balkans. The solution—let Austria-Hungary govern them—came easily.

Count Andrassy's reason for not taking over the district of Novi-Bazar is not very clear. At the Congress of Berlin he said that Austria did not wish for the commission to govern it because it did not border on Austria-Hungary. His decision may have been due to a desire to save Turkey's feelings, or to a feeling that Austria-Hungary would have enough on her hands without it. However this may be, it was agreed that the Turkish civil administration should remain in operation in Novi-Bazar, but Austria-Hungary was authorised to make roads and railways in the district, and to keep garrisons to protect those roads. Thus was Lord Salisbury's anxiety relieved, and the Slav belt from the Black Sea to the Adriatic broken. The agreement is typical of the character of the Treaty of Berlin. It secured good government in the Balkans, and restricted Russian influence there.

The Treaty of Berlin may be regarded as a triumph for Austrian diplomacy, because Count Andrassy induced Europe to take up and support the Austro-Hungarian view as to the future of Bosnia. This view had been clearly expressed in a speech made by Count Andrassy to the Austrian Delegation on 19th December 1877. He then declared that if Serbia should invade Bosnia and the Herzegovina, whose fate was then in the balance, Austria-Hungary would make certain claims, and that if these claims were not listened to, she would invade the pro-

vinces.¹ It is indeed clear that if Bosnia and the Herzegovina had been erected into a Slav principality, Austria's power in the south and west and on the Adriatic would have been gravely prejudiced. The narrow strip of territory—Dalmatia—which runs for many miles between Bosnia and the sea, could not have been held, and Austria must, in the end, have retired once more, as she did in 1859 and 1866, from lands which she could not hold. It was, indeed, essential to Austria-Hungary that if the provinces must be freed from Turkish authority, they should not be handed over to the government of Russia as vassals. Had they been so, the balance of power in South-Eastern Europe would have been greatly—one may say decisively—altered in favour of the Slavs, as against that combination of Germans and Magyars which is, so to speak, personified in Austria-Hungary.

In this case the policy of the Dual Monarchy was in accord with the public policy of Europe. For England, for France and Italy and Germany, it was essential that Russia should not become the predominant power in the Balkan States. It was to prevent her becoming so that several of the Powers of Europe had intervened in 1856 between the Czar Nicholas and Turkey. To allow Bosnia and the Herzegovina to pass into Slavonic hands would have been to stultify all that England, France, and Young Italy had done, by war or diplomacy, in 1854, 1855, and 1856. These Powers were therefore in this position: they wished to secure good government for the Bosniaks, but they wished to restrict and not increase the Russian power in South-Eastern Europe. Thus their policy and the Austro-Hungarian policy were found to coincide, and were satisfied by the commission which Austria-Hungary undertook. She has carried it out with an ability, a dexterity, and a devotion proved by the evidence of every independent witness who has seen her work.

¹ The sitting of the Delegations was held with closed doors; but see *The Times* of 21st December 1877, p. 3.

The Berlin Congress did not arrange the details of the occupation, but left Austria and Turkey to work them out together, and the result of Austro-Turkish discussions was summarised in a treaty signed in April 1879. I need not refer at length to this Treaty. It reserved the sovereignty of the Sultan in Bosnia, but the Austrians refused to saddle their administration, like the English administration of Cyprus, with the liability to pay tribute to the Porte. The Sultan took special guarantees for the protection of the Moslem faith ; and these have been observed with scrupulous respect. It was agreed that any surplus of the revenue of the provinces over current expense should be spent in Bosnia. Thus Bosnia has the full benefit of any improvement which may take place in her economic condition. Moreover, the "Law of Administration" of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which was passed through the Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments in 1880, provided¹ that if the revenue of Bosnia and the Herzegovina should not in any year suffice to meet the needs of the local government, the deficit should be made good out of the common fund of the Dual Monarchy. This was a most generous provision, and gave to Bosnia the advantage of being able to rely on the Dual Exchequer for works of improvement of all kinds. Taken together with the financial provision of the Austria-Turkish Treaty, it placed her in a position which other Balkan States may well envy. She could make no debts ! Could Servia, with her rotten finance, have given such terms ? Would Russia have done so ?

As to the manner in which Austria-Hungary has carried out her work in Bosnia and Herzegovina there cannot, I think, be any serious conflict of opinion.² The roads, the schools, the railways, the mining works, the survival of her splendid forests, the hospitals and gymnasia, and above all, the

¹ Spalaikovitich, *op. cit.* pp. 176, 178.

² For an independent judgment I may again refer to Mr. Miller's book (cited above, p. 234). His opinion is confirmed by numerous newspaper reports which have since been published.

security of life and property, bear conclusive testimony to the competence and integrity of the Austrian Government. Indeed, that competence and integrity has never been seriously questioned, so that it is almost waste of time to dilate upon them.

A traveller is as safe now in the mountains of Bosnia as in London, and a good deal safer than in Chicago. The Austrian and Hungarian civil service has always been a training-ground for young men of good, often of noble family, who enter it in early years before they succeed to their property, or before they turn to politics. The Bosnian service has been filled with civilians of this class who have devoted themselves with the utmost keenness and with high intelligence to their work ; and in thirty years they have literally done wonders. Complete tolerance is secured to all creeds, and the old land system which would have been just enough if it had been honestly worked, has been preserved and is worked with honesty. The labouring peasantry can draw on the Government for purchase of their holdings on terms of generosity which are exceeded only in Ireland. Travelling is very cheap for the poor, and can be comfortable for the rich ; and the Government has provided hotels in which modern comforts can be obtained, and the terrors of Eastern travel forgotten.

"From a considerable experience," says an independent witness, "of the Austria-Hungarian authorities, not merely in the chief towns and on the beaten track, but up country and off the ordinary routes, I have come to the conclusion that they resemble our own civil servants in their integrity, their absolute devotion to their duty, and their unflagging energy, whilst I think they surpass the average Anglo-Indian official in their keen interest in the welfare of the people committed to their charge."¹

And now, after exactly thirty years, the Emperor Francis Joseph has announced that he will not retire from Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and that he has superseded the sovereignty of the Sultan there by his own. This is not,

¹ Miller, *op. cit.* pp. 116-17.

either in form or in substance, a violation of any clause in the Treaty of Berlin. That Treaty never stated that the occupation should be temporary or provisional; nor did it safeguard the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Sultan, as was done in the case of Bulgaria.¹ On the other hand, the Treaty of 1879 between Austria-Hungary and Turkey did declare that the Sultan's sovereignty in Bosnia and the Herzegovina was to be maintained; and Turkey will undoubtedly complain that this Treaty has been violated. The only question for English diplomatists is whether, under these circumstances, we have any *locus standi* for objecting to what Austria has done.

The Treaty of Paris of 1856 admitted Turkey to "the advantages" of the Concert of Europe. Though I won the Whewell scholarship at Cambridge, I have never clearly understood what this means. Those who believe that they do so, say it means that Turkey is to be an independent country, and that arrangements or treaties with her are not to be made by single states, but are a matter of common concern in which the Powers of Europe are to be consulted.² These two alleged meanings are so clearly inconsistent that it is hard to agree with them, or to share the opinion of their sponsors that they have really mastered the meaning of the Treaty of Paris. I suggest that this admission of Turkey to the Concert of Europe meant not that she was to be independent, but that she was to be dependent on all the other states of the Concert, and that no one of them might deal separately or alone with her in any matter which involved the alteration of her territory or the diminution of her rights. Before 1856 many infringements of Turkish territory had taken place. The Russian demand for the right to "protect" the Christians in Turkey was an attempt to trespass on the Sultan's prerogative. The old French

¹ The declaration of Bulgarian independence was therefore much more like a violation of the Treaty of Berlin than the Austrian annexation of Bosnia.

² See, e.g., the late Duke of Argyll's *Our Responsibilities towards Turkey*, pp. 14-16.

claim to protect the Eastern Catholics and the "capitulations" may be cited as instances of the same thing. I imagine that the real meaning of admitting Turkey to the Concert of Europe was that arrangements of this kind were not to be made in the future by any *one* Power without the previous knowledge and consent of all the others. Now, if this suggestion be right, it may be argued with some show of justice that the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina should not have taken place without at least a previous interchange of views between the Powers. On this ground Great Britain may have some *locus standi* for objecting to the annexation.¹ The Treaty of Berlin gives her none.

I may notice, in passing, that the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to keep a free hand (so far as the Concert of Europe was concerned) in the matter of Bosnia and the Herzegovina ought to have been clear to the Powers of Europe very soon after the Treaty of Berlin was signed. In July 1880 the signatories of that Treaty were pressing Turkey to carry out some of its provisions which concerned the Greek and Montenegrin frontiers and the improvement of the government of Turkish Armenia. Whilst this pressure was being put upon Turkey, Lord Granville² proposed to the Powers that they should sign a protocol in the nature of a self-denying agreement. Such agreements have often been signed by Powers acting together for a common object, and in them those Powers have bound themselves not to seek increase of territory or other exclusive influence or advantage. The form of agreement proposed by Lord Granville was as follows:—

"The Governments represented by the undersigned engage not to seek in any arrangement which may be come to in consequence of their concerted action for the execution of

¹ By a Treaty of 15th April 1856, Austria, France, and Great Britain bound themselves to consider any infraction of the Treaty of Paris as a *casus belli*.

² I take the facts from the Blue Book, marked "Turkey, No. 3, 1881 [C, 2759]."

the Treaty of Berlin, any augmentation of territory, any exclusive influence, or any commercial advantage for their subjects which those of every other nation may not equally obtain."

The Austro-Hungarian Government, before signing this agreement, asked for its modification, and it was changed so as in substance to read after "Treaty of Berlin," the words "in regard to the Montenegrin question, and eventually the Greek question." The significance of this change, to which the Powers acceded, was not appreciated at the time, and Baron Haymerle's diplomatic explanation of it was accepted. Its true significance is now clear. Had Austria-Hungary signed the protocol as originally drafted, she would not have retained the freedom of action which she has lately used.

But, after all, though this annexation may be formally incorrect, is it worth fighting about? It was carried out suddenly, and Englishmen may feel nettled that King Edward (as they say) heard nothing of it when he was abroad last summer. The step from occupation to annexation was one which might have been taken at any time, and which has very small practical results. The work which Austria-Hungary has done in Bosnia has been as good as ours in Egypt and Cyprus; and a time may come when the step which has been so boldly and frankly taken by Austria may have to be taken by ourselves. If we wanted to take such a step, should we like to have to consult a congress first? The attitude of the English Press towards the recent action of Austria-Hungary has certainly given a good handle to those who would have us do so. As for giving "compensation," the Sultan will hardly expect compensation for the nominal loss of a province which has already been lost in substance for thirty years. The annexation has delivered Turkey from the unpleasant possibility of having to call Bosnians to her Parliament, in which they would form a violent and recalcitrant home rule party. Compensation to Servia for something which never belonged to her, and which was withheld from her in 1878, is hardly a thing to press for, even if Servia had shown herself capable of decent

government. How much less should we press for it when Serbia is governed by men whose titles are rooted in murder and whose hands still smell of human blood.

The objections made in England to this annexation, so far as they are sincere, are probably due at the bottom to the suspicion that Germany may be pulling the strings of Austro-Hungarian policy. The new move is pictured as a step in the march of German expansion and a sign of the approach of Germany to the field of Levantine politics. The enemies of Germany in England to-day are so many and so bitter that a writer who does not agree with them may well feel it useless to argue. If, however, the Emperor William should have instigated this step, it is strange that the annexation should not have included Novi-Bazar. So far as expansion of trade to the East is concerned, Novi-Bazar was very important, for it enabled Austro-Hungarian goods to get into Turkey without passing through any foreign country, and placed Vienna in direct communication—actual or prospective—with Salonica. Yet at the moment of annexation the garrisons in Novi-Bazar are withdrawn. Austria-Hungary surrenders the right of protecting her roads and railway into Turkey, for which she asked in 1878, and which was vital to schemes of expansion towards the Levant. If the wicked hand of Germany were really at work here, is it not strange that this should be done? Those who do not see German design in every step which is taken in Continental politics may well conclude that the annexation is a step which has long been contemplated and which was prompted by a number of reasons. If I may venture to express my own view, it is that the Emperor-King, in his decree of annexation, told the truth. He desired to give local powers to Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and his action was brought about by the granting of a constitution in Turkey. Austria-Hungary is friendly to the Young Turkish movement, and the giving of local power to the Bosnians was a method of showing her assent to the inauguration of popular government in Turkey. Whilst the nominal sovereignty of

Turkey remained in Bosnia, it was quite possible that members from Bosnia might be summoned to the new Parliament at Constantinople, which would have led to the absurdity of the provinces being governed and taxed by one state whilst it was represented in the Parliament of another. The Emperor-King, desiring to grant local home rule in Bosnia, found himself impeded by the fact that the question of sovereignty was undetermined. The clock had either to be put back or forward; and, after all Austria has done in Bosnia, she could not put it back. Far from casting an aspersion on the Young Turkish movement, Austria's action has given it a tacit approval.¹

A question of some interest, and one which has yet to be solved, is—whether Bosnia and the Herzegovina will be annexed to Austria or to Hungary. There is no such thing in law as Austro-Hungarian citizenship. The Emperor-King's subjects are citizens either of one state or the other, but not of both. If it is intended to give the Bosnians a constitution, the common Government will at some time have to decide whether they are to become Austrian or Hungarian citizens and send members to the Austrian or the Hungarian Parliament. Whichever country gets them, the other will object. Hungary has certain historic claims, for, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Bosnia, or some parts of it, formed part of the Kingdom of St. Stephen. Moreover, Bosnia and the Herzegovina are to a large extent surrounded by the Hungarian province of Croatia, and the system of local independence which Croatia has may be used as a precedent for giving Bosnia a modest diet and a strong governor after the manner of the Ban of Croatia. Hungary, on the other hand, is *aux prises* with the Slavs within her boundaries, and may not like to have these two Slav provinces thrown into her lap.

Austria has already got to the bottom of her nationality question; or, at least, she has taken the Slavs into partner-

¹ Since this was written, the *Nineteenth Century* (November 1908) has appeared with a valuable article from Dr. Emil Reich to which the reader is referred.

ship, and abandoned the idea of German supremacy. Her Parliament is kept going, when it does go, by effecting a compromise with two or three races who agree to outvote the others; and if the Bosnian peasantry came to Vienna they might in a short time find a suitable place in the kaleidoscope of Austrian parties. The annexation of Bosnia must in accordance with the fifth section of the Bosnian Law of Administration of 1880 be submitted to the Austrian and Hungarian Houses of Parliament. When it is so submitted we shall no doubt hear more on this question.

Meantime the Delegations have met, and it is of the greatest interest to observe that they passed off in unusual concord, and readily approved the annexation. This is remarkable for more than one reason; first, because the Delegates might fairly have expected to be consulted before the issue of the decree; secondly, because the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina in 1878 was unpopular both in the Austrian and the Hungarian Parliaments; thirdly, because, at all events in the Austrian Delegation, there are many members who might be supposed favourable to South Slav claims; fourthly, because the question whether the provinces shall be annexed to Austria or to Hungary has not been settled. In spite of all these reasons to the contrary, a very general and loyal approval has been given to the action of the Emperor-King. In the most important action of his later years he is supported by men whose political predecessors opposed the occupation of 1878; and who might have given a great deal of trouble had they wished to do so. The Emperor has now the support of a unanimous Monarchy, and in the silence of consent, which contrasts so strongly with the vapouring of responsible or irresponsible persons in Servia, there is strength. To friends of Austria-Hungary this is a cause for profound satisfaction. The Emperor-King's long and patient endeavours to create a spirit and feeling of citizenship have met with many checks and disappointments; yet here, at the end of sixty years, a step is taken in which he has the

ready support of his subjects. The differences between Magyars and Germans, the disputes between Germans, Magyars, Slavs, and Italians seem, at the moment of this great experiment, to have sunk into unimportance. And so this old Sovereign, having cast his bread upon the waters, has found it—after many days.

APPENDIX B

THE CROWN OF ST. STEPHEN¹

THE structure, history, and adventures of the famous Crown have been the subject of prolonged controversy and of a whole literature of lectures and essays. Some years before 1896 it was taken out of its box in the Castle of Buda—an Act of Parliament being necessary for the purpose—and was submitted to careful examination by the most competent critics. Many new facts were observed and commented upon, but the true history of the Crown never has been, and probably never will be, written. It would require an archæological treatise to deal fully with this subject, but the main facts can be told in a short space. The Crown consists of two parts, the diadem which surrounds the head, and the dome, which is surmounted by a slanting cross. The diadem is a beautiful piece of Byzantine gold-work. Precious stones and enamels are alternately set around it. The enamel in front is a figure of Christ; that behind is a portrait bust of the Emperor Michael Ducas VII., who, about the year 1071, gave this part of the Crown to Geza I., who was at this time trying to upset and supplant Salomon, King of Hungary. This part of the Crown is surmounted by crenellations apparently of a later date, alternately rounded and pointed and made of transparent enamel. The dome of the Crown has a Latin inscription, and may therefore be of Italian workmanship. If the modern piece of cloth-of-gold which is put in to “roof in” the Crown be taken away, the framework of the dome will remain. It is a cross of tenth-century gold-work, which may be either Byzantine or Italian, enamelled with figures of Christ and of

¹ The substance of this Appendix appeared in the *Morning Post* in June 1906. I thank the proprietor for leave to reproduce it.

eight of the twelve Apostles. An examination of this Cross, which is bent down in four curves from its centre so as to be joined on to the diadem and form the frame of a dome, shows that it was not originally intended to be part of a Crown. Had it been so, there would have been no evidence, as there is, of violence used to bend the four limbs of a Cross into quarter-circle curves. Moreover, there are only eight Apostles, two on each of the four curves; and there is evidence that the other four Apostles were enamelled at the ends of the limbs of the Cross and were broken off, so that the dome of the Crown might not be too high. The dome is, therefore, probably made of some relic, possibly the binding of a valuable book, probably the central part of a Byzantine portable altar which was hastily taken and used, in conjunction with the Byzantine diadem, to form a complete Crown.

This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the Cross which surmounts the dome is driven into it through the middle of the enamelled figure of the Saviour, a regular piece of tinkering which could never have been perpetrated if those who were making the Crown had had plenty of time and materials at their disposal. No really satisfactory explanation of the construction of the Crown has as yet been given, but a very ingenious one was put forward in 1881 by a Hungarian archæologist, whose monograph was afterwards published by the Hungarian Academy, and is a fine contribution to this thorny question. The critics in Hungary are rather afraid of the conclusion to which the facts lead, which is this: that the Crown as it exists now is not the Crown given by Sylvester II. to Stephen, King of Hungary, in A.D. 1000, but the Crown given to King Geza about 1073. There is documentary evidence for the fact that King Salomon, who was deposed in 1074, handed over the Crown of St. Stephen to the Emperor Henry III., and that the Emperor returned it to the Pope, as if to put an end to any independent rights which the Hungarian nation might have gained by its presentation to them. Salomon was succeeded by Geza, who got the

present Crown from Rome. The lower part he had already been given by Michael Ducas ; the upper may have been part of the old Crown given to St. Stephen, or may not.

At all events, this Crown has been the Crown with which, since 1073, all the kings of Hungary have been crowned, except during times of civil war when one party held the Crown. It was early invested with special sanctity by the tradition that it (really its predecessor) had been delivered to Pope Sylvester II. by an angel. The angel appeared to him in a dream saying that on the morrow emissaries would come from a heathen race in the East and ask for admission to the Church and for a Crown wherewith to crown their kings. He was to grant their request and give them the Crown now delivered. This is the tradition ; and the emissaries did come and received a Crown, whilst the Bull of Sylvester II. granted their petition. The tradition and the Bull of Sylvester have placed the Crown of St. Stephen in a different position from any other relic. It is at once a badge of sovereignty and Divine right, and an emblem of the king's obligations towards his people ; for the Bull of Sylvester recognises the right of the Hungarian people to elect their kings, which existed whilst they were still heathen. The Cross which surmounts the dome is not vertical, but inclines backwards at an angle of about twelve degrees ; and the common tradition is that this is due to a blow which bent the Cross ; but this explanation can hardly be correct. The screw which fastens the Cross into the dome has not been bent, and passes quite straight into the little ball at the base of the Cross, whilst the Cross springs from this ball at a point not directly opposite that at which the screw enters. Moreover, the Cross bears no signs of violence ; and if the Crown had ever met with an accident which had bent the Cross, it is hard to believe that it would not have been set straight again. The conclusion is that the Cross was intended to stand at a slant on the top of the Crown on the head of the Magyar kings. What is the significance of this inclination ? The question has not been answered.

One might be eloquent on the adventures of this famous relic. It has been stolen, lost, pawned, buried, and recovered again. It was taken to Prag during the Turkish occupation of Hungary, but brought back when the Turks were driven out in the seventeenth century, and laws for its keeping, which are still in force, were then made. The Emperor Joseph II. took it to Vienna at the end of the eighteenth century, the act being part of the centralist policy to which he devoted his abilities; but Hungarian public feeling compelled him to return it. In 1849, after the failure of the Hungarian insurrection, an agent of Kossuth took it away and buried it near the Iron Gates of the Danube, but, owing to a breach of confidence by one who knew the secret of its whereabouts, it was discovered and taken to Vienna. It was returned to Pesth in 1867 for the Coronation ceremony which I have described elsewhere; and in 1896 was taken out again for the inauguration of the new Hungarian House of Parliament. It returned to its old home in the Castle of Buda. There, high over the rushing Danube and guarded by two great nobles of Magyar race, it awaits the next coronation. I am not aware that the sanctity which attaches to it is claimed for any other Crown except the Iron Crown of Italy (whether it be that in Vienna or at Monza).

In England we have so many crowns that no particular one can be of supreme importance; and provided our Sovereign is crowned and anointed and takes the oaths prescribed by law, the actual crown does not matter. In Hungary this is not so. To be legally King of Hungary the person entitled under the Pragmatic Sanction must have been crowned with the Crown of St. Stephen and with no other. This sanctity sprang from the tradition that the Crown was miraculously delivered to Sylvester II. 900 years ago. It is, in fact, a fetish—the only one, so far as I know, which, in the twentieth century, has a place and recognition in the public law of Europe.

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